Problems of COMMUNISM

What Happened to "Collective Leadership"?

MERLE FAINSOD

Literature under Khrushchev

MAX HAYWARD

Soviet Bloc Economic Integration

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

SPECIAL BOOK SECTION

Reviews by Denis Healey, D. D. Kostich, K. A. Jelenski, Peter Wiles, Victor Alba

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Khrushchev at the Helm: IV

EDITORS' NOTE: The two articles below constitute the fourth in a series of surveys of major Soviet policies instituted under Khrushchev. In the first, Professor Fainsod traces the history of the Soviet Premier's rise to power, the short-lived experiment in "collecitve leadership," and the emergence of a new "cult of personality," culminating in the recent celebrations of Khrushchev's 65th birthday. In the second article, Mr. Hayward analyzes the current state of Soviet literature, as reflected particularly by the Third Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers, held in Moscow on May 18-23. In discussing one "highlight" of the Congress—Khrushchev's speech—the author notes that while Khrushchev spoke with the authority stemming from a consciousness of absolute power, his approach both to literature in general and to "errant" writers differs considerably not only from Stalin's paranoic dogmatism, but also from his own punitive attitude in the first "post-October" year: as long as authors will accept the leadership of the Communist Party, he indicated, they will have little to fear from it. For—as both articles demonstrate—as long as the dictator's power is assured, he can exercise it either firmly or leniently, in accordance with his particular moods or the political exigencies of the moment.

What Happened to "Collective Leadership"?

By Merle Fainsod

ON APRIL 19, 1959, two days after Khrushchev's sixty-fifth birthday, the Soviet press erupted in a rash of congratulatory tributes, the tenor of which evoked vivid memories of the Stalinist "cult of personality" condemned only a few years ago. Of the many messages which were printed, the most important came from Khrushchev's fellow members of the party Presidium, who saluted his career as a "model" and "example" of "devoted service" and refered to him deferentially as "senior comrade and friend, true disciple of Lenin, and outstanding leader of the Communist Party, the Soviet state, and the entire international Communist and workers' movement." While the reasons for the press delay in celebrating Khrushchev's birthday remain somewhat mysterious, the contents of the congratulatory messages came as no surprise. They had been foreshadowed by an outpouring of lavish tributes at the 21st Party Congress in the course of which delegate after delegate joined in praising Khrushchev's "Leninist firmness," "profound practical knowledge," "fatherly solicitude" and "tireless energy," as well as his "brilliant, comprehensive, and profound report." [1]

At the 20th Party Congress Khrushchev had denounced Stalin's craving for flattery and his insistence on presenting himself as a superman who "knows everything, sees everything," and "can do anything . . ."; at the subsequent party gathering Khrushchev interposed no objections as one speaker after another offered effusive thanks for the personal guidance and initiative

One of the foremost American authorities on the Soviet Union, Professor Fainsod is author of How Russia Is Ruled *(Harvard University Press, 1953) among other works. He last appeared on these pages with "The Party in the Post-Stalin Era," January-February 1958.*

[1] See *Problems of Communism,* March-April, 1959, pp. 4-5.

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which Khrushchev had supplied in every sector of Soviet life from foreign policy and the development of guided missiles to cotton-growing in Tadjikistan. If these genuflections still represented a far cry from the heights of glorification witnessed during the Stalin cult, they left little doubt that Khrushchev had reached the summit of the Soviet power structure and that his position of undisputed leadership was universally acknowledged.

The image of Khrushchev's personal leadership which emerged from the 21st Congress was obviously modelled on that of Lenin. As Khrushchev himself put it in his secret speech to the previous congress:

Lenin resolutely stood against every attempt aimed at belittling or weakening the directing role of the party in the structure of the Soviet state. . . . He tried to convince; he patiently explained his opinion to others. Lenin always diligently insisted that . . . the party statute be enforced, that the party congresses and the plenary sessions of the Central Committee take place at the proper intervals . . .[2]

Taking his cue from these precepts, Khrushchev sought to project himself as the true custodian of the Leninist tradition—a leader who maintains his contact with the masses, who embodies his authority in the party and its Central Committee, and who insists on rigorous observance of the Leninist norms of party life. It is in this sense, and perhaps in this sense only, that it was still possible for delegates to the 21st Congress to refer to collective leadership at all.

If by collective leadership is meant an equal sharing of authority by all members of the party Presidium, then collective leadership must clearly be regarded as a thing of the past. The proceedings of the last Congress provide unmistakable evidence that Khrushchev now towers high above all his associates. While future events may demonstrate that his position is not impregnable, the possibility that he will soon be dislodged by another cabal in the party Presidium seems remote indeed. The levers of power in the Soviet system appear to be firmly in his hands, and the charismatic qualities of popular leadership which he has displayed contribute to give his authority a secure base. At the present time it is difficult to discern the direction from which a challenge to his supremacy might arise.

Disorder and Forgotten Sorrow

What happened to collective leadership? A retrospective analysis of the struggle for the succession may help to shed light on the problems of collective rule. When Stalin died, no single member of the Presidium loomed as the clearly anointed heir with an unquestioned title to supreme power. In the first few days after Stalin's entombment, there were some signs that Malenkov aspired to Stalin's role. But the *Pravda* announcement on March 21, 1953, that Malenkov had been "released" from his duties as party Secretary "at his own request" seemed to indicate that his colleagues in the Presidium were making a determined and successful effort to dilute his power. At the same time the delicate problems attendant on the transition and the need to consolidate the authority of the new regime compelled the new rulers to submerge their differences in the interest of presenting a united front to the nation and to the world. In these circumstances, collective leadership emerged as the natural formula to describe the divided and uncertain distribution of power.

Its long-term stability was in question from the start. Collective rule may attain a degree of solidity when those who share power are bound together by common dangers, interests, and purposes which outweigh their individual interests, where no one of the group possesses the ability, ambition, or will to stake out a claim to supremacy, and where power is so dispersed within the group as to make it dangerous for any member to try to dominate the rest. On the other hand, the stability of collective leadership is obviously endangered when deep policy differences begin to divide the group and one or more members strike out for the additional increments of power which make them a real threat to their colleagues.

The legacy which Stalin bequeathed to his successors did not easily adapt itself to collective rule. In the absence of the Supreme Despot, power was precariously apportioned and distributed with no point of coordination short of the Presidium itself. Malenkov, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, rested his authority on command of the administrative apparatus and on such informal connections as he retained in the party organization itself. Beria, as head of the MVD, had a formidable weapon in his hands. Molotov, as Foreign Minister and Old Bolshevik, enjoyed the prestige of an elder statesman, but lacked an organizational power base. Khrushchev, who succeeded Malenkov as senior party Secretary, identified his authority with that of the party functionaries, but in the first months of the new regime, he remained largely in the background. Bulganin as Defense Minister supervised the armed forces, but the degree of personal control which he exercised over them was unclear. With Stalin gone, the interrelationship of these plural power centers was, to say the least, ambiguous. Since party, police,

[2] Russian Institute, Columbia University, *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*. N. Y., 1956, pp. 5-6.

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and administrative controls overlapped and penetrated each other, it was difficult to envisage how a clash of wills and interests could be avoided.

Moves and Countermoves

The possibility of conflict was magnified by the issues which the collective leadership confronted. Should the Soviet ship of state continue to be steered on a Stalinist course, or should new departures in policy be ventured? Should the new regime strive for a detente in its relations with the outside world, and if so, on what terms and conditions? Should large-scale concessions be made to the desire of the populace for more consumer goods, or should heavy industry and armaments continue to enjoy top priority in planning future economic developments? With power dispersed in the ruling groups and ambitions unleashed, a complete harmony of outlook on questions such as these could hardly be anticipated. In a political system where opposition is outlawed, policy conflicts ordinarily lead to the suppression or elimination of one or another of the antagonistic forces. This deeply-rooted party practice augured ill for the stability of collective leadership.

The first challenge came from Beria. The very existence of a powerful secret police controlled by one member of the oligarchy posed a constant threat to his colleagues, and their fears were doubtless reinforced by the uses to which the secret police had been put in past party struggles. Even though the charge that Beria endeavored to use his subordinates in the police hierarchy to gain control of the party and administrative apparatus cannot be fully documented, the remark attributed to Khrushchev (by the French socialist Senator Pierre Commin) that Beria "was clearly preparing a conspiracy against the Presidium" has a ring of authenticity.[3] It expressed the underlying concern which ultimately resulted in Beria's liquidation.

While the arrest of Beria in July 1953 eliminated one of the chief contenders for supremacy, it left the problem of control of the police still to be resolved. The appointment of Kruglov, a professional police officer, as head of the MVD and the strengthening of party controls over the police at all levels served both to downgrade the police and to neutralize its role in the power struggle. The decision in the spring of 1954 to transfer the political police from MVD jurisdiction to a newly organized Committee on State Security (KGB) under Colonel-General Serov marked another phase in the dilution of police power. By the same token these actions also served to underline the residual importance of control of the armed forces.

The designation of Khrushchev as First Secretary in September 1953 set the stage for his bid for supreme power. After Lenin's death Stalin had used his position as General Secretary to consolidate his control of the party apparatus and to extend his authority into other spheres. Khrushchev's associates in the Presidium undoubtedly were aware of the precedent, and one must conclude that they either underestimated Khrushchev or displayed excessive confidence in their capacity to contain such ambitions as he cherished. The series of moves which he initiated, beginning in the fall of 1953, to install his henchmen in leading party posts in Moscow, Leningrad, and other key areas could hardly fail to arouse concern among his colleagues in the Presidium; one can only surmise that at this juncture some of them, at least, saw an even greater danger in the ambitions and programs of Malenkov.

Malenkov *vs.* Khrushchev

The search for an explanation of the alignments of the early post-Stalinist period cannot be limited to moves on the chessboard of power. Important policy differences divided the ruling group, and while they are only faintly illumined by Soviet press comment, they are visible enough so that patterns can be discerned. During this period Malenkov and Khrushchev emerged as the major antagonists. In the area of foreign affairs Malenkov saw nuclear war as spelling "the destruction of world civilization," developed a thesis of peace based on mutual deterrence which minimized the danger of war, and called for improvement in relations with the United States through a process of patient negotiations. Khrushchev took a harder line. Speaking before the 10th Congress of the Czech Communist Party on June 12, 1954, he hailed a nuclear war as inevitably leading to a collapse of capitalism rather than of "world civilization." He accused reactionary capitalist circles of seeking a way out of their difficulties "by the preparation of a new war" and stressed the aggressive intentions of the imperialist camp. Similar views were expressed in a series of speeches delivered by Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Bulganin.[4]

Malenkov's optimistic outlook on the prospects for peace found its reflection on the domestic scene in his identification with the consumer goods program. Here

[3]See B. D. Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957, p. 316.

[4]See H. S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union*. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1959. pp. 71-75.

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again it was Khrushchev who took the "hard" line. In calling for a reassertion of the priority of heavy industry and armaments, he drew on the support of the armed forces as well as on those members of the Presidium who shared his world outlook. The alignment on such new agricultural programs as the opening of the virgin lands was somewhat different. Here it was Khrushchev who was the innovator, while, if later testimony is to be credited, Malenkov was joined by Molotov and Kaganovich in conservative opposition.

These cross-currents suggest the danger of viewing the struggle for the succession as merely a series of maneuvers for power and place. Coalitions were cemented by principle as well as by calculations of advantage and fear. The opposition to the Malenkov program provided a powerful rallying point which reinforced the position of Khrushchev. The erosion of Malenkov's strength can be traced at least from the spring of 1954. In a speech on April 26, 1954, which represented a complete concession to the views of his opponents, he declared that a third world war "would inevitably lead to the collapse of the capitalist social system." [5] It was not without significance that this speech of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers was addressed to the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, while the greater honor of addressing the Council of the Union was reserved for Khrushchev.

Meanwhile, the battle over the priority of heavy industry *versus* consumer goods continued to be fought. The conflict came into sharp focus with the appearance of a curious pair of editorials on December 21, 1954. *Izvestia,* the presumed organ of Malenkov, called for the increased production of consumers' goods; *Pravda,* the organ of Khrushchev, summoned "the Soviet people to direct their main attention to fulfilling plans for the further growth of heavy industry." The issue between Khrushchev and Malenkov came to a head at the meeting of the Central Committee in late January 1955. The published version of Khrushchev's speech to a plenary session on January 25, 1955, named no names, but its intent was unmistakable. Said Khrushchev:

In connection with the measures lately taken for increasing output of consumers' goods, some comrades have confused the question of the pace of development of heavy and light industry in our country. . . . These pseudo-theoreticians try to claim that at some state of socialist construction the development of heavy industry ceases to be the main task and that light industry can and should overtake all other branches of industry. This is profoundly incorrect reasoning, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism—nothing but slander to our party. This is a belching of the rightist deviation, a regurgitation of views hostile to Leninism, views which Rykov, Bukharin, and their ilk once preached.[6]

The denouncement was not long in coming. On February 8, 1955, Malenkov "resigned" as chairman of the Council of Ministers, after signing a letter acknowledging his administrative "inexperience" and his past "guilt and responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in agriculture." [7]

By previous standards, his punishment was mild indeed. Although demoted to the positions of Minister of Power Stations and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, he remained on the party Presidium.

The Shrinking Collective

The demotion of Malenkov opened the way to a reconstruction of the top leadership. Bulganin replaced Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and

MALENKOV

To the Chairman of the Joint Session of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities:

I beg you to inform the Supreme Soviet . . . of my request to be freed from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

My request is motivated by a businesslike consideration for the necessity of strengthening the leadership of the Council of Ministers and the expediency of having, in the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, another comrade, more experienced in governmental work. I see clearly that my insufficient experience in local work and the fact that I had no . . . direct experience in the administration of various sectors of the national economy had a negative effect on the way I carried out my complex and responsible duties of Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

I also feel obligated . . . to state that now, when the CP of the Soviet Union and the workers of our country are concentrating all their energies for the further upsurge of agriculture, I see with particular clarity my guilt and responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in agriculture. . . . In turning to you with the request to free me from my duties . . . I would like to assure the Supreme Soviet . . . that in my new post I shall, under the leadership of the monolithic and unified Central Committee of the CPSU, carry out the duties that are entrusted to me in a most conscientious manner.

—Pravda, February 9, 1955.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 74.

[6] *Pravda,* February 3, 1955.

[7] *Ibid.,* February 9, 1955.

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MOLOTOV

In my report to the February 8, 1955, session of the USSR Supreme Soviet I permitted an erroneous formulation concerning the question of the building of a socialist society in the USSR. . . . I consider my formulation . . . to be theoretically erroneous and politically harmful. . . .

—Kommunist, No. 14, September 1955.

at the same time yielded his post as Minister of Defense to Marshal Zhukov. Khrushchev remained First Secretary. Five Presidium members, Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, and Pervukhin, served as First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers. Voroshilov, the senior member of the Presidium group, continued to discharge the protocol functions of head of state. At the July 1955 session of the Central Committee two new Presidium members were elected, A. I. Kirichenko, First Secretary of the Ukraininan Party, and M. A. Suslov, the senior Central Committee secretary after Khrushchev.

At this same session of the Central Committee, Molotov was marked out as the next candidate for demotion and disgrace. As was subsequently revealed, the chief subject of discussion at this meeting—which came soon after the "B&K" state visit to Belgrade—was the question of policy toward Tito.[8] Khrushchev favored reconciliation and an attempt to recapture Tito for the Soviet cause; Molotov opposed concessions to Tito as unnecessary and dangerous. But Molotov's views found little support in the Central Committee, and from that point on, his influence sharply declined. The party theoretical journal, *Kommunist,* in its issue of September 1955, administered an added blow to his prestige as an Old Bolshevik when it published a strange letter of recantation signed by Molotov. In it he acknowledged that in a speech delivered some seven months earlier he had committed a major ideological error by describing the Soviet Union as only having constructed "the foundations of a socialist society" instead of adhering to the orthodox formula that the Soviet Union had achieved socialism and was now building communism. A further sharp rebuff followed in June 1956 when Molotov was replaced as Foreign Minister by D. T. Shepilov.

Meanwhile, Kaganovich was undergoing a similar process of downgrading. In March 1955 his authority in the industrial sphere was reduced when Mikoyan, Pervukhin, and Saburov joined him as First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers. His appointment as Chairman of the State Committee on Labor and Wage Problems in May 1955 was terminated in June of the next year, and in September 1956 he was transferred to the still lower post of USSR Minister of the Construction Materials Industry. Despite these humiliations, which were shared with Molotov and Malenkov, all three remained members of the party Presidium, where, it can reasonably be assumed, they continued to harbor their grievances and thoughts of revenge.

[8] *Ibid.,* July 4, 1957.

The Hard Climb to the Summit

The maneuverings which attended the 20th Party Congress marked a further stage in the development of the intra-Presidium struggle. The attack on Stalin and "the cult of personality," which was first launched by Mikoyan and then documented in detail in Khrushchev's secret speech, was interpreted at the time as an effort to bar the way to the emergence of another Stalin. Yet if we assume, as in the light of later events we must, that Khrushchev was determined to consolidate his authority, his secret speech can also be read as an effort to discredit his major opponents in the Presidium. In the process of attacking Stalin, he made a studied effort to dissociate himself from responsibility for Stalin's excesses, and to single out others—particularly Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich—as having been tarred with the brush of their master's misdeeds. Conversely, he attempted to demonstrate—though somewhat lamely—that he and Bulganin had opposed Stalin's methods and policies. Despite the fact that Khrushchev had served as one of Stalin's proconsuls during the Great Purge, first in the Moscow party organization and after January 1938 in the Ukraine, he insisted that he had nothing to do with the purge, that it was engineered by Stalin and Yezhov, and that they alone were responsible for the liquidation of Postyshev, Kossior and other prominent party figures in the Ukraine whom Khrushchev both succeeded and, at the time, denounced. Even though the explanations were labored, their intent was unmistakable. Khrushchev was seeking to demonstrate that the party had nothing to fear from him, while it had a great deal indeed to fear from those who had been more intimately involved in Stalin's crimes.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev also moved to use his powers as First Secretary to extend his influence in the leading organs of the party. More than a third of the Central Committee members—53 out of 133—and more than half of the candidate members of the Central Committee—76 out of 122—were newly elected at the 20th Congress, and in numerous instances their elevation in

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the party apparatus was directly traceable to earlier associations with Khrushchev. Five additions were made to the alternate membership list of the Presidium—Marshal Zhukov; Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Kazakhstan party organization; Mukhitdinov, the Uzbek First Secretary; Furtseva, head of the Moscow party organization; and Shepilov, editor of *Pravda.* All of them appeared to owe their appointments to Khrushchev, although both Marshal Zhukov and Shepilov were later to break with him. Khrushchev strengthened his hold over the Central Committee Secretariat through the appointments of Brezhnev, Furtseva, and Shepilov as party secretaries. In addition, a special Russian Republic Bureau of the Central Committee was established with Khrushchev as Chairman; of its ten members at least nine could plausibly be identified as part of Khrushchev's entourage.

The 20th Congress was followed by a series of blows directed at the Stalinist Old Guard. On June 2, 1956, Shepilov replaced Molotov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Molotov was moved to the lesser post of Minister of State Control. Soon thereafter, Kaganovich was demoted. By mid-1956 Khrushchev appeared to be riding high with no competitor on the horizon to offer a serious challenge.

But appearances were deceptive. The shock of Khrushchev's revelations at the 20th Congress opened up a Pandora's box of wholly unintended consequences. The Hungarian uprising in October and the political overturn in Poland threatened the Soviet satellite system with disintegration. All this gave powerful ammunition to Khrushchev's Presidium opponents who could now argue that Khrushchev's policies at the 20th Congress had placed the entire Soviet bloc in jeopardy.

During this period evidence accumulated that Khrushchev was in trouble. The delegation which was hastily dispatched to Warsaw on October 19 to discuss "topical problems" with the Polish Politburo included Molotov and Kaganovich, as well as Khrushchev and Mikoyan—a juxtaposition which seemed to point to a new correlation of forces in the Presidium. The break with Tito which followed the Hungarian events served to discredit Khrushchev's policy of reconciliation. Increasing difficulties on the industrial front, which were complicated by the need to buttress the shaky satellite economies, contributed to undermine Khrushchev's leadership. Significantly, at the Central Committee session in December 1956, which revised the industrial targets downward and sought to tighten the planning machinery, Khrushchev did not even deliver an address. The main speeches were made by Bulganin, Saburov, and Baibakov. At this session the Central Committee greatly broadened the powers of the State Economic Commission, which was charged with current planning. Pervukhin was designated chairman of the Commission and became something of an "overlord of overlords," exercising primary responsibility for the operation of the national economy. The effect of this move was to strengthen the authority of elements in the Presidium identified with the state, rather than the party machine. The scheme was approved by the Supreme Soviet on February 12, 1957.

The very next day Khrushchev launched a counterattack. Appearing before a specially summoned session of the Central Committee, he offered a plan which was designed to emasculate the Economic Commission, to strengthen the role of Gosplan as the supreme planning authority, to abolish a number of central ministries, and to devolve many of their operational responsibilities on new regional economic councils, or *sovnarkhozy.* The plan which Khrushchev espoused was clearly calculated to weaken the power of his ministerial competitors, to enlist support from local and regional managerial personnel, and to leave the field free for the party apparatus to become the primary integrating and centralizing force. This bold move by Khrushchev to consolidate his authority served to bring matters to a head.

Open Conflict

The question may well be raised why Khrushchev was prepared to throw down the gage to his opponents in February when he was not willing to do so in December. While the answer must be speculative, certain considerations appear to be relevant. By February, far more than in December, the unrest in the satellite empire appeared to be under firm restraint and less of a threatening factor. The bountiful harvest in the virgin lands provided a vindication of Khrushchev's agricultural program and strengthened his position. And perhaps most important of all, Khrushchev's readiness to

PERVUKHIN

I am profoundly aware of my guilt before the party and I am trying to prove this in the work that has been entrusted to me. . . . I shall never forget the just lesson which the party has administered to me. I must express my ardent and sincere gratitude to the Central Committee and to the Central Committee Presidium, which, guided by Leninist standards of party life, have given me a chance to show by deeds in important state work that I can atone for my guilt before the party and be of use to it. I shall do everything in my power to justify this high trust of the party.

—Pravda, February 4, 1959.

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act indicated that he counted on the program which he had devised to rally the party apparatus to his banner.

From this point on Khrushchev moved swiftly to consolidate his position. A law approved by the Supreme Soviet on May 10, 1957, established the regional economic councils, abolished the State Economic Commission and made Gosplan the dominant economic planning agency. By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet a week earlier, I. I. Kuzmin, one of Khrushchev's subordinates in the Central Committee apparatus, had already been installed as Chairman of Gosplan and First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev's opponents in the Presidium were also gathering their forces. By June Khrushchev found himself in a minority in the Presidium. Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich were joined in opposition by Bulganin and Saburov, making a total of six out of eleven full members of the Presidium; they also enlisted the support of Shepilov, an alternate member of the Presidium. The details of the cabal remain obscure, but judging by the special violence of the attack on Malenkov at the 21st Party Congress in January of this year, it is probable that he was the moving and organizing spirit. Despite previous disagreements with both Molotov and Kaganovich, he was able to find common ground with them in the effort to curb Khrushchev's bid for supremacy. Bulganin, Pervukhin, and Saburov were late comers to the conspiracy. Bulganin, in his speech at the December 1958 plenum of the Central Committee, abjectly confessed to having been not only an "accomplice" of the anti-party group, but as Chairman of the Council of Ministers its "nominal leader as well." [9]

Pervukhin's participation was directly traceable to the dispute over industrial reorganization. As he put it in his speech to the 21st Congress:

In the Central Committee discussion on the problem of reorganizing the management of industry and construction, I cast doubts on and objected to certain propositions in the suggested reorganization. My incorrect position in this most important matter and the discontent connected with it caused me to commit a gross political mistake; namely that I upheld the attacks of the anti-party group on Comrade Khrushchev at the sessions of the Central Committee Presidium which preceded the plenum in June, and consequently, as I later became aware, also attacks on his stand with regard to several problems of internal and foreign policy.[10]

[9]Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, December 15-19, 1958, Stenographic Report (in Russian), p. 338.

[10]*Pravda,* February 4, 1959.

SABUROV

It is known, comrades, that I made a mistake and showed political instability in the struggle of the Central Committee against the antiparty group in June 1957. . . . My error, comrades, consisted in that, before the June Plenum . . . I criticized shortcomings in the work of the Presidium, not from the position of the healthy section of the Presidium . . . but from the position of the anti-party group which, using petty and easily-corrected shortcomings as a screen, attacked Comrade Khrushchev, striving for a change in the leadership of the Central Committee. . . . The June Plenum . . . noted the political instability which I showed at that moment, and taking into consideration the fact that I had helped the Plenum in exposing the anti-party group, removed me from membership in the Presidium of the CC but let me remain a member of the CC. Later, by decision of the CC of the party, I was sent to work as director of a plant in the city of Syzran. I acknowledged this decision to be correct and, in working at the plant, I am devoting all my powers to correcting my mistake. . . . Comrades! An honest acknowledgement of my mistake gives me hope that the delegates of the 21st Congress will find it possible to forgive me my past and thus open for me the prospect of active participation in the building of a Communist society under the leadership of our party and under the banner of the great Lenin.

—Stenographic Report of the 21st CPSU Congress (in Russian), Moscow, 1959, Vol. II, pp. 289-92.

But he also added that "once the anti-party group openly put forth the question of a change of leadership in the Central Committee, I disagreed and did not support this request." Saburov similarly confessed at the 21st Congress to having manifested "political instability" prior to the June Central Committee meeting. [11] Nevertheless, in a subsequent speech at the Congress Kuzmin took both Pervukhin and Saburov sharply to task for seeking to minimize their parts in the conspiracy, and Pervukhin was singled out as having played a particularly active role, together with Molotov and Shepilov, in resisting Khrushchev's plans for industrial reorganization. [12]

The opposition group's attempts to unseat Khrushchev by confronting him with a hostile majority in the Presidium misfired. Khrushchev refused to resign and took his appeal to a hastily assembled special session of the Central Committee where, according to the of-

[11]TASS Summary, February 4, 1959.

[12]*Pravda,* February 5, 1959.

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BULGANIN

What, then, is Molotov . . .? Molotov is a person who has cut himself off from the life of the Soviet people and is totally ignorant of both industry and agriculture. Kaganovitch is a phrase-maker who obstructed work with his long, confused speeches. Malenkov is an intriguer who proved himself capable of every sort of vileness. . . . [As for] my position, comrades . . . I must honestly say that prior to the events of June 1957, I was not with Malenkov, Kaganovitch, and Molotov. . . . But . . . a fact is a fact: . . . in 1957 I joined them, supported them, and . . . later shared with them all the anti-party filth. . . .

Today I am honestly striving to fulfill the duties that the Central Committee has entrusted to me. . . . In my day-to-day work I see all the genius and wisdom of the policy of our party and our Central Committee. . . . I am filled with the thought of being useful to the party. . . . I consider it my sacred duty . . . to justify the high trust of the party and to merit the title of party member. . . . I promise . . . that I will be an honest and devoted member of the Communist Party and that is what I will be. I repeat that I will make every effort in my day-to-day work to merit the high calling of party member. . . .

—*Pravda*, December 19, 1958.

ficial report, he received unanimous support, with only Molotov abstaining. The resolution of the Central Committee, which was published on July 4, centered its fire on Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov, as well as Shepilov "who joined them." That the conspiracy had wider ramifications could be inferred from the fact that Saburov was dropped from the Presidium and that Pervukhin was demoted to alternate membership. In the resolution, the "anti-party group" was accused of having used "factional methods in an attempt to change the composition of the party's leading bodies . . ." and of having disagreed with and fought the party line on a number of issues, including industrial reorganization, agricultural policy and foreign policy. Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov were expelled from the Presidium and the Central Committee; Shepilov lost his posts as a Central Committee Secretary, Presidium alternate, and Central Committee member.

From Rout to Triumph

The reconstruction of the membership of the Presidium which followed the June plenum represented a striking triumph for Khrushchev. The Presidium was enlarged to 15 members. Marshal Zhukov was promoted from alternate to full membership, an action which seemed to imply that the Marshal had given full support to Khrushchev in the struggle against the "anti-party" group. The other new members of the Presidium —Furtseva, Aristov, Belyayev, Brezhnev, Ignatov, Kozlov, Kuusinen, and Shvernik—had all been closely associated with Khrushchev in his rise to power and were appropriately rewarded.

The treatment of the conspirators was far less harsh than might have been anticipated. All of them retained their party membership. Molotov was honorably exiled to Outer Mongolia as an ambassador; Malenkov was dispatched to manage an electric power station in Kazakhstan; Kaganovich was sent to the Urals to run a cement plant; and Shepilov was reported as occupying a teaching position somewhere away from Moscow. The other major participants in the conspiracy, who were not publicly identified at the time of the June plenum, suffered a series of retaliatory demotions. Pervukhin, after stepping down to an alternate membership in the Presidium, lost his position as a First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, became Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Relations, and was then shifted to East Germany as ambassador.[13] Saburov's disgrace was more complete. After losing his Presidium membership he became a Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations under Pervukhin, was subsequently moved from that post, and at the 21st Congress was identified merely as a "factory manager in Syzran."

The treatment of Bulganin followed a particularly curious course. After the June plenum he retained both his seat in the Presidium and his position as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Although his public role as government spokesman declined greatly, he was not replaced as Chairman of the Council of Ministers by Khrushchev until March 27, 1958, remained on the Presidium until September 5, 1958, and was not formally linked with the anti-party group until Khrushchev's speech of November 14, 1958. His consignment to the relatively obscure post of Chairman of the Stavropol Economic Council completed his humiliation.

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[13] At least two recent items appearing in the Soviet press imply that Pervukhin is no longer an alternate member of the Presidium. The open letter from Presidium members and alternates to various district commission indicating their willingness to stand for election to the Supreme Soviet, which appeared in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on February 1, 1959, did not include the name of Pervukhin. His signature was also missing from the Presidium's congratulatory birthday message to Khrushchev, which was published by *Pravda* on April 19, 1959.

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Meanwhile, Khrushchev also found it necessary to settle accounts with Marshal Zhukov. While it is at least possible that the Marshal had Bonapartist pretentions, it is more likely that the purge of the popular World War II hero was a prophylactic action taken to eliminate a potential rallying point of military discontent. The issue was precipitated by friction between the party's political apparatus in the armed forces and the more professionally-oriented officers who followed Marshal Zhukov in seeking to subordinate political indoctrination to combat training and military control. Even before the 20th Congress the Army newspaper *Krasnaia Zvezda* reported in its issue of January 25, 1956, that Marshal Zhukov—speaking at a party conference of the Moscow military district—had complained:

. . . certain efforts have been made to subject the official activity of commanders to criticism at party meetings. Such efforts are blameworthy. Our task is the comprehensive strengthening of the authority of the commanders, giving support to exacting officers and generals.

This doctrine proved unpalatable to Khrushchev. The Central Committee resolution of October 1957, approving the ouster of Zhukov from his positions as Minister of Defense and member of the Presidium and Central Committee, charged that he had "pursued a policy" of underestimating and curtailing party leadership of the Army and Navy.[14] It reminded the armed forces of the paramount role of the party and called for an intensification of political work in the armed forces. The reorganization of the military high command in the wake of the Zhukov purge also involved the elevation of such Khrushchev protégés as Marshal Konev to top command responsibilities.

The consolidation of Khrushchev's authority was manifest in every sphere of Soviet society. His assumption of the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers in late March 1958 represented merely a formal recognition of the leadership which he already exercised in the area

[14] *Pravda,* November 2, 1957.

HAPPY BIRTHDAY!

Khrushchev to Stalin:

All peoples of the Soviet Union and progressive mankind throughout the world are observing a precious date —the 70th birthday of our inspired leader and teacher, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. . . .

Soviet citizens link all their achievements in the struggle for communism, in rebuilding a multi-national socialist state, with the name of the immortal Lenin, with the name of the great continuer of Lenin's cause—Comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin's name is the banner of all victories of the Soviet people, the banner of struggle for the workers of the entire world. . . .

Like a careful gardener, Comrade Stalin cultivates and trains . . . personnel in a spirit of ardent Soviet patriotism. He has taught and is teaching them the Bolshevik mode of work and sharp implacability toward the slightest manifestation of alien bourgeois ideology. . . .

For centuries the Ukrainian, Belorussian and Moldavian peoples dreamed of joining their lands into united national states. But thanks only to Comrade Stalin's fraternal solicitude for the fate of these peoples . . . were these treasured dreams and aspirations of the people realized. . . . For all these successes, the Ukrainian people, like all peoples of the Soviet Union, are indebted to the Bolshevik party and to the leader of the party and the people, the great Stalin.

—Pravda, December 21, 1949.

Presidium to Khrushchev:

Our dear Nikita Sergeyevitch!

On your 65th birthday we warmly and cordially greet you—our elder comrade and friend, Lenin's loyal disciple and outstanding leader of the Communist Party, the Soviet state and the entire international Communist and workers' movement.

We wish to note in particular your bold and creative Bolshevik approach . . . to the solution of urgent problems. . . . The major political and economic measures taken by the party . . . have been carried out on your initiative and under your leadership. . . .

Dear Nikita Sergeyevitch! Your entire activity is to us an example of a party and state approach to the solution of big and small questions, an example of selfless service to the historic cause of the working class, an example of inseparable bond with the people and of unshakable fidelity to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. . . . All these remarkable qualities have won for you the deserved love and respect of the party and of the people.

We warmly embrace you, our dear Nikita Sergeyevitch, and from the bottom of our hearts wish you good health, many, many years of life and fruitful activity for the benefit of communism!

—Pravda, April 19, 1959.

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of governmental administration. His own party henchmen were increasingly moved into key control positions. The so-called Ukrainian contingent, who had formed part of Khrushchev's entourage during his long period of service in the Ukraine, forged rapidly ahead under Khrushchev's tutelage.[15] This was also true of assorted functionaries in the Central Committee Secretariat who worked closely with Khrushchev as First Secretary. As early as February 1, 1956, the professional police officer S. N. Kruglov was replaced as MVD chief by N. P. Dudorov, a former Khrushchev associate in the Ukraine and a section chief in the Central Committee Secretariat. On December 26, 1958 *Pravda* announced that A. N. Shelepin, former head of the Komsomol, would succeed General Serov as KGB chairman, and it was not without interest that Shelepin's successor as Komsomol chief for a period was one V. E. Semichatnyi, who had earlier occupied a corresponding post in the Ukraine.

The published proceedings of the December 1958 plenum of the Central Committee provide particularly dramatic evidence of Khrushchev's supremacy. Almost every important speaker at the meeting was interrupted by Khrushchev with questions or comments, and the kowtowing to Khrushchev which took place left no doubt that homage was being paid to the leader. The speeches at the 21st Congress represented variations on the same theme and were sufficiently fulsome in their praise to suggest that Khrushchev was being lifted to a new pedestal.

WHAT THEN HAS HAPPENED to collective leadership? In an interview with Henry Shapiro, chief Moscow correspondent of the United Press, on November 14, 1957, Khrushchev was asked, "When you speak of the collective leadership, do you mean the Central Committee or its Presidium?" Khrushchev replied:

> I mean the Central Committee of our Party. The Presidium is an executive body of the Central Committee. . . . The collective leadership consists not only of the members of the Central Committee. Collective leadership is exercised in our party from top to bottom. . . .[16]

Those who accept Khrushchev's assurance that collective leadership still prevails in the Soviet Union may point to the undoubted fact that the party Central Committee assembles with considerable frequency and that local party organizations function with greater regularity than was true during the latter part of Stalin's reign. But it may be worth remembering that Stalin at one time was also lavish in his praise of collective leadership and that he too made effective use of the Central Committee in his march to supreme power. Khrushchev's style of governance has its own distinctive characteristics, but the swiftness with which he has moved to consolidate his authority leaves little doubt that he is now, not merely *primus inter pares*, but the new master of the Soviet state.

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[15]For an authoritative account, see John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1959, pp. 146-150.

[16]*Pravda*, November 19, 1957.

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Soviet Literature in the Doldrums

By Max Hayward

IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR the French journal *Esprit* published an anonymous essay by a young Soviet writer on the topic of socialist realism, a brilliant and original effort to explain the stagnation of Soviet literature. Early in his discussion the writer observes:

Art does not fear dictatorship nor severity, nor repressions, nor even conservatism and cliches. If needs be, art is narrowly religious, stupidly *etatiste,* without individuality, and yet it is great. We are enthusiastic about the style of ancient Egypt, Russian iconography, folklore. Art is fluid enough to fit the Procrustean bed imposed by history. There is only one thing that it cannot tolerate: eclecticism.

The author points out that in a "theological" society where everything is subordinated to the achievement of a supreme Purpose, it is incongruous to employ modes of expression adequate only to lack of faith, skepticism and self-deprecating irony. A "religious esthetic" cannot be based on 19th-century models. Yet this is precisely what is demanded of Soviet writers. Ever since Gorky commanded them to "learn from the classics" they have been trying to glorify the "positive hero" and his devoted, single-minded struggle for communism in the style of Balzac, Tolstoy, de Maupassant and Chekhov. There is, then, a patent contradiction between form and content. Positive heroes and militant optimism cannot be convincingly portrayed in language associated with the "superfluous man" and deeply pessimistic uncertainty about the purpose of life. Thus, says the author:

If many writers are going through a crisis at the moment . . . it is because they have to seek a compromise and unite what cannot be united: the positive hero who logically lends himself to schematized, allegorical treatment—with psychological character-study; an elevated, declamatory style—with description of prosaic, everyday life; a sublime ideal—with verisimilitude to reality. This results in a monstrous salad. The characters [of Soviet fiction] torment themselves almost a la Dostoevsky, grow sad almost a la Chekhov, arrange their family life almost a la Tolstoy and yet at the same time vie with each other in shouting platitudes from the Soviet press: "Long live peace in the whole world," "Down with the warmongers." This is neither classicism nor realism. It is semi-classical demi-art of a none too socialist demi-realism.

In the author's view the only Soviet writer who has ever given original artistic expression to the Soviet epoch was Mayakovsky. He hated analysis and psychologism. He never described everyday life *(byt)* or nature. He did not try to imitate the Russian classics, but devised a hyperbolic, homeric style of his own. Since his day Soviet writers have been condemned to a ludicrous eclectic epigonism, including, if they are poets, even elements of Mayakovsky. This eclecticism was imposed in the 1930's and was in line with other extraordinary miscegenated forms (*e.g.,* the combination of one-man rule with a "democratic" constitution) invented by Stalin.

The greatest source of contradiction and tension in Soviet intellectual life since the famous 20th Congress of 1956 is that these ideological hybrids have not been allowed to lapse with the partial eclipse of their maker.

Free Content *vs.* Free Form

Students of communism have tended to ascribe all the ills of Soviet literature and art to the principle of "partiinost" *(i.e.,* conformity to party guidance) with special emphasis on the restrictions that this places on *what* the writer says. As the author of the *Esprit* articles suggests, however, perhaps an even greater handicap for the Soviet writer is the fact that party doctrine prevents him from freely elaborating an original style. Freedom to express certain ideas is less important in art than freedom in the choice of form. It is only this latter freedom that is essential to art.

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It is odd that the more imaginative post-Stalin leadership has not realized that by granting this freedom it might win much more effective support from the writers as propagandists for the Cause (at least from those of them who still have not lost faith in it) and at the same time deflect them from their interest in the extension of more general freedoms. Since the events of 1956, this has been understood by the party leadership in Poland and even in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where considerable discretion is allowed the writers in their choice of style. Thus, while it retains control in the realm of political ideas, the party gives the writer relative freedom to be an *artist,* and by removing a major frustration, reduces his potentialities as a rebel. This particular lesson of the Polish-Hungarian revolts has not been learned by the Soviet Central Committee. Instead of allowing writers to be artists it forces them to be second-rate publicists—"second-rate," because to be a first-rate publicist one needs a political and intellectual freedom much wider than the license of form required by an artist. The policy of the Central Committee, therefore, has compelled Soviet writers to seek an improvement in their position by striving for a measure of liberty, which, if granted, would undermine the political and ideological foundations of the regime.

The "controversial" novels, plays and articles of the last few years (Ehrenburg's *Thaw,* Zorin's *Guests,* Pomerantsev on "Sincerity in Literature," Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone,* etc.) were the first truly publicist works to appear in the Soviet Union for decades. They also demonstrated that the realist style is effective only when it is employed to express the mood and outlook of those Russian writers of the last century who created it. In other words, they broke down the specious distinction between "socialist realism" and "critical realism." *The Thaw* reintroduced the theme of the Superfluous Man into Russian literature. Instead of faith in the future we find uncertainty in the present. Reality becomes complex and hence rather sad, instead of simple and joyous. Doubt, hesitation and introspection ("What is the meaning of life?," asks a character in one of Vera Panova's novels) belie the optimism of the still obligatory happy ending. In all this post-Stalin literature, however conformist the author tries to be, the "shining heights of communism" are gradually being overcast by a haze.

Since the counterattack against "revisionism" in 1956 the party's policy in literature has been to suppress overt challenges to its authority while encouraging the writers to give a more balanced and truthful picture of life. They have been asked to write on contemporary themes with greater plausibility and artistic skill. Since perfection is always unconvincing, positive heroes may be endowed with human weakness and the difficulties and hardships of the transitional stage between socialism and communism may be frankly exposed. These concessions to greater realism have, if anything, made the writers' educational task more difficult. Virtue is tedious and Soviet readers are not exceptional in being far more interested in vice.

A Grounded Literature

The official speeches at the Third Congress of Soviet Writers, which was finally held last May after two unexplained postponements, show little evidence of con-

PLEDGES AND PLATITUDES

The Party to the Writers:

Soviet writers . . . must inspire people in the struggle for communism, educate them in the spirit of Communist ideology, inculcate high moral qualities and intolerance of bourgeois ideology and morals. The main task of Soviet writers is to depict truthfully and colorfully the beauty of the great labor feats of the people, the greatness and the immensity of the struggle for communism; to be passionate propagandists of the Seven-Year Plan; to instill strength and energy in the hearts of the Soviet people; to help eliminate all that remains in the way of our forward movement. . . .

The Communist Party will continue to show constant care for the development of Soviet literature and art.

The Writers to the Party:

We promise the party, following its example, to give all our strength to the creation of a new society and to the development of a new man. . . . We promise the party, following its example, to use art to criticize openly and fearlessly everything that is still impeding progress of our society toward communism—obsolete forms and the remnants of capitalism in the consciousness of the people —for the victory of our Communist cause.

We promise the party, following its lofty example, that . . . we will ruthlessly rebuff all direct and indirect attempts of revisionists and opponents of socialism who wish to surround the past with falsehood, abuse the present, and sow distrust in the future of our socialist culture.

—Exchange of messages between the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Third Congress of Soviet Writers, May 1959.

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cern at the obvious inadequacy of this modification of literary formula.[1] In its formal address to the Congress, the Central Committee told the writers that their "high calling" is "to show truthfully and vividly the beauty of the people's labor exploits . . . to be passionate propagandists of the Seven-Year-Plan and to imbue the hearts of Soviet people with courage and energy." They are to do this by "giving every support to realist art which is opposed to formalist, idea-less art."

The monumentally tedious speech delivered by Andrei Surkov, outgoing head of the Writers' Union, spells out these two incongrous demands at inordinate length. But there are passages which suggest that he is aware of the contradiction between them no less than the author of the *Esprit* article. Speaking of the poverty of language in many recent Soviet works he observes that "content that has not found the right form cannot influence the minds and hearts of the readers." He virtually admits the incompatibility of realism and the portrayal of romantic, inspiring heroes when he says:

> We have many truthful and talented books about the life of the people, but what one of our great writers said ten years ago about our literature not being sufficiently *winged* is as valid now as it was then. Indeed, we seem to have difficulty in poeticizing the people of the present day.

Earth and air, it seems, mix no better in Soviet literature than they did in medieval alchemy. Surkov goes even further when he says: "We often forget that the portrayal of what is new in life demands innovation *(novatorstvo)* in form."

What would be simpler, then, than to encourage writers to go ahead and experiment? The answer is that it cannot be done because freedom to experiment might lead to formalism and "pseudo-innovation". Surkov's argument at this point is quoted in full because nothing could better illustrate the crabbed, infantile perversity of pseudo-dialectical logic:

> In the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's there was often heated discussion among writers about the novelty of Soviet literature in general, and innovation was understood as the search for a new form, for new linguistic possibilities of expressing the new material of revolutionary reality. Admittedly there was much that was false and pseudo-revolutionary in the debates of those days. Formalist quirks were often passed off as innovation. . . . The struggle against these false interpretations of the idea of innovation was successfully concluded about a quarter of a century ago, because the rich literary practice of the Soviet epoch mercilessly destroyed all the inventions of the pseudo-theoreticians. Formalism now manifested itself only in certain cases of recidivism. But now it has come about that serious discussion of innovation in our literature has ceased altogether. Our literature is not subjected to a profound analysis from the point of view of the compatibility of the form of literary expression with the new material of reality.[2]

The older writers at the Congress will have remembered sadly that in many cases the pseudo-theoreticians were destroyed together with their inventions. They will also have wondered how it is possible to seek for new forms without courting the charge of formalism. Everybody will have thought back to the period just after Stalin's death when the party launched an appeal for "boldness" and when those who responded were soon being charged with "pseudo-boldness."

A Plea for Growing-Room

It was one of the older writers, Vsevolod Ivanov, who gently pointed out the absurdity of asking people to experiment without allowing them to do so. In what was almost the only noteworthy speech from the floor, he made a plea that the younger writers be given their head in this respect:

> Young writers must be allowed and helped to experiment, to find their own style, their own manner of writing. . . . It would occur to nobody to dispute the fact that progress in science is unthinkable without experiment. Yet attempts to experiment in literature are not met with approval and the experimenter risks being classed as a formalist. In my opinion this is nonsense. There is not and cannot be any danger of formalism in our literature because formalism was a short and by-gone stage in the lives of certain literary critics and it by no means embraced the whole of Soviet literature.

The last sentence makes an important and obvious point that has probably never been publicly made before, namely that the very use of the term "formalism" (as in the Central Committee's message to the Congress) is an unwarranted extension of its original meaning. In the 1920's it was the term chosen by a small but very influential group of literary critics to describe their method of analyzing the linguistic and structural aspects of works of literature. Its pejorative application to writers was a misappropriation of the term.[3]

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[1]The Congress convened on May 18th and closed on May 23rd. The article is based on its most important speeches, published in *Literaturnaia Gazeta,* May 18-27. Subsequent issues of the paper, which carried summaries of the less important speeches, came in too late to be included in the article.

[2]Surkov's reference to recidivism is a fascinating example of how the language of criminology has become commonplace in Soviet literary debate. It is quite natural to talk of an "amnesty" for erring intellectuals.

[3]See Victor Erlich, "Soviet Literary Criticism: Past and Present," *Problems of Communism,* No. 1 (Jan-Feb.), 1958.

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Рисунок А. КАНЕВСКОГО. **СМЕЛЫЙ КРИТИК**



— Был в Союзе писателей. Выступал с резкой критикой.
— Кого критиковал!
— Повара: шашлык пережарил!

THE BRAVE CRITIC

—I've been to the Writers' Union meeting.
I made a sharp criticism.
—Whom did you criticize?
—The cook. He burned the shashlik!

—*From* **Krokodil** *(Moscow), November 30, 1958.*

Apart from Khrushchev's address, the only other notable contribution to the Congress came in the shape of an article by Konstantin Paustovsky, one of the more outspoken and rebellious of the older writers.[4] He discusses with notable frankness some of the factors that "impede the free development of literature." The first is the lack of tolerance towards various, as he puts it, "isms." He speaks of them with unprecedented indulgence:

All these *isms* are the children of extravagant Paris and America. Beyond the outer ring of the Paris fortifications they lose their glamor, the soil that feeds them and they look far-fetched and unnatural. But even these extravagances (surrealism, decaphonism, dadaism and other *isms*) are essentially a completely normal expression of youthful impetuosity. There is no reason whatsoever to sound the tocsin and shout with panic, for the recklessness of youth is useful—it prevents the older generation from going to seed and regarding itself as infallible and "untouchable".

His second point is even more radical. Flying in the face of "anti-revisionist" orthodoxy, he disputes the standard charge that writers who fail to make a judicious balance between "negative" and "positive" have lost contact with the people. In a cautious phrase which could well refer to Pasternak as well as Dudintsev, he asks whether those writers accused of "isolation from the people" are really the ones guilty of it.[5] His answer, in so many words, is that the writers who are alien to the people are rather those who try to combine realism with phony optimism *(bodryachestvo)*, who lace their work with high-minded sentiment, insert saving clauses and devise happy-endings. "Perhaps," he writes, "we shout so much and so loudly about truth in literature just because there is lack of it. . . . The people see everything and understand everything and they will never excuse falsity and deceit in a writer, however talented he may be." Comparing the saving clauses and the happy endings to the bows which a clown makes to the spectators before he leaves the ring, he comments:

It is well that Tolstoy was able to write *Anna Karenina* before the appearance of this tradition. He did not have to "bow" to anybody, even the publisher, and he allowed Anna to disrupt her family and die for purely personal and, therefore, impermissible, reasons. It is not acceptable to write about defects, however harmful they may be for the life of our society, without first making an exculpatory "bow" by mentioning our achievements. . . . Another useless and burdensome tradition is the reluctance to write about suffering, the fear of any suggestion of sadness, as though our lives should take place under a sugary sky to the cheerful laughter of "militant" men and women . . .

This article by Paustovsky amounts to a manifesto, audaciously close in spirit and tone to the demands for freedom (at least freedom from the absurd formulas bequeathed by Stalin and Zhdanov) which caused such a furor when they were first enunciated in 1953-54 and again, with even greater insistence, in 1956. The fact that these demands could be reiterated at the Congress by a writer who previously had compromised himself as their ardent champion shows very clearly that, surface appearances to the contrary, the movement towards the emancipation of literature (and hence of intellectual activity in general) is still strong and undefeated. Talk

[4]Paustovsky has used the comparative immunity of old age once before to plead for a more common-sense approach to literary questions, particularly as they affect the right of the younger generation to break new ground. About two years ago he made a sensational speech at a public discussion on Dudintsev. It was never printed in the Soviet press, but a transcript appeared in a French newspaper.

[5]The Pasternak affair was scarcely mentioned at the Congress. Only Surkov saw fit to refer to his "treacherous activities." But one of the other speakers took up the subject. The only other reference is by Galina Nikolaeva in an article published in *Literaturnaia Gazeta* on May 18, the opening day of the Congress. In a strikingly different tonality to Surkov's remark, she speaks *en passant* of Pasternak's "mistake".

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in the West about the end of the "thaw" has been grossly exaggerated. The current flows even more strongly than before, but under a thin covering of ice. In a curious negative way the Writers' Congress indeed bears witness to the victory of the opposition. The lack of controversy, the calculated absence (or at least failure to participate) of all those writers who could have injected a spark of life into the proceedings, turned the Congress into a rather pathetic parade of old-timers.[6] It was all reminiscent of a demonstration by some dwindling political group whose members turn out to keep the flag flying, but whose arguments and slogans are so irrelevant that nobody bothers to contradict them anymore.

Culture and Corn

It was only the appearance of Khrushchev which enlivened the Congress and perhaps saved it from being a fiasco. His speech was an impressive example of his impromptu oratory in the intimate and rather bantering style that he adopts in his discourses to the peasants and other producers of material goods. There are even agricultural similes: the fostering of young literary talent, for instance, is elaborately compared with the cultivation of corn.

It would be useless to look for any new thinking on ideological or cultural questions in Khrushchev's address. What he says is so conventional as to be irrelevant to the problems which vex the writers. Gone is the angry exhortative note which marked his three "literary" speeches of 1957, when he personally intervened to rap the knuckles of the "revisionist" recalcitrants. Indeed he now evinces something close to boredom with literary questions, and there is a note of mock-humility in his constant assurance to the audience that he is not really competent to judge literary matters. He informed them apologetically that he didn't really have much time left over from matters of state to do much reading and even then he often needed to prick himself with a pin to keep awake. One can only imagine the discomfiture of certain people in the hall when he went on to mention one book he had read recently without the aid of a pin, namely *Not by Bread Alone:* "Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, who read this work before me, said to me, 'Read it —from some of the things he says it looks as though he has been eavesdropping on you!' " The embarrassment of those who led the campaign against Dudintsev can have been matched only by the relief of the majority on hearing that their works are no longer passed upon by an omniscient and malignant judge.

Khrushchev's main concern is evidently not that the writers should be ideologically pure but that they should keep the peace and not trouble the government with their interminable squabbles. He also makes it quite clear that they are no longer regarded as being so important as they believe: "Life is incomparably richer, more full-blooded and deeper than any work of art." Their mistakes, therefore, scarcely warrant all the fuss made about them. The following passage in his speech could very well have significant implications since it suggests a certain abdication by the party of its exclusive prerogatives in the control of literature, in favor of the corporate judgment of the writers themselves:

You will ask: what guarantee is there against mistakes? Yes, it is difficult to give guarantees, because a writer, if he is a real Soviet writer, makes mistakes not consciously, not intentionally, but for a whole number of reasons, such

[6]Mikhail Sholokhov, who arrived back in Moscow from his foreign tour two days before the opening session, did not speak, even if he attended. At the last Congress in 1954 he spoke scathingly of the "Olympian calm" of the proceedings and all but disrupted them by a series of scurrilous personal attacks on various conformist colleagues. It would be interesting to know what he thought of this Congress.

What Did Leonid Sergeyevich Sobolev Say?

Comrades! Can one speak about the author's right to commit mistakes and about the author's right to suffer failures? I believe that the very position of the author and the part he plays in society deprive him of such a right. Leonid Sergeyevich Sobolev put this well at the First Writers' Congress in 1934: "The party and the government have given the Soviet author absolutely everything and have deprived him of only one right—the right to write badly."

In my view the people have deprived the author not only of the right to write badly but primarily of the right to write wrongly.

—N. S. Khrushchev in his speech to the Third Writers' Congress, May 22, 1959

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as inadequate knowledge of life and incorrect premises, *etc.* In order to prevent this, one must remember that writers live in society, reflect the life of society, that their work must be guided by the criticism of society and that they must take account of this criticism. . . . Again you may say: "Criticize us, control us, if a work is incorrect, do not print it." But you know that it is not easy to decide right away what to print and what not to print. The easiest thing would be to print nothing, then there would be no mistakes. . . . But it would be stupidity. Therefore, comrades, do not burden the government with the solution of such questions, decide them for yourselves in a comradely fashion.

This grant of relative autonomy to the writers is accompanied by guarantees that there will be no return to the "intolerable phenomena" associated with the "cult of personality" and also by a plea for tolerance and tact in dealing with colleagues, however seriously they may have erred. Wayward intellectuals, like hardened criminals (see footnote 2!), are not incorrigible if they are given every chance to reform. Apologizing for the "crudity" of his analogy, Khrushchev told his audience how he himself had recently reformed a thief with a little kindness. In calling for comradely love and reconciliation, however, Khrushchev makes it quite plain that forgiveness depends on penitence and a contrite admission of defeat. One must "not strike a man when he's down"; but neither must one forget the immortal words of Maxim Gorky: "If the enemy does not surrender, he must be destroyed." Nor must the writers be allowed to forget that their role is primarily to assist the party in the education of man. At the end of his speech, through a remarkable unconscious blunder, he reformulated this sacred task of the Soviet writers in words rather familiar to Western ears:

I saw some Americans three days ago. Among them was an old man, a judge. At the end of our talk he said. . . "I fear that when I get back and tell my friends about my impressions, some of them will say, 'The Russians have washed the old judge's brains.'" That's literally what he said. Not a bad expression. So there you are, comrades, you should wash people's brains with your works.

Despite the ominous reservations in Khrushchev's speech, it gives some hope that the life of the writers may now be easier. It may encourage editors to take greater risks in publishing ambiguous works, and it may give a weapon to the opposition against the hacks. If this comes to pass, the latter will feel much less sure of their ground in exposing "mistakes" and they will have to fight out their battles within the writers' organization instead of appealing for the Central Committee's arbitration. The composition of the new Secretariat of the Writers' Union, elected immediately after the Congress, shows that the conservatives will now have to contend with formidable opposition from liberals who wish to free literature from the trammels of the past. It now includes Tvardovski and Panfyorov, the editors of *Novy Mir* and *Oktyabr* respectively, both of whom were temporarily relieved of their posts by Surkov a few years ago for pursuing an overly independent line in their editorial policies. Surkov himself was dismissed as First Secretary of the Union and replaced by K. A. Fedin, who takes a rather cautious but tolerant view of the new moods among the writers. In his speech at the Congress he in fact came out on the side of freedom to experiment in form: "We value and respect innovators in science, industry and agriculture. The question is, may a writer rest content with the working methods of the 19th century?" It seems highly likely that under this new leadership there may at last appear in the Soviet Union some literary works of lasting and distinctive artistic quality. We may see the emergence of a new style which will give adequate expression to the age. It is idle to speculate what new forms might arise, but the author of the *Esprit* article offers one intriguing suggestion:

I put my hope in a phantasmagorical art, with hypothesis instead of a Purpose, an art in which the grotesque will replace realist description of everyday life. This is what would best correspond to the spirit of our epoch. Let the *outre* images of Hoffman, Dostoyevsky, Goya, Shagall and Mayakovsky . . . teach us how to be truthful with the aid of absurd fantasy.

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The Metamorphosis of the New Class

By Ernst Halperin

THE POLITICAL ELITE of the countries ruled by Communist dictatorship has been described by Milovan Djilas as the "New Class". It is a product, according to Djilas, of a revolutionary mass movement of the exploited classes—the workers and the peasants—and consists of a nucleus, represented by the apparatus of the dictatorial party, and a peripheral group of favorites and parasites. The Communist Party is the unique independent center of power in the state and the sole owner of the means of production. It rules supreme over the life and death of the citizens.

Djilas further maintained that the position of the individual in the social hierarchy of the totalitarian Communist state depends primarily on his proximity to the center of power, *i.e.,* the party leadership. His status and his job are determined not by his training and professional qualifications, but by his membership in the victorious revolutionary party, by the abundance or paucity of his political connections, by his sense for power and intrigue; in short, by his political talent in the crudest sense of the word. The personal destiny of the revolutionary self-made men of the New Class is thus closely bound to the fate of the party, and their entire effort is by necessity dedicated to the consolidation and extension of the party's power.

Djilas has thus given us an accurate picture of the mentality of the New Class. However, he has left open the question of its further development. Not even the Communists can escape the rhythm of life and death, and the time will inevitably come when the first (that is the revolutionary) generation of the New Class will have disappeared from the political scene. Concomitantly, the social composition of the revolutionary party, on which the ruling class leans, will have changed. The party of the poor and the exploited will have become the party of the privileged, who in the modern Soviet industrial society are members of the intelligentsia. These changes in social structure must sooner or later be reflected in the social composition of the party leadership and the entire ruling class. The revolutionary self-made men will be gradually replaced by persons of higher social origin, education and training.

It is the purpose of this article to show that Djilas' New Class is a passing phenomenon; that in the course of time its dominance will be increasingly threatened by a different social category, which may be termed the "New Middle Class", embracing the technicians, managers, skilled workers and other specialists of modern industrial society.

The Origins of the New Class

The New Class, as defined by Djilas, owes its characteristics to the special historical circumstances that brought it forth. In spite of the fundamental traits common to the New Class of all the Communist countries, certain differences determined by varying social and political conditions during the crucial 1940's are clearly evident from country to country.

Let us first consider the Yugoslav New Class, of which Djilas himself once was a prominent member. At the start of World War II there existed in Yugoslavia a small but tightly organized Communist Party. Later, in the course of the war, the Yugoslav Communists succeeded in organizing around their party a powerful partisan movement which from the very beginning functioned not only as an armed resistance force waging a relentless war against the German occupation

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army, but also as an instrument of social revolution. Manned largely by the inhabitants of the most impoverished areas of old Yugoslavia, the mountains and the plateaus of the Yugoslav Karst, it was an army of shepherds and poor peasants under the leadership of university and high school students of peasant and petit-bourgeois origin. After the victorious conclusion of the war the fighters of this partisan army and their families—altogether perhaps one and a half to two million people—emerged as Yugoslavia's ruling New Class. Only very few members of the new elite had not taken part in the partisan war. Fairly homogeneous in social origin and welded together with the powerful bonds of common war experience, the Yugoslav New Class remains to this day a compact group infused with a sense of intimate camaraderie.

The origins of the Russian and the Chinese New Classes are similar. From one of the peasant revolts so familiar in Chinese history sprung a revolutionary army. It became victorious after twenty years of fighting, and occupied all positions of power in the land. In the Soviet Union only the order of events differed from that in Yugoslavia and China. Power in Russia was seized at the outset by a relatively small organization of workers, soldiers and sailors led by intellectuals and semi-intellectuals. Larger masses of workers, peasants and agricultural workers joined the revolutionary forces during the subsequent four years of civil war and anti-intervention campaigns. It was in the course of this long struggle that the Communist movement in the Soviet Union gained in numbers as well as in military discipline. In terms of origin and development the Communist elite of North Vietnam and Albania belongs in this same category; in both countries the New Class is based on a battle-tested partisan movement.

Weak Links

The two important conditions present in the make-up of the New Class in the countries mentioned thus far—a revolutionary mass movement at the base, and a sense of fraternity forged in battle—have been partly or entirely absent in some of the other countries where Communist dictatorships were established. In all such cases the New Class has evidenced decisive signs of weakness. Poland, Hungary and Rumania, where the Communist parties had been extremely weak during World War II, are good examples. It is true that after the war the meager party ranks were strengthened by the liberated inmates of German concentration camps and by many former war prisoners who were released from Soviet captivity to fight alongside the Red Army; but even with these reinforcements there were not enough reliable party members available to fill the key positions in the new governments established after the Communists, under the protection of Soviet bayonets, seized total control.

Attempts to broaden the basis of the New Class followed; the missing revolutionary mass movement was to be artificially created by action of the state. The peasants were to be won for the Communist regime by land distribution; the workers by assignment of living quarters once owned by the well-to-do, and by sweeping social legislation. All these efforts failed, however, because the redistribution of land was soon followed by a collectivization campaign, and the reassignment of housing and the social reforms failed to prevent a rapid drop in the workers' living standards. The anti-Russian tradition of all three countries helped to strengthen even further the resentment felt against the new regime, which, in the popular view, represented the interests of a foreign power. All this is not meant to imply of course that a New Class has not come into being in Poland, Hungary and Rumania. It has, but it is shot through with opportunists, and having no roots in a revolutionary mass movement, or the cohesive experience of war-time partnership, it lacks social and political homogeneity. As a result, in times of crisis the regimes in these countries can hardly trust their own party members. This became evident in 1956 in Hungary, where during the October days the New Class simply disintegrated. Only after the suppression of the uprising by the Soviet Army did its members—with a few notable exceptions—dare to reassemble in public.

More favorable conditions for the development of the New Class existed in traditionally pro-Russian Bulgaria where, before the seizure of power, the Communists already enjoyed considerable support among the students. In Czechoslovakia, too, historical experience had created a pro-Russian climate, and the Czechoslovak Communists were additionally favored by the fact that they had operated a mass party before the war, and had won some 38 percent of the popular vote in the relatively free elections of 1946. Thus after the *coup d'état* of 1948 the Czechoslovak party could reach into a large political reservoir in order to fill all the important positions in the state. The Czechoslovak New Class, however, has never been tested in battle, and while it is very numerous, it lacks the cohesive sense of comradeship born in the vicissitudes of war. It is therefore difficult to say how the New Class would withstand the test of a serious crisis.

Finally, the New Class of Eastern Germany must be mentioned. It is certainly one of the weakest. While

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the Communist Party of Germany, to which the East German New Class can trace its origin, was at one time a powerful organization, its ranks were decimated by Hitler, and its leading cadres suffered further losses when in 1936-38 the foreign Communists in the Soviet Union were struck by Stalin's great purges. Installed in power after the war by the Soviet Army, the present Communist leaders of East Germany have been generally recognized as mere puppets of Moscow.

Recruitment Difficulties

It seems clear then that wherever the New Class is strong and healthy, it has arisen from a revolutionary mass movement. Not long after the seizure of power, however, the ties of the ruling elite to its mass basis become loosened, and the process soon culminates in complete alienation; as soon as the social classes hostile to the regime are politically and economically liquidated, the New Class turns against its own social matrix, the lower strata of the population.

It is not the writer's purpose to discuss here in detail the question whether the New Class is forced upon this course by political and economic exigencies, or by merely doctrinaire considerations. In any case, the peasants are inevitably forced into collectives, which in practice means their expropriation and degradation to mere agricultural workers; at the same time, the feverish drive for industrialization and the introduction of a cumbersome and costly system of centralized economic planning lead to a sharp drop of the living standard in the cities. Thus the New Class soon finds itself surrounded by an atmosphere of fear, hate and general rejection, and it feels compelled, in order to maintain itself in power, to make increasing use of police terror. If the New Class is strong, it becomes only more united, more tyrannical and more bellicose in its moral isolation; if it has been weak from the beginning, it becomes completely demoralized.

At any rate, separation from its popular base virtually cuts off the New Class from socially homologous reinforcements. The New Class lacks a recruitment base in the form of a revolutionary mass movement. *Such a movement would be in the new circumstances conceivable only as a movement against the rule of the New Class itself.*

Nor can the New Class find regenerative resources in its own midst. Let us consider a typical representative of the New Class, a regional party secretary, a director of an industrial trust, or a deputy minister of machine tool industry. In most cases this man will have risen from humble circumstances. Before the revolution he may have been a skilled locksmith or an office clerk. He thus owes his present post not to his education or higher technical training, but to his membership in the freemasonry of the revolutionary fighters, and to his skill in party politics.

This skill is a very special gift. Its ingredients are shrewdness, vitality, toughness, unscrupulousness in the fight for advancement and in the defense of one's own position, and a sure knowledge of men. A successful member of the New Class must be able to recognize those higher members of the party hierarchy who have a political future, and to win their support. He must also know how to make others dependent on himself, in order to build up a following of his own. Only very few people find these qualities and abilities in the cradle; more often than not they must be developed in the hard school of life, and it is this school that the sons of the revolutionary generation lack.

Our plebeian party secretary, director, or minister has probably shielded his son from the hardships he himself had to suffer on the road to success. He may have even pampered him and spoiled him, and the son, in spite of a good education and other advantages, may have become a good-for-nothing, wavering, incompetent citizen. (It seems that there are psychological laws which in all societies condemn a certain percentage of the offspring of the *nouveaux riches* to this fate.) But let us assume that the son has turned out well and that he successfully completes his studies. He will then most likely become not a party politician, an *apparatchik* like his father, but a member of the cultural or technical intelligentsia. His father's political influence will of course ease his professional progress, and he himself will most probably join the ruling Communist Party as a matter of course. The educated young man, however, will feel closer identity with his professional colleagues than with his fellow party members, and his interests and aims are likely to be governed primarily by professional rather than party-political considerations. In sum, not even biological propagation can assure the New Class political perpetuation.

So far this problem has become acute in one Communist state only—this, however, the most powerful of them all. More than forty years have passed since the Russian October Revolution, and in the intervening years the New Class of the Soviet Union has transformed a backward agrarian country into an industrial power second only to the United States. In the course of this development several generations of Soviet citizens have reached maturity and entered political life. Simultaneously, a new middle class has come into being, whose members, in contrast to the common people of the land—the peasants, unskilled workers and lowly white-collar employees —enjoy considerable economic privileges. To this favored group belong scientists, artists, the higher echelons

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of the government bureaucracy, and some educators; but it is the technical intelligentsia that makes up the bulk of the new Soviet social elite.

This New Middle Class is extraordinarily young of age. Most members of the group received their training in the 1930's and were just old enough to fight in World War II. They are today in their late thirties or middle forties. Significantly, even the oldest among them were only infants at the time of the revolution and can have no memory of it. This then is the social group on which the aging Soviet New Class depends today, and the only source from which new blood can be drawn for the party.

Generations in Conflict

Policy-making in the Soviet Union is still dominated by the New Class, represented by a handful of men old enough to have taken part in the revolution or at least in the following civil war. But *the New Middle Class already constitutes the majority of party membership,* and is now heavily represented in the lower echelons of the party apparatus. These younger party functionaries are considerably better educated than their superiors, the old plebeians of the New Class, and in party affairs they usually reflect more closely the interests of the New Middle Class. Thus the struggle between the aging plebeian New Class and the forward pressing Soviet New Middle Class represents in effect a conflict of generations. Two older generations, which for the sake of simplicity may be called the "1900" and "1910" generations, are forced to fight for positions in state and industry with the oldest members of the "1920" generation, or, in other words, the senior representatives of the New Middle Class.

The "1900" generation as designated here refers to those Soviet Communists who were born around 1900 or before. The revolution, the civil war and the anti-intervention campaigns were their great youthful experiences. It is also the generation which, except for small remnants, was wiped out in the great purges of the 1930's. Only very few of its representatives can be found in the party apparatus today, but those who remain, men of tough fiber and great vitality, still dominate the Soviet political scene, be they statesmen in power or former leaders now in silent but still dangerous opposition. Khrushchev and Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Bulganin, and also the older Voroshilov and Molotov, all belong to this generation. Malenkov, born in 1902, may also be included, in spite of his later entry into political life.

It stands to reason that these men could never have occupied the center of the political stage for so long if the following generation, that of "1910," had not been

SOVIET CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

Рисунок М. ЧЕРЕМНЫХ.

— А ваш муж все еще управляющий трестом!
— Как видите!..

—And your husband is still the director of the trust?
—As you can see! . . .
(Woman offers admission passes to the "Director of the Rest Resort.")

—*From* Krokodil *(Moscow), February 10, 1959.*

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so sapless and impotent. We may range under the "1910" heading the age group of Soviet Communists which did not become politically active until the 1920's or the early 1930's, *i.e.* after the revolution and the civil war. The will of these men seems to have broken under Stalin's cudgels; they have become diligent bureaucrats, busy executors of orders, good followers. While well versed in the malicious game of political intrigue—for an *apparatchik* of the totalitarian party a condition of survival —they are also extremely cautious. They stick to old schemes and fear new ideas. And when one of them, like Shepilov, stung by ambition, renounces his leader and tries for an independent role, he soon trips and slides off the slippery stage.

These two generations represent all that has remained in the Soviet Communist Party of the plebeian New Class. The following generation of party members, the "1920" generation, already belongs to the New Middle Class.

The situation is very different in the Communist states outside the Soviet Union; not even among the weakest of them is the New Class so superannuated as it is in the USSR. In China in particular the New Class is still young, fanatical and exultantly sure of its power. The fact, of course, is that none of these countries has yet had the time to develop a New Middle Class on the Soviet pattern. It is true that in some of the economically more advanced Communist states there exist important groups of skilled workers and bureaucrats, and a technical and cultural intelligentsia. These groups, however, have not come into being under Communist patronage, and to a large extent they remain committed to their prewar traditions—the workers to their social democracy, the intellectuals to their bourgeois ethics. The posture of the New Class *vis-à-vis* these politically alien groups varies from country to country, depending on the specific circumstances and power relationships. In Poland, at any rate since 1956, the New Class consistently seeks compromise solutions; in Czechoslovakia it combats its antagonists with varying degrees of terror, censorship and isolation.

Only in the Soviet Union has a genuinely new middle class come to the fore so far. Created under Communist dictatorship, yet unrelated by tradition to a prerevolutionary past, it is emerging as a challenge to the order which brought it forth.

A Political Profile

The accessibility of the Soviet population for public opinion research is of course very limited, in spite of the growing areas of contact between Westerners and Soviet citizens in private as well as public life. Yet, with the information we do already possess, and with the help of the ever more numerous analytical studies of Soviet life and institutions published in the West, it is possible to draw a tentative political profile of the Soviet Union's rising new elite.

Unlike Dr. Zhivago, the great majority of the Soviet New Middle Class seems to approve of the October Revolution in principle and to consider its achievements a progressive step in history. The same measure of appreciation is apparently accorded to the most important accomplishment of the Stalin era—industrialization. Furthermore, the forty years of the regime's ceaseless and all-pervading propaganda have had their effect on the New Middle Class: its vision of the non-Communist world has been distorted and its conception of Soviet achievement exaggerated. There is thus no justification for believing that the New Middle Class is fundamentally anti-Communist. On the other hand, there is no indication that this population group, and particularly its most important component, the technical intelligentsia, is very much concerned with Communist ideology as such.

THE SOVIET Middle Class has exchanged Communist ideology for a virulent nationalism which has been gathering strength ever since the Soviet victory in World War II. For that victory the "1920" generation paid with the highest sacrifices, and the war remains its most decisive character-forming experience. It should be noted, however, that the deep involvement in World War II has not isolated the New Middle Class from the rest of society, or transformed it into a conspiratorial fraternity —as happened to the Yugoslav and the Chinese Communists in connection with their partisan past, and to the Soviet "1900" generation after its revolutionary and civil war experience. The contrary indeed is true; in the "Great Patriotic War," the "1920" generation fought side-by-side with its non-party contemporaries, sharing the hardships and the victory alike. For the entire younger Soviet generation this was a uniting, rather than a divisive experience.

It is true of course that the early stages of the war had a sobering impact on the Communists of the "1920" generation. Party propaganda had impressed upon their minds a totally false picture about the superiority of Soviet technology on the one hand, and the fragility and imminent disintegration of the "capitalist" world, including fascist Germany, on the other. These illusions broke up under the blows of German armor and air power. But the final victory filled the fighting Soviet generation with a new strong faith in the capacity of the Soviet Union,

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and this self-assurance has been further strengthened by the rapid pace of postwar economic development and by more recent Soviet scientific and technological achievements.

All that has been said so far by no means implies that the New Middle Class faces the regime and the current conditions in the Soviet Union with uncritical approval. On the contrary, it has called for many concrete reforms and has exacted them from the government with increasing success. Its primary concern is an improvement in the standard of living and this issue has received increasingly prominent treatment in government and party declarations ever since Stalin's death. In spite of all the official cant about the primacy of heavy industry, the share of consumer goods in the national product has been rising continuously. And Khrushchev's recent measures for decentralization of the Soviet economy certainly had as one of its purposes the increased production of consumer goods and foodstuffs.

But the Soviet managerial and technical intelligentsia has another reason to be vitally interested in industrial decentralization. In a centrally administered planned economy the man on the spot—the production manager or the engineer—is at the mercy of a distant center of authority which is ignorant of conditions in the individual plant, and which often bases its decisions on political rather than economic considerations. While the Soviet production managers have been armed with very little authority, they have been held responsible for the fulfillment of their production quotas. In order to satisfy the planners they have thus been frequently forced to disregard official channels and to acquire necessary raw materials and machinery illegally. Khrushchev's reorganization of industrial administration in the spring of 1957 did away with some of the worst excesses of the highly centralized system, but it was a half-measure only; it shortened the channels of command, but failed to transfer the direction of production to the plant managers themselves. There is little doubt in the author's mind that sooner or later this last step will have to be taken.

Another important element in the program of the Soviet New Middle Class is the call for freedom from fear. This demand has a double significance: in the realm of internal politics it aims at a reduction of police supervision and a firm establishment of the rule of law; in the sphere of foreign policy it bids for a termination of the cold war. This is not to say, however, that the New Middle Class has developed any foreign policy concepts of its own. It is indeed questionable, in view of its strong nationalism, whether this class would at this juncture be ready to accept the foreign policy concessions without which a normalization of the international situation is unthinkable.

MOST OF THE demands of the New Middle Class are diametrically opposed to the interests of the totalitarian party apparatus: yet because of the growing strength of the "1920" generation, the successors of Stalin have felt compelled to treat its wishes with ever more regard, and were thus inexorably led into conflict with their own contemporaries and class brethren in the party apparatus. This was the fate of Malenkov; and Khrushchev, the man who with the help of the party organization toppled him from power, has long since become involved in the same clash of interests.

In the defense of his position Khrushchev must increasingly rely on the political support of the "1920" generation. It is not his intention, of course, to break the power of the totalitarian party; his aim is rather to save Communist totalitarianism by modernizing it and harmonizing it with the interests of the rising New Middle Class. This will be an extremely difficult task, and even though Khrushchev now appears very strong indeed, his ultimate success is by no means certain. Whatever the outcome, it is certain to affect the destiny of the Communist bloc as well as of the rest of the world.

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Economic Integration: Problems and Prospects

By Alfred Zauberman

AFTER LONG AND INEFFECTUAL reliance upon intra-bloc trade as the primary mechanism for integrating their individual economies, the Soviet Union and its East European orbit partners have at last accepted the logic of their own internal form of centrally-controlled and planned economy and are seeking to achieve bloc-wide economic integration through extra-long-term supra-national planning. This important new phase of orbit economic development, although foreshadowed as early as 1955, began to take definite shape only much more recently and, as yet, still remains in its infant stage. Nevertheless, it is perhaps not too early to try to place it in historical perspective and to examine, if only in tentative fashion, some of the problems it is likely to encounter.[1]

Efforts at economic coordination of the Soviet sphere of control in Eastern Europe date all the way back to its establishment at the close of World War II. During the postwar phase of Stalinist rule, the East European economies were subjected to direct Soviet intervention on a broad scale, ranging from the imposition of delivery quotas—either as "war reparations" or under some other heading—to the stationing of Soviet "advisers" at key points in the satellite economic structures and the establishment of Soviet-operated industrial enclaves in East Germany. The overall effect of these measures was to put in operation an extremely crude sort of integrating machinery. Needless to say, it operated in a manner that was harmful to the East European economies, but it served the purposes of Moscow's "get-rich-quick" policies of the time.

[1]The present article expands some views advanced by the writer in a study submitted to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

Dr. Zauberman is a British economist of Polish extraction specializing in problems of Soviet and other centrally planned economies, in which field he has many publications to his credit.

Post-Stalin Policy

Even before the Stalinist epoch came to an end, changing conditions made it apparent that this one-sided, exploitative type of integrating mechanism had outlived its usefulness, and steps toward dismantling it began. Later political developments in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the orbit served to speed up the dismantling process. Today, the only area in which a remnant of the old outmoded system continues to operate—and even here in much attenuated form—is the extraction and processing of nuclear fuel.

In the meantime, the early 1950's saw the crystallization of a new Soviet policy stressing maximum development of the economic potential of the East European bloc. Such an objective necessarily entails the most efficient possible utilization of available resources, and this in turn demands that individual commodities be produced where their respective production costs are comparatively lowest. In other words, to be fully effective, the Soviet policy of maximizing the economic potential of the whole bloc logically required the formation of an integrated bloc economy in which production would be organized strictly on the basis of comparative advantage.

In fact, thoroughgoing integration on these lines has proven extremely difficult to attain for various reasons, not least of which has been the persistent postwar tendency of the individual economies within the bloc to pursue autarkic policies and hence to become self-sufficient entities. Although Khrushchev now insists that

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he repeatedly cautioned the orbit countries—Hungary in particular—not to overindulge in such policies,[2] their strong predilection for autarky has stemmed, in large part, from the very economic strategy which Moscow prescribed for the orbit to follow. One of the basic principles of this strategy, of course, is the priority development of capital goods industry—a rule derived from Marixist-Leninist theory and therefore sacrosanct. (It is interesting to note that the views of a Polish economist challenging the universality of this principle were sharply condemned as "heretical" by the Moscow guardians of economic orthodoxy as recently as mid-1958.[3])

The very fact that all members of the bloc were required to follow the same strategy inevitably resulted in the multiplication of identic economic structures and narrowed the possibility of dovetailing them. It also produced some striking economic follies. To cite an extreme example, Hungary tried to develop a steel industry in the face of the fact that the foreign-exchange cost of imported raw materials per ton of steel produced in Hungarian mills exceeded, by itself, the cost of a ton of finished steel purchased from abroad.[4]

Another factor which spurred the bloc countries to strive after self-sufficiency was the unreliability of supply sources within the orbit. In fact, experience has shown that the same impulsion operates at every echelon of a Soviet-type economy, from the individual enterprise on up. The desire to be as independent as possible from uncertain and unpredictable outside suppliers is a well-known and readily understandable element in the psychological make-up of the Soviet firm manager. It is entirely natural that this trait should have projected itself upward into the psychology of orbit economic planners at the top national level.

Trade as an Integrator

Besides the tendency toward autarky, there was a further impediment to effective economic integration, namely the bloc's primary reliance upon the intra-bloc trade network as the integrating mechanism. Trade can, indeed, be a powerful engine of coordination and unification. It can effectively integrate a market economy within national frontiers, and where *effective* international markets operate, it can perform the same function on the international scale. Competitive markets automatically reveal the cheapest sources of supply and tend to channelize productive resources accordingly. Hence, in order to integrate a group of national market economies in accord with the rule of comparative advantage, all that is necessary—in principle—is to assure the effective operation of a competitive international market by eliminating trade barriers such as customs tariffs and all types of quota restrictions. In practice, however, as the recent experience of such international agencies as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Economic Community (EEC) has shown, the dovetailing even of market economies, under contemporary conditions, requires supplementing the trade mechanism with a good deal of further coordination of various economic elements through some sort of inter-governmental planning.

In a family of centrally-planned economies of the Soviet type, on the other hand, there is incomparably less scope for achieving overall integration along lines of maximum productive efficiency through the operation of trade alone. Their domestic prices are divorced from external markets and consequently provide scant guidance as to which among them is the least expensive producer of any given commodity. Each member's whole pattern of production is consciously insulated against the pressure of market forces: it is governed, as are all areas of domestic economic life, by the national economic plan. Thus, it is demonstrable in logic that, just as the orbit countries rely upon their respective plans to regulate and integrate their economies on the national plane, so must they turn to supra-national planning as the appropriate method of integration for the whole group as an entity.

Why, then, did the Soviet Union and its orbit partners persist in relying chiefly on mutual commerce for this purpose—clearly the wrong instrument in an environment of planned economies? The internationally known economist Dr. Gunnar Myrdal, in an illuminating study, has rightly stressed the paradox presented by this restriction of the tools of integration basically to trade when the states concerned wield unlimited powers over all the means of production in their economies.[5] By way of explanation, a Soviet official who plays a prominent

[2]Khrushchev statement, reported in *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) July 21, 1958.

[3]The Polish critic, Prof. B. Minc, argued that the principle holds good only for some epochs of technological progress. (*Zagadnienia ekonomii politycznej socjalizmu,* 2nd ed., Warsaw, 1957, p. 253) This view was repudiated by A. Pashkov, in *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 6, 1958, p. 49 ff. (For another critical comment by the Czechoslovak economist Prof. V. Kaigl, see *Voprosy Ekonomiki,* No. 7, 1958.)

[4]*Statisztikai Szemle* (Statistical Review), Budapest, No. 7, 1957.

[5]Gunnar Myrdal, *An International Economy,* London, 1956, p. 147.

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role in the current phase of economic integration efforts of the bloc, came forward recently with the argument that the concentration on intrabloc trade was dictated by international political and economic conditions in the late 1940's, specifically by the "economic boycott of the socialist camp countries."[6] It may be conceded that once Stalin had slammed the door against further co-operation with the West, the substitution of intra-bloc trade channels for those severed with the West naturally must have been a matter of immediate concern. But this still would not explain why the system instituted to cope with this emergency subsequently was retained as a mechanism of bloc economic integration. Perhaps Dr. Myrdal is near the truth when he surmises that the explanation has something to do with the doctrinal survival of Stalin's concept of "socialism in one country" at a time when it already had become anachronistic.[7]

Brakes on Intra-Bloc Trade

A further point deserves mention. One partner in a group of countries is handicapped in its search for trade opportunities if it cannot use currency earned from exports to another member of the group in order to purchase goods from any third member. Hence, a group of market economies seeking to assure better integration tends to develop "multilaterality" of trade through the adoption of some kind of arrangements making the currencies of the member countries mutually "transferable," so that a member acquiring a credit balance *vis-à-vis* another need not worry about being able to make the best use of it elsewhere. This was the purpose, for example, of the West European payments union which was set up within the framework of the OEEC.

By contrast, trade within the Soviet-East European orbit has consistently tended towards "bilaterality": that is, individual pairs of countries conclude separate trade agreements which, as a rule, are long-term and provide for strictly-balanced exchanges of goods. In fact, any other system would hardly be workable inasmuch as what a bloc member can sell to another is fixed by its national economic plan, which obviously would be thrown out of kilter if the system permitted an unscheduled demand for goods to be made by a third country. It is thus apparent that little room exists for transferability, or convertibility, of currencies in trade arrangements among countries with centrally-planned economies.[8] Still, there have been constant complaints from bloc members that the lack of currency convertibility under the bilateral system restricts their opportunities and hinders trade growth. In response to these grumblings, an attempt has been made since 1957 to provide machinery for the current settlement of intra-bloc trade balances by having the Soviet State Bank act as a clearing house. As was to be expected, however, this makeshift arrangement has not been successful, and its failure is now being frankly admitted by Soviet spokesmen.[9]

True, the volume of intra-bloc exchanges of commodities has swelled appreciably over the years (roughly two and one-half times during the 1950's), and they now account for 60 percent of the total foreign trade of bloc members—70 percent if trade with non-European Communist countries is included in the intra-bloc figure.[10] In 1957, for example, intra-bloc trade channels supplied four-fifths of the members' total imports of machinery and capital equipment; 75-100 percent of their imports of fuel, iron ore and pig iron, fertilizers, grains, and timber; and half of their cotton imports.[11] Nevertheless, there has been a growing awareness that the intra-bloc trade mechanism does not, of itself, forge the bloc economies into a coherently integrated whole based on a rational division of labor, and that the lack of such integration not only causes enormous waste but also hampers the economic growth of the entire bloc. It was only when the Communist leaders finally realized the urgency of this problem that serious efforts began to be made to integrate the bloc economies by methods more compatible with their basic character.

Birth of a New Approach

The Council of Mutual Economic Aid, established by Stalin in 1949 as a counterpoise to the OEEC and West European economic consolidation under the Mar-

[6]N. Siluyanov, in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 3, 1959. Siluyanov is permanent Soviet deputy representative on the orbit Council of Mutual Economic Aid.

[7]Myrdal, *loc. cit.*

[8]For this reason, it is difficult to comprehend Soviet claims that the ruble will displace the dollar as an international currency (*e.g.*, K. V. Ostrovityanov's statement at the 21st CPSU Congress, reported in *Pravda*, February 6, 1959). The leading East German economist Professor G. Kohlmey has further claimed that the existence of the "parallel" capitalist market is responsible for restricting the scope of multilateral arrangements in intrabloc trade (*Der democratische Weltmarkt*, Berlin, 1956, p. 224). The fact is, however, that such arrangements have appeared *only* where necessary to facilitate trade with a capitalist outsider, *e.g.*, Finland.

[9]O. Bogomolov, in *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia* (World Economy and International Relations), Moscow, No. 4, 1959, pp. 34-5.

[10]*Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), May 24, 1955.

[11]*Pravda*, April 28, 1959.

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shall Plan, has furnished the framework for these efforts. Despite its ten-year existence, the CMEA actually has had only three or four years of active life; its function for several years seems to have been confined largely to lending titular sponsorship to bilateral trade agreements concluded between its members, but since the mid-1950's its institutional framework has been rapidly expanded and life has been infused into what was formerly little more than one of Stalin's dummies. Starting with the sixth session at Budapest in 1955, successive CMEA meetings have delineated broad boundaries of economic specialization within the bloc, and individual committees dealing with practically every area and facet of economic activity have sought to develop the habit of intra-bloc cooperation on the technological plane.

All this represents progress, but nonetheless within rather narrow limits. In the area of specialization, there have been frequent reports that the CMEA has allotted the leading role in hard-coal mining and zinc and sulphur production to Poland; in brown-coal mining and processing, to East Germany; in oil and natural gas production, to the USSR and Rumania; in bauxite extraction and aluminum products, to Hungary. Within the particular field of engineering industry, Poland and East Germany are directed to concentrate, *inter alia,* on shipbuilding; Czechoslovakia chiefly on heavy machinery; East Germany on precision instruments; and the Soviet Union, *i.a.,* on steel mill equipment. Most of these "allocations," however, merely reflect the pattern of specialization resulting from natural endowment or from historically-developed special skills. It is only when one goes beyond the allotment of general fields of specialization to the assignment of the thousands of different items making up the product-ranges of such diversified industries as engineering and chemicals, that the real job of coordination begins.

The CMEA has, it is true, already ventured into this complex area by compiling detailed catalogues of specialization. According to a recent Soviet report, the May 1956 CMEA session at Berlin, for example, indicated lines of specialization for several hundred different products of the machine-making industry.[12] Still, this has not prevented Czechoslovakia, a small country with a limited home market, from continuing to produce 80 percent of all items covered by the international nomenclature of engineering.[13] Moreover, intra-bloc trade movements have not given evidence of greater specialization. Whereas real progress in this area would naturally tend to reflect itself in stepped-up exchanges of products within the bloc, this has not been evident even in respect of those products which offer the widest scope for greater specialization—*e.g.,* machine tools. Thus, for example, not more than 3.5 percent of the 200,000 metal-working machines produced annually in the USSR and the East European "people's democracies" find their way into intra-bloc trade channels.[14]

Experiment That Failed

But, more than the specific results achieved to date, what makes the CMEA's efforts of such fundamental importance is the fact that they represent a new approach to economic integration of the bloc through coordinated planning. The pioneering step in this direction was the attempt made at the 1955 Budapest meeting to synchronize and coordinate the national economic plans of the orbit countries for the latter half of the 1950's. The more discerning Soviet economists today would undoubtedly agree with a recent statement by one of their number calling the 1955 effort "the *first serious* experiment in coordinating the economic development of the socialist countries" (present writer's italics).[15] For with this effort the orbit countries at last took the first stride along the path which logic suggests as the appropriate way to a rational integration of planned economies. Commerce was henceforth to be merely a by-product, rather than the engine, of integration.

The coordinated plans worked out at the Budapest meeting were, of course, completely disrupted by the political ferment in the orbit, which reached its peak just as the implementation period was beginning. The planners were soon to discover, however, that the crude fashion in which the plans had been dovetailed would have doomed the effort in any event. The initial action amounted, in fact, merely to collating each member country's deficits in key commodities and telling others to meet them; the individual countries were expected to adjust their own output targets accordingly.

Such a fragmentary adjustment of selected production targets obviously was not enough to achieve real coordination of the bloc economies. A modern economy is an extremely sensitive mechanism, in which each segment is tightly interwoven into the complex whole. An adjustment of one segment automatically sends wave-like repercussions throughout the entire system. Suppose, for example, that the CMEA directs Poland to produce a larger tonnage of ships to fill the needs of other bloc members. This calls for larger deliveries of steel plates to Polish shipyards, thereby increasing requirements of imported iron ore or scrap for the steel

[12] *Izvestia,* April 28, 1959.

[13] *Targovo-Promyshlennaia Gazeta,* February 7, 1958.

[14] Bogomolov, *op. cit.,* p. 33.

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 23.

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industry; it also entails reallocation of fuel supplies and shifts in manpower, and may further require augmentation of shipbuilding and steel-making capacities by the addition of new yards, coke ovens, furnaces, and rolling mills. Such an involved process of adjustment necessarily takes time, since years must elapse before a newly-programmed mine, steel mill, or shipyard actually enters operation. Moreover, extra capital is required to build and equip them, posing the question of whether to seek foreign credits or attempt to "squeeze" it out of the domestic economy through enforced savings, with inevitable repercussions upon the popular welfare. Schematic as this hypothetical example may be, it suffices to show how bloc action to adjust and correlate production targets for a single item may necessitate a whole gamut of additional decisions on a bloc-wide scale, including in particular those affecting the distribution of national income and the balance of payments of individual bloc members.

New Principles of Integration

It is precisely on the points just outlined that responsible Soviet economists now appear to have recognized the defects and shortcomings of the abortive 1955 experiment in intra-bloc coordination.[16] Their keener perception of the root causes of failure has led to the formulation of new principles according to which, in addition to being multilateral, coordinated economic planning for the bloc (1) should be detailed and comprehensive in scope, and (2) should be carried out on the basis of a much longer plan-period, perhaps as long as 15 years. These new concepts were considered important enough to be given formal endorsement at the "summit" conference of bloc leaders held at Moscow in May 1958, and a month later the 8th CMEA session at Warsaw took the first steps toward their implementation. As a result of these developments, the bloc has moved appreciably nearer to a system of supra-national, extra long-term planning as the logical method of economic integration.

Logical as the system may be, however, its implemention confronts intra-bloc economic planners with at least as many new problems and dilemmas as it solved. An examination of the various difficulties involved has fortunately been facilitated by the fact that, after years of secrecy, some information is at last being published with regard to how the CMEA goes about its business. Thus, it has recently been revealed that the fundamental method relied upon by the CMEA in implementing economic coordination is one based on the concept of "material balances of output and use of individual products, for the world socialist system as a whole and, first of all, for the member countries of the CMEA."[17]

Intrinsically the method contains nothing new, for it merely projects into intra-bloc planning a concept which has long been basic to the methodology of Soviet (and hence the other orbit countries') *national* economic planning. Reduced to simple terms, the method as applied nationally involves the planning, regulation, and adjustment of all factors governing output (supply) on the one hand (labor, materials and equipment input, etc.), and of product-use (consumption) on the other, so as to bring these elements into equilibrium and thus establish a "balance" in each individual sector of the economy. The balances for different but interrelated sectors must necessarily be dovetailed together: *e.g.,* the balance for the iron and steel industry must be dovetailed with that for energy sources, from which it gets its coking-coal and electric power; with the balance for ore mining, on which it depends for raw materials; and doubly with the balance for engineering industry, which not only supplies capital equipment *to* the steel industry but inversely obtains *from* it its own supplies of steel. All the numerous balances, are, of course, closely related to the key balance of labor supply and use. Hence, it is obvious that the task of working out the individual balances and of interlocking them into a coherent, dynamic whole is already formidable enough on the national scale.[18] It stands to reason that, on a vastly enlarged international scale and with a prolonged plan-period, the problems and pitfalls facing the planners will multiply more than proportionately. In fact, by the time they extend their coordinating efforts to cover half a generation of economic activities spread over an area from the Elbe to the Pacific, it can safely be predicted that the difficulties will assume nightmare dimensions.

Major Economic Problems

While shunning technical intricacies, the writer would like at this point to make specific though very cursory mention of a few of the major hurdles which confront

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] *Ibid.,* p. 33.

[18] The dean of Soviet economics, Academician S. Strumilin, described this method in 1954 as still in an "embryonic" stage (*Voprosy Ekonomiki,* No. 11, 1954, p. 39). At present, Soviet economic thought is showing a tendency to look to methodologies developed in the West, notably those based on Leontiev's input-output analysis.

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the orbit planners. First of all, their fundamental task is to determine which bloc country has the best conditions for developing a certain line of production—or, in other words, in which country investment in a given branch of productive activity will be most fruitful. In a Soviet-type economy, however, the planner experiences enormous difficulties in trying to compare potential yields from alternative uses of capital—one of the snags being that, according to Marxian ideology, only labor, and not capital as such, can have value-creating property.[19] The difficulties are great enough within the bounds of a single economy but are so much the greater on an international scale, as for example when trying to figure out whether it would be more economical to sink another coal mine in Poland or to invest instead in a new Rumanian oil well in order to obtain a given increment to the energy balance.

A closely-related problem is that of pricing. In order to choose the most efficient producer among several countries, it is necessary to know and compare their production costs; however, costs can be compared internationally only if the prices on which they are based are internationally comparable. The point is that, in the orbit economies, they are not. As has already been pointed out, prices in each bloc country are completely divorced from the outside world. And even though ingenious yardsticks have been devised to help the national planners obtain some idea whether a given commodity had best be imported or produced at home (and perhaps exported), the simpler formulas are too crude to be of much use, and the more refined too unwieldy for practical application.[20] Here again, if the problem is a difficult one for national planners, it is vastly more difficult on the international, *i.e.,* intra-bloc, scale.

ONE MORE VITAL PROBLEM has to do with the emergent realization that effective integration of the bloc economies implies a high degree of intra-bloc mobility of capital, labor, and managerial and technical skills. The question of capital mobility is largely one of Soviet capacity and willingness to help finance economic development in the rest of the orbit. This recalls to mind the excellent article by Victor Winston which appeared in these pages some time ago, and which (for the first time, to the present writer's knowledge) broached the question of whether the dependent orbit countries have become an economic liability to the USSR.[21] As one who broadly subscribes to Winston's affirmative answer, the present writer would however like to offer one qualification. Although, as far as one can judge, the period of ruthless Soviet milking of the orbit economies does appear to be a thing of the past, the criterion of whether or not they now are a "liability" to the USSR is the drain on Soviet resources for financing their growth.[22] Actually, there is little prospect of any substantial flow of Soviet capital to the East European dependent area because the USSR itself is a capital-hungry nation and will remain so in the foreseeable future: its present quest for Western credits should dispel any fallacious ideas that have gained currency on this score. Moreover, should the Soviet Union commit itself further to helping China finance her industrialization program, reversing the present trend in the Sino-Soviet balance of payments,[23] Soviet resources which could be spared for developing the East European orbit economies would be very sharply reduced. It is highly significant in this connection that the only extra-long-term national economic plan that has so far been published in detail by a bloc country—the Polish plan, extending to 1975—assumes self-sufficiency in capital,[24] despite the fact that the severe pressure of population on Polish resources makes an influx of capital indispensable if there is to be substantial economic growth.

The absence of mobility in respect of the manpower factor has a different background. The dependent bloc economies include some with a surplus of manpower and a measure of more or less disguised unemployment, as well as others where progress is severely hampered by a

[19]The problem of comparing relative "efficiencies of capital investment" has preoccupied Soviet and orbit planners and theoretical economists for years, and much has been written on the subject in the West; *i.a.,* this writer's contributions in *Soviet Studies,* Vol. 1, pp. 328-33; *Review of Economic Studies,* Vol. XVI, pp. 119-27; *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* Vol. LXIX, pp. 445-51; also Gregory Grossman's excellent article in *ibid.,* Vol. LXVII.

[20]This is another much-debated problem in the orbit and was the main topic of discussion at a CMEA conference held in Czechoslovakia in September 1957. For a highly elaborate "coefficient of efficiency" formula for foreign trade, see article by the Czechoslovak economist V. Cerniavsky in *Politicka Ekonomie* (Prague), No. 4, 1957, p. 237 ff.

[21]Victor Winston, "The Soviet Satellites—Economic Liability?", *Problems of Communism,* No. 1, 1958, p. 14 ff.

[22]By this criterion, "liability" patterns would differ somewhat from those suggested by Winston. East Germany, though now suffering from acute capital anemia because of past Soviet exactions, may in the long run achieve capital self-sufficiency. On the other hand, Bulgaria, Rumania and Poland, because of their structural capital/labor-supply ratio, are likely to remain a chronic drain on the capital resources of the bloc.

[23]During 1956-58, China had a mounting export surplus in her trade with the USSR, reflecting principal and interest payments on old Soviet credits in excess of new Soviet capital transfers to China. This is confirmed by budget data.

[24]M. Kalecki, in *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 8, 1959, p. 27 ff.

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chronic and acute manpower deficit—notably East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Yet, with one or two quite marginal exceptions (such as the small-scale and mainly seasonal migration of Bulgarian workers to the Soviet Union), there have been no indications of any intra-bloc move to equalize these imbalances of labor supply through increased mobility. Here, of course, the obstacles are political and psychological, rather than economic.

Political Stumbling Blocks

Indeed, while the whole focus of the present article has deliberately been economic, it must not be forgotten that the movement toward bloc economic integration has far-reaching political implications, just as some of the problems it faces are political in nature. Economic integration means greater economic strength, and greater economic strength means increased external political strength for the bloc as a whole. But this is not all. As a long-range policy, economic integration also may commend itself to Soviet policy-makers as a means of strengthening intra-bloc ties and thereby consolidating Soviet political hegemony over Eastern Europe — the more so because they may see in it the way that is comparatively least provocative and hence least likely to evoke resistance and trouble.

It would appear, however, that these implications have also not escaped the leaders of the dependent orbit countries, and that their political sensitivities constitute one of the stumbling blocks in the way of bloc economic integration. This is indirectly evidenced by the fact that Soviet leaders and economists have been prone to insist that the CMEA is *not* a supra-national body and does not affect national sovereignties. A. N. Kosygin, head of the Soviet State Planning Commission, for example, has gone on record with an emphatic statement that there is no single master plan in the CMEA.[25] Again, the same sort of assurance was the *leitmotif* of the congratulatory address delivered by the permanent secretary of CMEA, Fadeyev, at the tenth anniversary session of the organization held at Tirana in May 1959.

In contrast to its meetings of the preceding few years, the Tirana session seems to have discreetly side-stepped the thorny central problem of overall planning for integration—possibly because it was considered hardly fitting to air fundamental issues and difficulties on such a gala occasion. Most of the session's attention was devoted to bottlenecks in certain sectors (coking coal and non-ferrous metals) and projects, already long discussed but as yet not matured, for inter-connecting power grids across national boundaries. In short, technical problems rather than basic economic issues dominated the discussions.

AS POINTED OUT ABOVE, moreover, the basic economic issues are inextricably linked with political ones. Despite Soviet assurances that the CMEA is not a supra-national organ seeking to impose a single plan, such an authoritative Soviet economist as Professor O. Bogomolov has, in effect, qualified these assurances with a highly significant "not as yet."[26] The qualification seems to reflect tacit recognition that the process of integration will be fully consummated only if and when the orbit economies are directed as a single unit in accordance with a single plan drawn up and implemented from a single center of authority. This would practically make the forging of an *organic political entity* a necessary pre-condition for full-fledged economic integration—and such a development can hardly be contemplated as a real possibility in the post-1956 political climate of Central and Eastern Europe.

In any event, it is abundantly clear that the bloc of centrally-planned economies, though hardly past the threshold of its new, more "logical" approach to economic integration, is already discovering obstacles to which, as the same Professor Bogomolov admits, no satisfactory solutions have yet been found.[27] In the writer's view, the experience of the CMEA lends strong support to the proposition—theoretically evolved by the well-known American economist, Professor Jacob Viner—that it is far more difficult to integrate centrally-planned socialist economies than market economies, without the suppression of national identities.

Herein lies the fundamental dilemma of the Soviet planners in Eastern Europe.

[25] *Pravda,* April 28, 1959.

[26] Bogomolov, *op. cit.,* p. 32.

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 34.

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Soviet Youth in Life and Literature

By Vera Alexandrova

EDITORS' NOTE: Miss Alexandrova's article is the second in our series of reports on current Soviet literature as a reflection of Soviet reality (see "The Factory Manager in Soviet Fiction," by George Gibian, in the March-April, 1959 issue). The next two articles will deal with agriculture and the status and position of Soviet women.

IN STORMY HISTORICAL epochs youth always regards itself as a "new generation," ready to replace its elders. One of the Soviet Union's most talented young poets, Evgeny Evtushenko, wrote in an article on "Two Poetic Generations" in early 1955:

New poets do not appear in literature singly. We connect the image of every poet with a specific poetic generation. . . . Only a poet who is profoundly related to his generation can later become the spokesman for the intellectual moods of the entire people. . . .[1]

Evtushenko classified himself as a member of a generation distinct from that which was old enough to take an active part in World War II, and whose poets' works directly reflected that experience. The new generation is also and profoundly a product of the war, but only a few of its eldest fringe actually joined in the final stages of fighting. Most were children at the time (Evtushenko himself was about eight when the war broke out) and they felt the war's impact in a different way.

Glimpses of this generation in its childhood are furnished by some of the writings of the war period. A common characteristic of the children is enforced self-reliance beyond their years. There is the boy Vova, in Tatyana Ocks' "On the Petrograd Side" (1942), who is the son of a Red Army soldier fighting at besieged Leningrad. Vova's mother works in a defense plant. The boy takes care of the home, and in the evenings goes to meet his mother, so that she need not be afraid coming home alone. Similar self-sufficient personalities are exhibited by Olya in Nikolai Tikhonov's "The Family" (1942) and Petrusha in the late Andrei Platonov's "Ivanov's Family" (1946). These children became accustomed from their earliest years to live *by themselves,* concealing from their elders their thoughts, sorrows and dreams. Petrusha's father, home from the front, catches himself in the feeling that he has lost touch with his family, that he feels no real tenderness for the boy: "Talks like a grandfather, but I'll bet he cannot read." It is only when Petrusha speaks in his sleep, "tenderly and piteously"—"mama, mama, pick me up in your arms, I am so tired"—that we realize how young he still is, what a "childish soul is in him when it is untouched by care."

That the theme of childhood looms large in the latterday creative works of this generation is thus understandable. The young writer Korenev muses:

The spirited boy may not remember
Those days; that road, and that heavy burden.
But childhood knows
With its special sense
Of the most important. . . .[2]

And with the same acuity these children "saw their elders without masks," says the young poetess Yulia Neiman, recollecting a child's view of the war in her poem "1941."[3]

Life "Without Embellishments"

The war's formative influence on the new literary generation is summed up by the Soviet writer Vassily Azhaev (author of the novel *Far From Moscow,* 1952) in an article entitled "The Young Forces in Soviet

[1] *Literaturnaia Gazeta,* January 25, 1955.

Miss Alexandrova is a well-known writer on Soviet literature. Her authoritative articles have appeared in many periodicals in the United States and Europe.

[2] A. Korenev, *Octyabr,* (October), 1956.

[3] *Literaturnaia Moskva,* Vol. 2, 1956.

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Prose."[4] Azhaev asks: "What is the common feature in the lives of the youngest generation? . . . how do its writers differ from the young writers of preceding generations?" And he answers:

They were formed by the war . . . whether they fought in it or were merely torn away from their homes and sent into evacuation. In either case they felt the impact in childhood and youth of a life full of trials and hardships; they came to know [life] not from books but from experience, and certainly without embellishments.

Azhaev apparently felt impelled to add that this acquaintance with life as it was—not "from books" (in other words, not according to the official stereotype)—"did not prevent the children of this generation from absorbing with their mothers' milk a deep love for their socialist homeland." Yet the literature produced by the new generation reveals that whatever its feelings for country may be, they are something quite apart from the hackneyed depictions in earlier writing of youth's enthusiastic "socialist patriotism".

Among recent writings which have probed youth's attitudes is Nikolai Pogodin's sketch, "Kustanai Meetings," portraying the young people lately mobilized for developmental work on the virgin lands.[5] Noting that these youths bear "very little resemblance" to the zealous contingent which undertook the building of the city of Komsomolsk in the 1930's, Pogodin remarks:

The times are different. The romanticism and novelty of the first five-year plans are things of the past. There has been a great national war, and the work itself on the virgin lands is not the building of a romantic city.

The virgin-lands workers, he goes on, are mostly "fellows" who have left secondary school before graduating. Many of them have lost their families. They are sparing of words and smiles, and their speech is frequently punctuated by "uncultured" expressions. They all share a dislike of pompous slogans:

Some quiet-eyed boy will listen in silence when you call him an emissary of his homeland. The truth, it turns out, is that he has come here to change his life. . . . There are young people here whose lives in some factory, in some collective did not work out, cracked somewhere. And so, as one told me, they went to look for . . . a new place where they were not known, where they would not be condemned for old mistakes, and where, discarding their past, they could start life over again.

There are very few "hopeless cases, incorrigibles or hooligans" among the new settlers on the virgin lands. But if some of them are still unsuccessful in reordering their lives, then the blame, says the writer, can often be laid to a lack of helpful understanding and interest on the part of local authorities.

Bureaucratic Blinders

Some instances of this soulless approach of the party officialdom are described in a sketch by Leonid Volynsky, also titled "Kustanai Meetings."[6] He relates, for example, the cases of Tolya Kostiuchenko, a boy who was unable to finish school and left home to go to work in a factory in Kazakhstan. At first everything went well. But later Tolya began staying away from work and drinking to excess. Called to the office for a talk, "he honestly admitted that he could not restrain himself, and asked that his mother come to live with him" (Tolya's father was killed in the war). The mother wanted to come, but was given no help in arranging for work. Eventualy Tolya fell into bad company, was caught stealing and sent to prison. Seeking help for him, the mother came and appealed to the district committee of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol). Too late, they realized that they themselves had failed the boy. The author muses a good deal about "how deeply injustice wounds the young defenseless heart, and how little the people whose task it is to teach and educate concern themselves with the problem."

This idea finds further illustration in a play by the young writer Alexander Volodin, "Factory Girl" (1956). The simple plot centers around a young spinning mill worker named Zhenka Shulzhenko. A motion picture director comes to the mill to film a group of the women workers, showing what a "cultured" life they lead. In an amusing scene at the dormitory—where the girls hasten to clean up the disarray and to exhibit books from what they call the "Red Corner"—Zhenka stands out for her prettiness, high spirits and impish frankness. Later, at the staging of a party in the workers' club, Zhenka is asked to leave the dance floor because she behaves too boisterously and merrily. A party organizer named Bibichev then scores her in the local newspaper as a typical example of workers who "spoil the reputation of the whole group" by their conduct. Zhenka is "taken to task" and almost loses her job; her friends intercede for her, however, and the play ends happily.

It is highly interesting that this play, dramatically weak as it is, has enjoyed great success at public presentations. The critic M. Stroev in a commentary entitled "Critical Turn of Mind"[7] (an attribute which Zhenka gaily claims in describing herself), states that

[4] *Novy Mir*, March 1956.

[5] *Znamia*, November 1955.

[6] *Novy Mir*, November 1958.

[7] *Teatr*, June 1957.

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he does not recall an equal success since "Pavel Grekov" by Voytekhov and Lench, in 1939. "The cheeky, merry girl" has conquered the young viewer by her "fresh truth." At the theater, filled with young people, "you are carried along by the passionate and attentive reaction of the public, you will hear the soldier or officer in front of you mutter encouragement and approval to the mischievous Zhenka. . ."

Other recent plays which have been received favorably by the public are Rozov's "Bon Voyage" (1955) and Shtein's "Personal Affair" (1954) and "Hotel Astoria" (1957). These, like "Factory Girl," are theatrically weak yet seem to have evoked a sympathetic response through the portrayal of youthful characters who tend to be critical of petty party authority.

Apathy and Honesty

A valuable source of clues to young people's attitudes was a collection of commentaries entitled "Today, September 1st," published in *Novy Mir* in connection with the opening of the 1955 academic year.[8] Of particular interest was a piece by L. Rozanova, secretary of a Komsomol unit at Moscow University, who reported the results of interviews with young Communist freshmen. One Komsomol member, when asked what "social" activities he would like to participate in, replied:

"You know, I have decided to stay away from social activities here."

"Why?"

"Well, you know . . . I did quite a bit at school. I think it's enough. I am tired. There is too little free time . . ."

Then, after some thought, he adds calmly: "Besides, honestly speaking, there is no point to it all."

"No point to what?"

"Oh, Komsomol work . . ."

The writer records that these ideas are familiar to her; she has heard the same talk—"theories about fatigue, and, "honestly speaking, 'the uselessness' of social activities"—from other students. She remarks:

Of course, we have met such people in the past. They may not have expressed these "theories" with so much frankness, but they certainly practiced them. Yet I have never before encountered such cool skepticism in a freshman, a boy just . . . graduated from secondary school.

The conclusions reached by Rozanova are not too flattering to party methods of youth training. It appears that those students who entertain the "correct" ideas generally "think in stock phrases," while the genuinely interesting young people are either disillusioned in Komsomol work or are not members of the Komsomol at all.

The remarks of the student quoted above call attention to a notable characteristic of the young generation, its tendency to adopt favorite phrases or words and to invest them with a special meaning. "Honest" and "honestly speaking" join with the commonly-heard expressions, "wholeness" and "of a piece," key words used to assert and to defend individuality. Evtushenko devoted an entire poem to the theme of "Wholeness" (its title), concluding it with the lines: "Yes /This is very difficult —/ becoming happy /Yes, first one must/ become himself."[9] And Nelly Ivanova, in Leonid Volynsky's story mentioned earlier, says to the writer: "A person must be whole and honest, don't you think? And first of all honest with himself." The main concern of the young man Andrei in Rozov's "Bon Voyage" is being thus "honest with himself." Other terms in the special lexicon of youth similarly express a groping effort to discover and to assert individual personality.

An interesting sidelight of the young generation is the curiosity exhibited by some of its members about literature that has been criticized or banned by the authorities. A case in point emerges in "Letters from a Young People's Dormitory," by V. Mikhailov, a writer who went to live for a time at a factory dormitory in the Urals.[10] His roommate was a young rolling-mill worker named Sasha who loved literature, especially poetry. One day he surprised Mikhailov with the question, "Where can you get rare . . . forbidden books—

[8]September issue, 1955.

[9]*Novy Mir*, March 1956.

[10]*Literaturnaia Gazeta*, October 1, 1955.

Speaking Honestly

Once in the ninth grade we were asked what we wanted to be. Well, the kids told what they thought, but not all of it was true. Fed'ka Kuskov, for instance, said—a flier. Why did he say that? Just to show off. And now he is looking for a soft berth. Volodia Tsepochkin spoke even more emphatically: Anything at all, so long as he could be useful to the Fatherland! This Volod'ka was, is, and always will be a scoundrel of the first order: a toady and a parasite! I myself honestly replied—I do not know. What a commotion that started! "What a Komsomolets! A ninth grader, and he still does not know!" Almost the whole school took part in the row! This way one might develop an aversion to almost any calling. . . .

—An episode related by Andrei, the 17-year-old lead character in Vladimir Rozov's play, "Bon Voyage!", published in Teatr, March, 1955.

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say, Essenin or Pushkin?" He revealed that he already had a small collection of such books and that he made a practice of copying obscured poems to his taste when he was able to find them. On another occasion Sasha commented on the stupidity of rejecting Mayakovsky or Essenin, since both, in his opinion, had written some remarkable poems. And thoughtfully he quoted a line from Mayakovsky: "When the soul has frozen to the rib, then see if you can thaw it off. . ."

The Appeal of Revisionism

The above discussion necessarily provides only a few clues to the thinking and attitudes of the young Soviet generation; yet those characteristics which have been underscored are important ones, for without understanding them, we cannot understand the emergence and persistence of the phenomenon of "revisionism" on the Soviet scene. In the field of literature—which is the particular concern here—the label of "revisionism" has been applied by the authorities to stigmatize the effort of a notable sector of the intellectuals to break away from certain esthetic and literary values of the Stalin era, expressed in the precepts of socialist realism."

There have been other instances in Soviet history when "oppositional" moods developed within the society. As a rule, the authorities quickly dissipated such moods by the simple expedient of disposing of the people suspected of harboring them. This time, however, the regime has found its task much more difficult and protracted. While it has put a stop to the publicizing of "revisionist" ideas and works, it has by no means vanquished the spirit which produced them, as its own persisting complaints have attested. The intensity of the antirevisionist campaign is indeed the surest index of the widespread support these ideas have evoked among literary people and the general reading public—particularly in the ranks of the younger generation.

So much has been written concerning the causes, emergence and course of the revisionist trend in literature that it would be neither possible nor profitable to dwell on its history here. Yet in the context of the present paper it might be interesting to recall the positions taken by some of its protagonists who are still fairly young in years themselves, and whose viewpoints represent the most articulate expression of that yearning for "truth" in literature—and in life—which has been under discussion here.

One of the memorable forums for such ideas was the Third Plenum of the Moscow section of the Writers' Union held in March 1957, which formally marked the onset of the authorities' crack-down on the revisionists and which in turn evoked some vehement speeches in defense of the ideas and works under official criticism.[11] Notable among the speakers was Vladimir Dudintsev, whose novel *Not By Bread Alone* (published in 1956) was a prime target of the "orthodox" critics' wrath.

Pleading openly for "the possibility of creative discussion," Dudintsev returned his censurers' fire by likening the critic to a cripple who "threateningly bangs his crutch." And in another analogy, he maintained that the time had come when Soviet writers

> **. . . might be allowed, like young swimmers, to try their skill at swimming on their own. Perhaps we might not drown, after all! But alas, I constantly feel the pressure of that leash, which is sometimes used to lead children. And it hampers me in swimming.**

In a separate address to the Plenum Dudintsev referred to the circumstances under which his novel came to be conceived, in a story which has cogency for our earlier discussion concerning the war's influence:

> **I remember the first days of the patriotic war. I was lying in the trenches, and over me an aerial battle was going on. Messerschmidts knocking down our planes. At that moment something began to give in me, because until then I had always heard that our air force was faster and better than all the others. Some people say that I express "derogatory" tendencies. This is not true. I simply want to prevent a repetition of what I have experienced. And I have a right to want it!**

Another speaker at the Plenum was the young poet Semyon Kirsanov, whose scathing poetic allegory "Seven Days of the Week" (1956) roused the authorities' anger as much as had Dudintsev. Kirsanov, too, pleaded that literature had entered "a new phase of development"—a phase that "does not deny the past" but that should allow greater creative license to do "things that we were not always able to do in former times." The principle shortcoming of literature in the past, he went on, was the attempt to depict Soviet life as if it were devoid of conflicts. "In its more 'crass' manifestations, it was a varnishing of reality." Instead of showing life as a struggle of contradictions, writers showed "only its positive aspects."

Among others who protested the regime view at the Plenum were Evgeny Evtushenko, the poet of the "new generation" mentioned at the start of this article, and Veniamin Kaverin, a member of the editorial board of the journal *Literaturnaia Moskva,* which had come under attack for its publication of so-called "revisionist" writings. Both of these men were sharply rebuked in the official report of the Plenum for their stubborn defense of their ideas.[12]

[11]Proceedings published in *ibid.*, March 19, 1957.

[12]*Ibid.*

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Not all critics, of course, are in the ranks of the conformists. One of the most vivid talents among the younger literary critics was the late Mark Shcheglov, whose views have been a vital element in the controversy over revisionism although he himself died in 1956 (at the age of 30).[13] A recurrent theme in Shcheglov's writing was an attempt to define the essence of truth in art. The aim of art, he felt, should not be the mere *reflection* of life, but the *expression* of the truth of life by artistic means, creating the irresistible and eternal truth of art. This truth could be created and projected most graphically in the theater. He minced no words in expressing what he felt was wrong with Soviet theater, as stated most clearly in his article "Realism in Contemporary Drama":

Despite their modern clothes, the heroes of many of our current plays resemble living people, our contemporaries, only in a most general way. . . . For a genuine resemblance they lack too much: they lack a vital plenitude of emotions, intensity, simplicity and irony. . . . They are not endowed with the ability to think about anything except "the business at hand," they have no philosophy and no values of their own in appraising the phenomena of life. . . . They are severely ill with pathetics and rigorism; without a penny's worth of thought or feeling, they are insanely spendthrift of pompous and loud words. This is why one is so often overwhelmed with a sense of falseness and untruth in the most elevated scenes.[14]

The Repercussions

It is not hard to see in these ideas of the younger intellectual elite a reflection, in a highly articulate and positive form, of the characteristics and attitudes of Soviet youth analyzed earlier. And so it is no surprise that some of the staunchest and most fervent support for the "revisionist" works and ideas came from the young generation, particularly the student populace at the universities, in the short months of 1956 and early 1957 when open debate was still permitted.

The new intellectual trend was, of course, a product not only of the representatives of the young intelligentsia but of many established talents—Ilya Ehrenburg, Konstantin Simonov, Anna Akhmatova and others—and its appeal spread to all of the more educated layers of Soviet society. Indeed, combined with other events, the initial widespread reaction to the "new look" in literature made the 1956 period and its immediate aftermath one of the most dramatic in Soviet history.

Yet the real proof of revisionism's profound impact is to be found in the sequel to those dynamic days—that is, in the veiled yet stubborn resistance of the revisionist spirit to the authorities' efforts to extirpate it. The seriousness with which the regime viewed the situation became eminently clear when Khrushchev personally intervened in literary affairs with his three speeches of the spring and summer of 1957 (published in September of that year under the title, "For Close Ties between Literature and Art and the Life of the People" [15]), which bluntly warned the intellectual world that it must bow to the dictates of party-determined orthodoxy. That the reaction to this attack from highest authority fell far short of its intended effect became vividly apparent in succeeding months.

The Voice of Silence

In February 1958 a Plenum of the Executive Board of the Soviet Writers' Union was called at which the dominant theme was a complaint against the persistence of revisionism.[16] One of the key speakers was Sergei Smirnov, a regime-line spokesman who recently (March 1959) was appointed editor-in-chief of the Union's organ, *Literaturnaia Gazeta.* He offered the opinion that those of the "revisionists" who were disposed to regard their recent "enthusiasms" as mistaken or accidental should be given some attention and help in returning "to the correct path"—for them, let bygones be bygones. But, he added:

. . . what is to be done if some of our writers cherish these "bygones" as something sacred, and reply with dead silence to the demand of literary public opinion that they re-evaluate their recent positions? If at the [aforementioned] Third Plenum their silence evoked "concern," today this stubborn silence rouses not concern, but indignation, for theirs is the pose of men who have *not* disarmed . . .

Others extremely aggressive in their criticism of the "revisionists" were the writers Nikolai Gribachev and Alexander Chakovsky. Gribachev deplored the persistence of revisionist manifestations both at home and in the people's democracies and complained that Soviet publicists were not waging a sufficiently energetic campaign against them. He declared in summary:

The principal danger to our literature is revisionism, which appears in many forms—from vilification of everything we have done, to attempts to dance rock and roll on the backs of the dead and the living, down to cunning

[13] See the collection of his "Literary-Critical Articles," posthumously published in *Sovetskii Pisatel* (Soviet Writer), Moscow, 1958.

[14] *Literaturnaia Moskva,* Vol. 2, 1956.

[15] *Kommunist,* No. 12, 1957.

[16] Proceedings published in *Literaturnaia Gazeta,* February 13 and 15, 1958.

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attempts, with the aid of theoretical acids, to undermine the foundation of our literature—its Marxist-Leninist esthetics.

Chakovsky similarly summed up the results of the struggle against revisionism with the statement:

The soap bubbles of revisionism are bursting. . . . But it would be naive political simpering to assert that the struggle with revisionism is finished. It is not finished either in the Soviet Union or internationally. . . .

A Sea of Troubles

In the same month that this meeting was held, a revealing article entitled "When the Compass is Lost," by the writer E. Surkov (not to be confused with Alexei Surkov, First Secretary of the Executive Board of the Writers' Union), was published in the journal *Znamia.*[17] The article constituted a scathing attack on the entire "revisionist" front, but in particular on its tenacious influence in the sphere of drama. Among Surkov's targets were a number of the young drama critics of the magazine *Teatr* (N. Velekhova, V. Kardin, A. Anastasiev and others) as well as the Georgian tragedienne Veriko Andzhaparidze (in connection with her public remark at a theater-union gathering that "The divine is gone from the theater"). The late Shcheglov and his aforementioned article, "Realism in Contemporary Drama," also were dragged out anew for criticism.

Surkov's main complaint against the *Teatr* staff was tied up with his fury against the "not-unknown" Polish writer Jan Kott and his article, "Hamlet After the Twentieth Congress," an interpretive critique of a Cracow production of "Hamlet" which had caused a stir in Polish literary circles. What incensed Surkov was Kott's view that the production was "built on political allusions to contemporary facts . . . This Hamlet is all action, instead of reflection. He is rabid, this young intransigent, drunk with his own indignation, suddenly finding an opportunity for action. It is Hamlet after the Twentieth Congress, one of many. . ." Ominously, if somewhat ambiguously, Surkov complained that instead of exposing "this frankest of the Polish revisionists," the "political infants" of *Teatr* "have with great interest paraphrased in its pages 'Kott's original interpretation,' little suspecting into *whose* arms [his italics] it is possible to fall once the Marxist-Leninist party compass is lost. This is *whose* shores you can drift to, if you passively submit to the 'will of the waves' . . . ."

Throughout 1958 regime pressures of this sort continued. At the year's end, just last December, the First Congress of the newly-constituted Writers' Union of the RSFSR again took up the cudgels. The greater part of a keynote speech by Alexei Surkov was devoted to "revisionist attacks against us." Though he concentrated his remarks on the revisionist danger in Eastern Europe, he urged Soviet writers to re-examine carefully their "ideological weapons . . . to make sure there are no nicks of revisionism nor rust of dogmatism or sectarianism" on them.[18]

* * *

IN VERY RECENT WEEKS, as this paper was being written, there was evidence from Moscow that the current year may bring a new and milder phase in the anti-revisionist campaign. At the May Congress of the Writers' Union, regime spokesmen seemed to make a special effort to inject a more conciliatory note into their speeches, to stress—in the words of the aforementioned Smirnov—the theme of "let bygones be bygones." But if the tone of speeches was friendlier, they made clear that the regime still considered "revisionist" ideas and critical attitudes toward the new orthodoxy dangers to be guarded against with utmost "vigilance."[19]

Today Soviet writers who sympathize with "revisionism" are unable to come out in open defense of their ideas. Yet evidence as well as logic strongly suggest that the "silent" revisionists—to borrow again from Smirnov—continue to cherish their views as "something sacred."

That a great deal of the vigor and originality, as well as the tenacity, of revisionism has been attributable to the role of the younger Soviet intelligentsia is, in the present context, perhaps its most significant aspect, and warrants some concluding reflections. For the first time in Soviet history, the Communist Party's effort to stamp out what it has considered a form of intellectual heresy has met with protracted resistance from a leading element of the younger generation. For the first time this active and socially valuable sector of the society has not been moved by the party's appeals that it adapt itself wholeheartedly to the official orthodoxy. It has instead resolutely asserted itself against conformism, perhaps without even realizing that it has thereby challenged the very basis of Communist dictatorship. That this intellectual element is, in the poet Evtushenko's words, "profoundly related to its generation," seems clear enough; whether it has actually been or will ever become "the spokesman for the intellectual moods of the entire people" remains a question for the future.

[17] February issue, 1958.

[18] *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, December 14, 1958.

[19] For more information on the Congress see Max Hayward's article in this issue—Ed.

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Ruble Politics

Joseph S. Berliner:
Soviet Economic Aid,
F. A. Praeger, New York, 1958.

Reviewed by Peter Wiles

THIS ADMIRABLE if somewhat disorderly book should clear up many, though not all, economic misconceptions about Communist aid to underdeveloped countries. The political passages are less complete. As befits a Sovietologist, Mr. Berliner is no alarmist; but he recognizes the appeals of communism and the necessity for an *educated* as against an emotional response in the West. Nevertheless he cannot be expected to have that insight into Southeast Asia that he has into the USSR, and he tends to fall into the common trap of treating the countries which receive aid as mere pawns in the cold war. To the extent that he does this he perhaps overestimates the impact of Soviet (or indeed Western) aid actions. Admittedly he sees and states that Egypt has succeeded in locking up all her Communists *and* at the same time accepting Communist arms, but one wonders if he fully perceives the importance of this. Looking elsewhere, never was more Soviet aid *per caput* given than in the case of Syria (as Berliner points out in his Table 2), yet in a pinch, when satellite-hood stared him in the face in early 1957, President Kuwatly flew to Cairo and delivered Syria over to Nasser in order to keep it out of Khrushchev's hands. Again, the situation of the Communist movement in Indonesia caused a disagreeable scare in early 1958, yet now that country accepts US arms and Subandrio has made his *rapprochement* with Australia. And if ever a major aid-recipient was in an exposed position it is Afghanistan, yet there too the Communist Party is banned.

That the Soviet Union, unlike Western countries, always lends and never gives is said (pp. 147-48) to have great appeal: the argument is that a loan leaves more room for self-respect and is less politically insinuating than a gift; both parties to the transaction help each other and the whole thing becomes cooperative. Yet here too Mr. Berliner exaggerates the advantage to the USSR. In 1957 the Cambodians, for example, turned down a Soviet aid offer because it was *not* a grant.

In short, while the political passages of the book must be described as "balanced," they still seem to this reviewer to be too pessimistic. It is undoubted that Washington and Moscow both believe that the cold war is now a trade war; but it does not seem to have occurred to the author that both sides may be wrong in the sense that they overrate the influence of aid in the long run.

TURNING TO ECONOMICS, the following propositions rightly receive emphasis from Mr. Berliner:

1) *Totals promised and publicized by Moscow in its aid offers are far larger than quantities annually delivered.* Normally our comparisons take no account of this fact, to the heavy detriment of the West. That is, Western aid is usually described in terms of annual allocations or expenditures, while Communist figures are always in terms of totals promised—maybe over ten years, some of the later expenditures coinciding in time with repayment installments. The most original aspect of Mr. Berliner's study is a long appendix devoted to the conversion of Soviet total promises into annual deliveries.

2) *Grants are not loans.* The West operates mainly with grants, the Communists with loans. This point is made very clearly except in the tables, which inexcusably continue to combine the two. A loan is statistically quite incomparable with a grant, and economic theory suggests no conversion procedure that is not arbitrary.[1] All that

Mr. Wiles is a Fellow of New College, Oxford, and author of numerous studies on Soviet economics. This is his first appearance in Problems of Communism.

[1]In attempting such a conversion, it seems necessary to assume a notional rate of futurity discount private to the particular lender or borrower. Thus let the USSR lend $100 to India in one lump on Jan. 1, 1960, repayable in ten equal annual installments of $11 beginning on January 1, 1961 (*i.e.*, at about 2 percent); and let the Indian rate of futurity discount be 5 percent. Then the present value to India on Jan. 1, 1960, of the future interest and amortization payments is $85, so the loan is as good to her as a gift of $15. If the Soviet rate of futurity discount is also 5 percent the USSR feels as if it has given away the same amount. (A similar technique has been used by F. D. Holzman to estimate the tax element in the forced sale of Soviet bonds to the population: see *American Economic Review,* June 1957).

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can be said is that a grant is unquestionably a much greater benefit to the receiver and sacrifice to the giver than a loan of the same amount. Add the fact that an underdeveloped country is not a *homo economicus,* coolly comparing a grant with a loan by means of interest tables, but will be swayed by the various psychological motives set out above, and it becomes scarcely sane to put the two things in one column.

3) *Communist aid is statistically insignificant.* The West and the Communist bloc contributed approximately the following amounts to the underdeveloped countries in 1957 (in millions of dollars):[2]

Source	*Short Loans*	*Long Loans*	*Grants*
USSR	—	100-20	1[3]
China	—	—	20
European satellites	—	40-60	0.4[3]
Total	—	**140-80**	**21.4**
U. S. Government	417[4]	286	1342
" "			15.5[3]
US private	—	1268	—
US banking system	459[5]	xx	xx
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	xx	200	xx
International Monetary Fund	562	xx	xx
Other Western governments	—	450[6]	450[6]
Other Western private	—	0[7]	—
UK banking system	711[8]	xx	xx
Total	**2149**	**2204**	**1807.5**

5) *Private as well as public finance is "aid."* We too often compare merely what our respective governments do, but private enterprise must in justice also be counted; its omission sets up a further bias in favor of Communist performance. This point is also fully brought out by Mr. Berliner. What, actually, is "aid"? It is obviously *not* the provision of any goods—including capital equipment—against current export deliveries; *i.e.,* it is not the mere sale of machinery as a straight business proposition. In this connection it must be noted that most Sino-Soviet transactions are not "aid," Moscow's labels notwithstanding, and Chinese figures for Soviet aid are far more reliable (and much smaller) than Soviet ones. Conversely, "aid" obviously *is* the loan of money even if it is spent on such evanescent commodities as rice. All goods and services provided on loan or gift, privately or publicly, are "aid." In short, *aid is simply another word for the current trading surplus, however financed.*

SO FAR, THEN, so very good. The chief defect of Mr. Berliner's book is its comparative neglect of aid inside the Communist bloc. The passage on this (pp. 51-55) is scholarly and useful, but far too short. Moreover, it neglects two sources of importance to the problem just mentioned of assessing Sino-Soviet transactions — the Chinese budget, which provides figures of annual revenue from foreign loans, and Soviet statistics on trade with China, which reveal the visible trade balance between the two countries. Here are the data from these sources (in millions of dollars):[9]

	Chinese revenue from foreign loans	*Chinese visible trade balance with USSR*
Before 1953	875	—
1953	175	−231
1954	354	−181
1955	663	− 99
1956	47	+ 31
1957	9	+ 94

[2]This table is essentially Mr. Berliner's, except for the International Monetary Fund figures and the short lending of the UK and US banks. Other countries do far less short-term business, but it is clear that more thorough research would show very surprising figures in this field. What, one wonders, is China's short-term position? Her trade drive of early 1958 must have been mainly on short credits. Or, say, Switzerland's? The symbol "—" means "not known," and "XX" means "not applicable."

[3]Contributions for UN technical aid: such contributions from other Western governments are included in the total grant figure for that category.

[4]Commodity loans under Public Law 480, not yet converted into long loans.

[5]Source: "International Financial Transactions of USA," *Federal Reserve Bulletin.*

[6]Figures in this case are for 1955; taken from Wiles, "The Red Widow's Mite," *The Nation,* Nov. 8, 1958. Mr. Berliner also uses 1955 figures here, but unaccountably gets them smaller by $150 million.

[7]Assuming that as in 1955, French private disinvestment in the Union Francaise offset all non-American private investment (see Wiles, *op. cit.*). Mr. Berliner seems to have taken no account of this French private disinvestment, which is a major feature of the foreign aid scene.

[8]Sterling area only. Sources: Cmd. 540, Table 10, less change in sterling holdings of Australia and New Zealand, estimated from International Monetary Fund's "International Financial Statistics."

[9]N. B. Scott, "Sino-Soviet Trade," *Soviet Studies,* Oct. 1958; United Nations Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, Bangkok, 1958, p. 103.

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Neither of these sets of figures bears any relation at all to Mr. Berliner's list of Soviet aid to China in his Table 5, and it would be good to know why. In two instances, at least, reasons can be given: the immense figure cited above for 1955 loan revenue, so entirely unrelated to the small total of published loans noted in Mr. Berliner's table, includes the installations of Port Arthur. On the other hand, Mr. Berliner's list includes a Soviet "loan" of $625 million on April 7, 1956; yet close inspection of the text of this transaction reveals it to be no loan at all, but rather a long-term trade agreement (as indeed is the recent agreement of January 1959). This error has, of course, a sizable effect on his totals.

It would be helpful here to sketch (the reviewer can do no more) the movement of the Soviet annual trading surplus or deficit since, say, 1950. In that year the principal element was the huge deficit represented by East German reparations. From 1946-53 these reparations totalled, according to a West German official estimate, 43.6 billion East German Deutschmarks [DM (0)] plus an additional DM (0) 16 billion in occupation costs.[10] Since they tapered off as time went on, let us assume the annual average (7.4 billion) applied to 1950; this would be about 19.2 billion rubles (or about 3.8 billion dollars)[11]—representing 4 percent of the Soviet national income (GNP at factor cost), or about twice the then value of all regular Soviet imports (at internal Soviet prices). This fantastic figure, all a "grant" and not a loan, exceeds many times over the aid extended by the USSR or indeed the whole Communist bloc in 1957. No wonder Soviet trade statistics exclude "goods the import and export of which do not have a commercial character."[12] Should a West German calculation of reparations be suspected of bias, two alternative approaches are given in a footnote.[13]

Other reparations payments to the USSR in 1950 were in comparison insignificant. They may be estimated as follows, in millions of reparations dollars and current dollars (the "reparations dollar" was supposed to represent world market prices of 1938, but this rule was very arbitrarily applied; as the American wholesale price level doubled between 1938 and 1950, we can only assume the same relation between reparations and current dollars):

	Reparations[14]	*Current*
Hungary	20	40
Rumania	30	60
Finland	14	28

Larger than any of these items was the USSR's receipt of cheap Polish coal. As a partial offset to her share in

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[10]Federal Ministry for All-German Questions, *SBZ von A bis Z* (The Soviet Occupation Zone from A to Z), Bonn, 1958, p. 262.

[11]Dr. Werner Klatt puts 1 DM (0) as equal to 2.6 rubles on retail food markets in 1956. Since retail prices have been falling in both East Germany and the USSR since 1950 and since the financial fiscal structures are similar, we may boldly convert this rate.

[12]*Vneshniaia Torgovyla SSR* (Foreign Trade of the USSR), 1958, p. 5.

[13]The first is that of Professor Wolfgang Stolper of Massachusetts Institute of Technology: in his draft, *The Structure of the East German Economy,* he holds (pp. 9-10) that a fair figure for reparations is 25 percent of the East German GNP, which he estimates (Table 163) at DM (0) 31.97 billion for 1950. The estimate of reparations in the text above almost fits this formula, constituting 23 percent of the GNP figure. Professor Stolper's draft is a careful and original calculation based on the raw data, but unfortunately does not deal directly with reparations, which remain embedded in the large "residual" item in the national income.

The second approach is based on the discrepancy between the two volume indices of Soviet investment. Every year the budget speech gives a figure in current rubles for investment outside *kolkhozy,* as financed by state grants and enterprises' retained funds. It is possible to deflate this by an investment price index and get a volume index utterly different from the official one. The discrepancy could well be that the unofficial index omits investment out of reparations, which needs of course no finance of any kind. The following is a table of investment outside *kolkhozy* in billion rubles or index numbers:

	1940	1946
(1) At current prices as in budget speech	43	46
(2) At 1955 prices as in the official volume index	43.2	46.8
(3) Price index for investment goods	100	142
(4) Volume index based on (1) and (3)	100	75
(5) Volume index based on (2)	100	107

Thus, at 1946 prices capital reparations were (107-75) ÷ 75 × 46 = 20 rubles. That this figure is so close to the estimate in the text must deceive no one; the calculation is very hazardous, the date is different, and capital reparations from all countries are not of course the same thing as capital and current reparations from East Germany. Nevertheless the order of magnitude is confirmed. Sources: Nove, *Review of Economics and Statistics,* 1954; Zverev, budget speeches; *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo,* 1956, pp. 158-9; Grossman, *Planovoye Khozyaistvo* No. 3, 1946, p. 41; N. Jasny, *The Soviet 1956 Statistical Handbook,* pp. 140-1; Lynn Turgeon, *Labor Productivity in Basic Industries of the USSR* (Columbia Dissertation, 1958) Tables IIC, IIF.

[14]The figure for Hungary is based on an original total of 200 million reparations dollars to be paid over six years, later extended to eight years; the outstanding amount was reduced by 50 percent on July 1,1948. Assuming that delays had held down actual deliveries to $50 million by that date, annual deliveries in 1950 were 8 x (200-50). The same formula is applied in the case of Rumania, substituting an original reparations figure of $300 million for Hungary's 200 million. Source for both countries: M. Dewar, *Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe* Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950. The figure for Finland is from the Bank of Finland Yearbook, 1950, p. 3.

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German reparations, which she received solely through the USSR as intermediary, Poland delivered at a preferential price altogether about 60 million tons of coal to the USSR over the years 1946-53 inclusive, in addition to normal exports. In 1950 this price was $2 a ton, when its market price would probably have been $18, implying a gift of $120 million.[15]

Thus the identifiable total of grants to the USSR in 1950 was $4,048 million. On the other side, Moscow extended a few small loans within the bloc, totalling $150 million, as set out by Mr. Berliner.

How different the picture in 1957. By now all reparations have stopped, and the USSR is a fair-sized capital exporter:

	in millions of dollars
Satellite debts cancelled (Berliner Table 5)	195.5
Loans to China (as per Chinese budget speech)	7
Current utilization of other loans within the bloc, assuming an average four-year utilization period from date of agreement (Berliner Table 5, omitting the aforementioned $625 million to China)	164
Current utilization of loans outside the bloc (Berliner Table 4)	110
UN technical aid (Berliner Table 13)	1
Less amortization:	
Within the bloc, assuming ten-year periods of amortization (Berliner Table 5)	−230
Outside the bloc, on the same basis (Berliner Appendix A)	− 15

Summing up, we may guess that the Soviet intake and output of "aid," excluding short-term movements, has gone through a tremendous swing between 1950 and 1957 (in millions of dollars; "+" indicates "made by," "—" indicates "made to" the USSR):

	Net grants	*Net loans*
1950	−4048	+150
1957	+ 196.5	+ 36

A FURTHER CRITICISM must be raised, bearing on Mr. Berliner's comparative neglect of China. If a grant is at least economically worth very much more than a loan, then China renders (or rendered until her balance of payments crisis in late 1958) more foreign aid than the USSR, and much more than she receives. For China alone of Communist countries proceeds mainly by grant. Her grants also extend to Mongolia and North Korea, though the latter do not seem to have been very grateful. Moreover Chinese external trade runs at about two-thirds of the volume of Soviet external trade. So all in all China is a force very much to be reckoned with, and we do wrong to speak of the "Soviet" bloc.

On balance, Mr. Berliner's study is an all-important contribution to the statistics of Soviet aid to non-Communist countries, which is shown to be in most cases economically negligible. It is the more unfortunate that he has neglected the capital account (or balance of aid) of the USSR with its allies, and the Chinese capital account altogether. No reader would guess what immense gifts the USSR was receiving just a few years ago, or that China was recently rendering more aid than the USSR, and more than she ever received. On the political side, Mr. Berliner has not shown what actually happens *to* and *in* countries that take Communist aid: *do* they go Communist, *does* it help the local party? With the single, dubious exception of Iraq it would seem not; but whatever the answer to this question it can only be given by experts on the recipient countries.

[15] *I.e.*, ⅛ x 60x $16. Figures from sundry Polish sources.

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Will Russia Attack?

H. S. Dinerstein:
War and the Soviet Union,
Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1959

Reviewed by Denis Healey

THOUGH THE SUBTITLE, "Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking," gives a clue to the contents of the book, the reader should be warned that Mr. Dinerstein does not attempt to offer a balanced picture of Soviet military doctrine at the present time. Mr. Garthoff's *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age,* (F. A. Praeger, New York, 1958) is much more useful in this respect.[1] But both books share a common defect. Although they provide in detail and without distortion much information, both make generalizations about the dominant trend in Soviet strategy for which there simply is no conclusive evidence—least of all in the service journals which are their main source material. As a result they are compelled to bridge gaps in the evidence by erecting structures of logical inference on foundations which are quite unable to bear their weight.

Mr. Garthoff tried to prove that because the Soviet Union now possesses balanced military forces for every level of warfare it is most likely to experiment in limited war, preferably with conventional forces alone. This is a reasonable view, but it flies in the face of all the documentary evidence. Against the unanimous verdict of official statements that limited war is impossible, Mr. Garthoff was able to find only one casual remark by Khrushchev to support his theory. This does not necessarily mean that Mr. Garthoff was wrong, but simply that we should not expect to find the intentions of the Soviet Union's political rulers spelled out in the professional writings of its colonels and generals. Indeed, in one sense, the new speculative freedom allowed to the services in Russia, though still severely limited, makes it even less likely than before that military journals will reflect the secret purposes of the party leaders.

Mr. Dinerstein concentrates almost the whole of his attention on Soviet military statements about all-out nuclear war, too often allowing the reader to forget that this is in any case only a small part of Soviet military doctrine. He tries to prove that the main purpose of Russia's growing missile forces is to provide the capacity for a pre-emptive strike against the United States; moreover, he argues that in certain circumstances, which he admits to be unlikely for technological reasons, the Soviet Union might without provocation launch an all-out nuclear suprise attack.

MR. DINERSTEIN, too, may be right. But he certainly fails to prove his case in this book. He has no difficulty in showing that Soviet military theory no longer excludes surprise as a factor which may decide the outcome of a battle, and even of a whole war (though the evidence is less convincing on the latter point). Moreover, he demonstrates conclusively that some Soviet writers envisage the necessity for pre-empting a surprise attack by the enemy with a surprise attack of their own. But when he goes further and argues that therefore we must assume that the USSR now gives priority to the creation of a first-strike counterforce capacity, he engages in speculation for which there is no Soviet evidence.

Mr. Dinerstein developes his argument as follows. Since some Soviet military authorities admit the utility of a pre-emptive attack, the Soviet government must be building a pre-emptive military capacity. Soviet missiles are said to have an accuracy of within six to twelve miles at five thousand miles range, which indicates, in the estimate of the author, that they are designed purely for military targets; by contrast, retaliation against an enemy's first strike must be aimed at large targets, such as population centers. In any case, military doctrine in the Soviet Union admits only of a counterforce role for her armed forces, Mr. Dinerstein continues, and her strategic nuclear weapons are accordingly designed to strike first, not to retaliate after being attacked by the

[1]Reviewed by this author in *Problems of Communism,* No. 5 (Sept.-Oct.), 1958, p. 44.

A frequent contributor to these pages, Mr. Healey is a Member of the British Parliament and one of the Labor Party's most articulate spokesmen on foreign affairs.

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enemy. The Russians are working hard at active and passive air defense, true. But this can only mean that they expect attack merely by that part of the enemy's forces which has survived their first strike, because the damage caused by any enemy's initial blow would be too great to be worth preparing against. Finally—though this is an argument which appears only intermittently—the very idea of pre-emptive attack assumes warning of the enemy's intentions, and as no warning will be possible when both sides have solid-fuelled missiles, the USSR must really be preparing to strike the first blow without provocation.

SOME OF these arguments are obviously unsound in logic. But even those which are formally correct depend on accepting the whole corpus of doctrine about nuclear grand strategy which has been built up over the last few years in American universities and institutions such as the Rand Corporation, to which Mr. Dinerstsein belongs. Much of this doctrine is useful, all of it is stimulating. But there is no reason whatever to believe that it governs Soviet thinking in the same field. Indeed the evidence suggests that, in this sphere of strategy at least, Soviet thinking is less influenced by theoretical preconceptions than it is often supposed. The Russians are building an intercontinental missile force, probably because this is the only way of neutralizing America's Strategic Air Command. They want the most accurate missiles, probably because accuracy is an advantage whatever the target. They are working on air defense, probably because they want to minimize their casualties whatever the weight of attack; and it should be remembered that as nuclear weapons become more widely available, the USSR may be threatened with attack by countries far weaker in nuclear armament than the United States is today.

Though it is intellectually convenient to distinguish between counterforce and retaliatory capacity, between first and second strike forces, the fact is that the same nuclear weapons can be used against civilian and military targets, before or after an enemy attack. (The chances of protecting a missile base against certain destruction are rapidly improving.) Thus the peacetime value of these weapons, whether as a deterrent or as a means of diplomatic blackmail, is considerably enhanced if the government responsible for firing them refuses to restrict their application to one particular set of circumstances. The important thing about the recent Soviet discussion of pre-emptive war is that it frees the Soviet government to make whatever diplomatic or military use of its nuclear weapons it desires. This is indeed the intellectual counterpart of Russia's impressive range of military capacity; for doctrinal flexibility in the necessary complement of balanced forces.

The USSR now has both a military capacity and a strategic doctrine which permits her to use military force as an instrument of policy with great precision. But there is overwhelming evidence that she will seek as always to limit the use of force according to the value of the issue at stake. Since 1950 the Soviet Union has been discouraged from using military power in direct aggression partly because American strategy has been based on the doctrine and capacity of direct all-out nuclear attack against the Soviet Union in response even to a conventional attack on any ally of the United States. Because the US has relied on a first-strike counterforce capacity to deter even limited aggression, the USSR has had every incentive to build the biggest nuclear strike force of her own compatible with maintaining her military superiority at other levels, and to multiply the diplomatic value of this striking force by suggesting its use in a pre-emptive role. For if an American nuclear attack were threatened in response to a local aggression, the Soviet Union could expect sufficient warning to neutralize it by the counter-threat of a pre-emptive attack. Thus by admitting a pre-emptive role for its weapons arsenal the Soviets seek to deter the United States from threatening to initiate all-out nuclear war on a minor issue and to render the threat of massive retaliation inoperable in defense of an ally.

BUT EVEN though the Soviet Union may emphasize the pre-emptive role of its missile forces to neutralize the Strategic Air Command during the period of the missile gap, a counterforce strategy at the level of all-out nuclear war may soon be irrational for both sides, since it may become technologically impossible for a first strike to reduce an enemy's retaliatory capacity to a tolerable level. In this situation neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will have any military incentive to maintain more than second-strike retaliatory forces, and America's allies will have to stand on their own nuclear weapons—unless the alliance as a whole can find a more rational collective strategy. From this point of view, acceptance of Mr. Dinerstein's thesis could prove positively dangerous. For by concentrating attention on that part of the arms race which neither side can win, it could distract Western governments from meeting Soviet power at the other side of the military spectrum, in the field of tactical and conventional armament.

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Polish Communism

Flora Lewis:
A Case History of Hope—
The Story of Poland's Peaceful Revolution,
Doubleday & Co., New York, 1958.

K. S. Karol:
Visa pour la Pologne (Visa for Poland),
Gallimard, Paris, 1958.
Macgibbon & Kee, London, 1959.

Wanda Bronska-Pampuch:
Polen Zwischen Hoffnung und Verzweiflung
(Poland Between Hope and Despair),
Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, Cologne, 1958.

M. K. Dziewanowski:
The Communist Party of Poland—
An Outline of History,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1959.

Reviewed by K. A. Jelenski

MORE THAN TWO YEARS after the October events in Poland, four new books have appeared in Europe and the United States, all of them dealing with the history and the background of what has certainly been one of the most stirring and significant chapters in communism's history.

Before delving into the various issues raised by these books, a concise summary of each is in order.

Flora Lewis' *Case History of Hope* is the work of an excellent journalist who lived through the "Polish October". Alert, sensitive, intelligent, and well-informed, she succeeds in rendering Polish postwar history intelligible to the lay reader by superimposing over a clear chronological narrative separate chapters on the various aspects of contemporary Poland. Thus the 1955 Youth Festival becomes the occasion for a chapter on the problems and the role of Polish youth, Swiatlo's revelations (of which more below) suggest a chapter on the secret police, the Poznan uprising leads naturally to a study of the economy, *etc.* What is sometimes lacking in this book is precisely what lies beyond the journalist's purview: a clear grasp of the historical roots of current events.

In K. S. Karol's *Visa pour la Pologne,* analytical and autobiographical elements are interwoven. Born in prewar Poland, raised in a leftwing milieu, the author's sympathies were clearly with communism when he sought refuge in the USSR, in 1939. Shocked by Soviet reality, Karol nevertheless continued to believe in Russia's socialist "mission". In 1946 he returned to Poland and actively supported the new regime, hoping that the "people's democracy" would avoid the pitfalls of Stalinist Russia. But the condemnation of Gomulka and the "new line" of 1948 led him to choose exile once again, this time in France. There, as a staff-writer of the weekly *L'Express* and Paris correspondent for the *New Statesman and Nation,* he "refused to choose between the two blocs," and adopted an interpretation of events much like Isaac Deutscher's. Revisiting Warsaw in July 1956, Karol found his old comrades "embittered and profoundly disappointed: They had devoted themselves unstintingly to a policy which they believed to be fundamentally right, in line with historical necessity; and the results were almost incredibly disastrous." This personal experience, described with complete honesty, abounding in direct and often striking observations, constitutes the best part of Karol's book. Indeed, one can only regret that the author-as-witness yields the stand so modestly to the author-as-analyst. For the very factors which enrich Karol's personal testament—his affective conditioning, the conflicts between his diverse loyalties—obscure and defeat his analytical judgment. Hence a certain confusion, as on a palimpsest, between the story we owe to the author's honesty and the remnants of quite another story, which we can only ascribe to his nostalgia.

A young Polish poet, journalist and literary critic now living in Paris, Mr. Jelenski authored "Revisionism—Pragmatism—Gomulkaism," which appeared in the May-June 1958 issue of this journal.

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Wanda Bronska-Pampuch *(Polen Zwischen Hoffnung und Verzweiflung)* belongs to an earlier generation of Polish Communists. For her, the destruction of the prewar party meant years of suffering in Soviet concentration camps, where she acquired some quite personal reasons for hating Stalinism. In her feeling for the revisionists, one senses something of the grim tenderness of a mother for an avenging child. Her old internationalism has been replaced by an almost missionary patriotism, here directed towards the German public which she passionately seeks to win over to the Polish "cause". Conscientious, a bit confused, her book contains a good deal of solid—often previously unpublished—information.

While Karol's tendency is to see modern Polish history as nothing more nor less than the history of the Polish Communist Party, M. K. Dziewanowski *(The Communist Party of Poland, an Outline of History)* has succeeded in placing the story of the party's development in a wider context. Of the four books under consideration, Dziewanowski's is the only one which is meant to have—and has—enduring validity as a work of historical scholarship.

Each of these books would justify a separate study. If there is an advantage in considering them together (even in Dziewanowski, the party's history becomes by 1945 the country's history, and more than half of his book covers the same ground as the three others), it is because their confrontation helps to clarify the major problems raised by the evolution of Poland since World War II.

POLAND ALONE, among the countries of the bloc, has managed to create and maintain the preconditions for an intimate *rapprochement* between the "legal country"—the power apparatus and its institutional manifestations—and the "real country"—the nation's economic, political, social, intellectual and religious forces. The specific features of Polish communism derive precisely from the always latent and tolerated tension between ideas and institutions, between the regime and the nation's spontaneous life—a tacit compromise concluded for the purpose of mutual defense against the Soviet menace, after the apparent victory of freedom over the regime. To be sure, the concrete forms of Polish communism are comprehensible only in terms of the country's economic and social background. Its significance to the outside world, however, has been a part of a more general process which has been taking place within the Soviet bloc. Indeed, it is quite clear that, whatever specifically Polish phenomena may be involved here, they could not have asserted themselves were it not for the crisis into which Stalin's death plunged the entire Communist empire.

This crisis is at the heart of our subject, and its various manifestations are dealt with abundantly in all four of these books. All, for example, justly stress the diminution of police terror, without which the "revolt" of the intellectuals would have been inconceivable. On the other hand, one is surprised to note that K. S. Karol, the most Marxist-oriented of these authors, has quite neglected the economic aspect of the October "revolt". In fact, he presents the Six-Year Plan as a resounding success, and only in the second part of his book does he indicate some realization of the fact that all was not well with economic planning during the Stalinist period.

The point, in the reviewer's opinion, is crucial. The crisis which was to lead to the Hungarian revolution and the Polish October was already latent in the satellite countries before Stalin's death, since it was inherent in the breakdown of an economic planning system slavishly copied (or, more precisely, imposed by the USSR) from the Soviet model. This system, which for all its inevitable waste and disorder could function in a country of practically inexhaustible resources, like the USSR, could only come to grief in countries lacking in raw materials and foreign exchange, and inhabited by a working population accustomed to certain minimum living standards (however low these were, when compared to those of Western Europe). According to the Polish Six-Year Plan, proclaimed in 1949, the average living standard was to rise by 50 percent. Instead, it declined rapidly and constantly after 1951. This led to a general tightening of the system of police terror, the classic Stalinist method of forcing workers and peasants to produce in worsening economic circumstances. The terror, had it continued in full force, might have contained the general disaffection in a state of latency, had not Stalin's death touched off a struggle for power between the system's various "apparatuses". The precise development of this struggle remains a mystery to the outside world, but one of its results was, obviously, the weakening of the MVD.

AFTER THE elimination of Beria, in July 1953, the Kremlin leaders duly informed their colleagues in the "popular democracies" of the "excesses" of the MVD, and authorized them to reorganize their own secret police organizations. Little as we know of the mechanism for the transmission of Moscow's orders to the satellite capitals, it can safely be said to be far more complex than most people on this side of the iron curtain—or even in Poland—ever imagined. The

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problem was, generally, to imitate the Soviet example, but it was sometimes necessary to guess what the Soviet leaders wanted—and woe unto those who guessed wrong. The political police, on the other hand, seem to have been far more directly subject to Beria's orders than the various other Polish organs were to their respective Russian counterparts. This may explain why seven months passed before a Polish delegation led by Franciszek Mazur, a hardcore Stalinist, ventured to leave for Moscow in order to study the problem of the reorganization of the secret police. In the interim, however, the Swiatlo revelations had burst over Poland.

This, despite superficial appearances to the contrary, was no banal cold war episode. In December 1953, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Swiatlo crossed into the western sector of Berlin and requested political asylum. Some nine months later this "super-cop"—formerly Deputy-Director of a department of the Ministry of Public Security responsible for the surveillance of the top echelons of the party—began a series of 150 broadcasts from Munich, on Radio Free Europe. His revelations on the inner party machinery, on the role of the Russians, on the methods of police, produced an enormous impression in Poland. The anti-Communist majority, of course, had always in any case suspected what Swiatlo now so circumstantially proved. But Swiatlo's broadcasts—which were printed and scattered over Poland in hundreds of thousands of copies, by means of balloons launched from West Germany—were a psychological shock for many Communists, indeed for many party leaders who were often in a position to verify his charges. Thus the political police, already compromised and threatened with reorganization, found itself exposed to the hatred of the population, including that of most party members. Thus did the party, in a rather unexpected way, begin to "recover contact with the masses"! In due time, an editorial in *Trybunu Ludu* (the party's daily) accused the political police of setting up a state within the state, and the purge of the police apparatus—together with the revision of the trials staged in the Stalinist manner—was begun.

SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH this attack on the Praetorian Guard of the totalitarian state, two other processes were helping to shake the Stalinist edifice: the beginning of a certain economic liberalization and the attempt to reinforce the party's position by strengthening its popular base. Both produced results quite different from what the Kremlin seems to have expected.

As early as the first months of 1953, *i.e.*, even before Malenkov's famous speech on the "new economic line", the Polish party leaders were envisaging various methods—decreasing the rate of national investment, raising real wages by releasing reserves and reducing prices, increasing the production of consumers' goods—to soften the rigors of the economic system. In approving these tactics, Moscow hoped to improve the situation of the satellite regimes by making them more popular. Exactly the opposite effect was attained, however, for two reasons. To begin with, the doctrinal and structural rigidity of the economic system was such, at that time, as to minimize the possibility of any effective change, short of such measures as those proposed by Imre Nagy in Hungary—who was replaced by the Stalinist Rakosi precisely because he had proposed them! The consequence, in Poland, was simply to infuriate the population further by first arousing, then disappointing, its hopes. On the other hand, the change of the government's economic line meant that the old planning dogmas were no longer sacrosanct. If the government could revise such shiboleths as the collectivization

THE BIG RISK

Scene: The "Government Insurance Office." Windows left to right offer insurance "Against Fire," "Against Persecutions for Criticism," "Against Theft," "Against Accidents."

—From Szpilki (Warsaw), April 26, 1959.

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of agriculture and the priority of heavy industry, it became possible to discuss them, and even to criticize them. And this possibility appeared at a providential moment, when Khrushchev had initiated his "return to Leninism" and the satellite parties were being urged to eschew the errors of the past and refurbish their "mass base". All at once it became clear that the Polish leadership, even within the party, was completely isolated. In November 1954 there was a meeting of party leaders, which Ochab, then Secretary of the United Workers' (*i.e.,* Communist) Party later (at the 8th Plenum, in October 1956) described in these terms: "The Party leadership found itself virtually isolated. Its proposals, although correctly conceived as far as they went, were inadequate to the demands of the situation." In seeking to apply the same methods at home and in the "popular democracies," the Russians were the victims of their own conformist world-view. They could not imagine how deeply they were hated in Poland, nor how unpopular the Polish Communists were in their own land. The Russian people had been conditioned by thirty years of totalitarianism, and it could derive some nationalist pride from the sheer power of the Soviet regime. But the factors which in the USSR tended to assuage the people's hatred of the regime produced a contrary effect in Poland, even among party members.

IN THESE circumstances—the relaxation of the terror and the weakening of the economic dogma—there was a wave of criticism, in principle authorized by the party, since in principle the party controlled everything. As early as 1954 this criticism was beginning to change the character of the Polish press.

Thus was set in motion an interacting process: on one side, the growing disaffection of the working class and the increasing boldness of the critical intelligentsia; on the other, the efforts of the party hierarchy to adapt to the new situation. This process—*i.e.,* the entire chain of action and reaction which led to the regime's transformation between 1953 and 1956—was still confined at this point to "Communist Poland." The majority of the nation with its powerful traditional forces—the peasantry and the Catholic Church—remained outside the movement, with no perspective of overthrowing the regime and no belief in the possibility of altering it from within. It was only later that these traditional forces were able, by offering the tottering party leadership a truce and a *modus vivendi,* to become the principal beneficiaries of the entire process.

Dziewanowski alone gives proper weight to the interaction of rank-and-file revolt and regime adaptation:

[The party] managed to save from destruction an alternate team of courageous former underground leaders who automatically gained a certain popularity in the eyes of the public because of their opposition to Stalin and his Polish stooges. This team was invaluable when the party eventually maneuvered itself into a truly "revolutionary situation."

THIS BRINGS US to two closely related problems—the nature of Polish Stalinism and the mystery of the party's dissolution in 1938. During the Stalinist period, the Hungarians used to say: "They are building Stalinvaros." The Poles, on the other hand said: "We are building Nowa Huta."[1] The point is simply that the Communist regime, detested as it was in Poland, never alienated itself from the population as completely as in the other satellite countries. The nationalist, even chauvinist, tone of the regime's propaganda during the early years, the apparently absurd but in reality deeply intuitive decision to reconstruct old Warsaw, the "national union" in defense of the new western frontiers—these factors gave Polish Stalinism a certain particularity. But even more determining were certain episodes of the party's history, and notably its conflicts with Stalin.

Obscurity still shrouds the reasons for the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party and the liquidation of its leaders. M. K. Dziewanowski, despite the excellent historical detective work which he describes in his book, is obliged to admit:

Even now, after rehabilitation of the KPP [the pre-war Polish Communist Party] after the official rejection of the charges against the party as forged, we are still puzzled by the sudden suppression of an entire section of the Comintern and the physical liquidation of its whole leadership. The statement that "the evidence for the dissolution of the KPP had been faked by a gang of saboteurs and provocateurs whose real role was only brought to light after Beria was unmasked . . ." does not explain why the party was actually dissolved. Neither were we told who were those "saboteurs and provocateurs."

On this point there are clues to be found in the varying interpretations of our authors: Wanda Bronska-Pampuch quotes an old Polish Bolshevik who had known Stalin well, saying that "Stalin dislikes the Poles." (As if to prove the point, she writes that the old man was imprisoned a few days later.) "Indeed, the dictator could not like Poles, for each Polish Communist had a spark of irreconcilable independence within him." Stalin's hatred was reinforced, she claims, by the latent Trotskyist sympathies of the KPP. And both Flora Lewis and Dziewanowski stress that the dissolu-

[1]References here are to the two "steel towns" constructed under Communist aegis in Hungary and Poland respectively.

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tion paved the way for Stalin's pact with Hitler a year later. K. S. Karol, however, refuses to accept this view:

The opinion has been expressed that Stalin was already preparing his pact with Hitler, and that the Polish Communists stood in his way. But . . . there is nothing to prove that Lenski and his friends [*i.e.*, the leaders of the Polish party] would have adopted an attitude different from that of Thorez and the German Communists. It seems therefore, that Stalin's motives were purely irrational. The dictator, laboring under a veritable persecution mania, simply decided once and for all to suppress "the stronghold of detestable Luxembourgism" and . . . "incurable heretics" . . ., the KPP. [2]

Two apparent contradictory themes recur in these interpretations. On one hand, the Polish Communists are alleged to have harbored nationalist tendencies (*e.g.*, their potential opposition to the Stalin-Hitler pact); on the other, stress is laid on the KPP's internationalist and Luxembourgist traditions, its Trotskyist leanings. The fact was that the Luxembourg tradition had both angered Stalin and isolated the Polish Communists among their own people.

In discussing the tension between nationalist tendencies and a Luxembourgian internationalism (which tended to isolate the party from the Polish people) Wanda Bronska-Pampuch proposes a subtle and plausible interpretation of Gomulka's evolution:

He began by blaming both tendencies for the party's dissolution. Such a disaster must somehow have been deserved. . . . Along with the pain he felt at the annihilation of the party's leaders in Russia, there was a skeptical reflection: had they not, after all, been wrong? Gomulka never believed—nor did anyone else in the party—that the fallen leaders had been "spies" or "enemy agents", but he recognized that they had taken the wrong line, that something essential had been lacking in their work. Later, he expressed the conclusion which he finally drew from the event: it was its lack of contact with the people which had led the KPP to bankruptcy and disaster.

Here we have one of the focal points of the Polish "October": the dialectics of socialism and the national "question."

FEW CONTEMPORARY phenomena are as paradoxical as national communism. The paradox would, indeed, seem even greater had not the history of these past forty years gradually accustomed us to the Great Russian nationalism of the USSR. For the original conception of communism did not envisage the realization of the revolution within a series of separate states. According to Marx and Engels, capitalism would itself create the preconditions of world unity, and the revolution would naturally take place on a global scale, sweeping away whatever remained of the national superstructures. Within the socialist world, Marxism envisaged not only the disappearance of the various states but also—somewhat vaguely—the withering away of the state function itself. With the development of the Russian revolution, as it became clear that Marx's predictions were unrealizable, another conception took shape, namely that of the voluntary association of each new Communist state with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, conceived not as a fixed geographic entity but as an open and free federation. The USSR annexed the Baltic States in the name of this principle—and thus reduced it to its ultimate absurdity.

THE POLISH COMMUNIST experience with Stalinism, the realization that it means a betrayal *both* of true internationalism *and* of true national independence helps to explain the existence of two apparently contradictory themes in Polish "revisionism." The young intellectuals who applied themselves so brilliantly to the ideological demolition of Stalinism in Poland had no difficulty in reconciling their admiration for Rosa Luxembourg with their insistence on national independence. Both terms of the seeming dichotomy implied opposition to the tyranny of the Kremlin. Both were rooted in the traditions of the party which Stalinism had destroyed. And both, when removed from the context of the hypocritical jargon of the Stalinist era, could be understood as complementary concepts, as attempts—from two different angles—to recreate in contemporary terms the genuine internationalism of the Founding Fathers.

Indeed, all four authors are quite visibly impressed by the resonance and volume of "revisionist" argumentation. With the exception of Dziewanowski, they all adopt the "revisionist" viewpoint in interpreting the new situation and the party leadership's response to it. Flora Lewis compares Djilas, who has lost his faith in the reformation of communism with the young Polish philosopher Kolakowski—"gently preserved for the future, for a time when ideas of how to reach more freedom will be welcomed again." Wanda Bronska-Pampuch is perhaps less confident that Kolakowski will escape Djilas' fate, but she is certain that "whatever measures

[2] The term "Luxembourgism" refers to the tradition of the pre-World War I Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL) headed by Rosa Luxemburg. The party was strongly Marxist and internationalist in outlook, and thus in conflict with the more nationalistic Polish Socialist Party (PPS), as well as with the official pro-Soviet line of the Polish Communist Party, which arose in 1918 from a merger of the SDKPiL and the left wing of the PPS.

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the leadership may take against the revisionists, reality will always prove the latter right." As for Karol, he sees the revolutionary thrust of the workers and leftwing intellectuals, and the maneuvers of the Central Committee, as two aspects of a single movement, vaguely designated as "Gomulkaism." He likes to imagine this movement as a "dialogue" between the builders of the "Polish road to socialism" (then men in power) and "the young theoreticians of Polish communism" (the "revisionist" intellectuals). By merging the two facets of contemporary Polish communism, however, he neglects what seems to be the most important phenomenon of Gomulka's Poland: the truce concluded by the regime, over the head of the "Left," with the "real country" and its traditional structures: the peasantry and the Catholic Church.

ALL FOUR AUTHORS tend for the most part to take a rather superficial view of the relations between Poland and the USSR. They make it appear that only the "Hungarian blackmail," the threat of Soviet tanks, maintains Poland within the Soviet bloc. But the "reason of state," based on alliance with Russia or even upon the temporary acceptance of Soviet domination, is not a new conception in Poland since it was championed by leaders both before World War I and during the country's short-lived independence (1918-1939). Since 1945, moreover, it has been singularly reinforced by Stalin's master-stroke: the tracing of Poland's western frontiers along the Oder-Neisse line. Thus, in the opinion of this reviewer, as long as these frontiers remain unrecognized by the Western powers, many Poles will feel themselves condemned—quite aside from any other consideration—to remain faithful to the Soviet alliance. Despite their abhorrence of the Stalinist tyranny which drove them to revolt against the Communist regime, many Poles can see no alternative to Gomulka's foreign policy, and even during the Stalinist period there were elements of the reactionary Right which supported the regime for the sake of the famous "reason of state." Paradoxically, those Poles who—since October 1956—have weighed the chances of driving the Communist Party from power, have thought in terms of continuing rather than dissolving the alliance with the USSR. In particular, the idea of a "Finnish solution" for Poland has occurred to certain Catholic milieux. If the party lacks authority, they reason, if it fails to lead the country effectively, would not the Russians prefer—or at least be perfectly agreeable to—a government of Catholics which would represent a genuine national force and, at the same time, subscribe to Soviet foreign policy? The flaw in this argument, of course, is that it strips all ideology from the Kremlin leaders and reduces them to abstract imperialist Machiavellians—an over-simplification common among many anti-Communists. It is, moreover, a narrowly nationalist argument, based on the illusion that Polish society can somehow isolate itself from the Communist orbit while remaining within it.

The fact remains however, that, aside from a young and lively Left, the Poles are more concerned with the "reason of state" than with the problematic transformations they might help to bring about in the Communist world. It is striking that neither Flora Lewis nor Wanda Bronska nor K. S. Karol accord the slightest attention to this line of thought, although it is regularly put forward in the articles of Poland's most influential journalist, Kisielewski, of the Catholic *Tygodnik Powszechny,* and constitutes an important factor in the truce between the regime and the traditionalist Polish intelligentsia. Apparently, these authors see Gomulka's Poland only as a function of the Stalinist past, and Polish evolution only as one phase in the development of post-Stalinist Eastern Europe.

Here again it is Dziewanowski who demonstrates the deepest grasp of the permanent factors with which the Polish political mind must grapple: He writes:

> The October revolution proved what a powerful hold the slogan of independence had retained over the minds of Polish people. The party, in consequence, has made an effort to identify independence with adherence to the "socialist camp" on the ground that Moscow is the sole power both willing and able to assure Poland's possession of the Western provinces, and that remaining within the "socialist camp" is a precondition of Poland's survival.

WHAT PERSPECTIVES does the future offer? K. S. Karol, characteristically, is the most optimistic of the four authors, since he considers Poland "the advance-guard within the Soviet bloc" and the natural promoter of a "relaxation of tension" between East and West. His analysis is influenced by an obviously preconceived view of the world, so that he can write: "Since 1949, my hopes of reestablishing my ties with Poland had been based on the existence of social forces within the Communist world which were bound, sooner or later, to impose a truly socialist policy." But if certain social forces within the Communist world indeed constitute a formidable anti-totalitarian tendency, it is difficult to identify them with socialism, and even more difficult to believe that the evolution of the Soviet bloc—which is the consequence of constantly shifting compromises between the leadership and various groups of the "led"—will result in the "realization of social-

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ism." It may still be possible to believe in socialism as the final outcome of human history, but it has become quite difficult to believe that the predestined instrument of such an outcome is the Soviet bloc.

Flora Lewis, of course, has a less doctrinaire view of the future: "Poland's story shows," she writes, "that there may be hope of drawing communism's fangs and extracting its venom until it becomes a new system with an old name."

Every cliché contains an element of truth—and that is the case with the view of Gomulka (which appears in each of these books) as a Janus looking towards "communism" on one side and towards "patriotism" on the other. The best formulation, in the reviewer's view, is Dziewanowski's:

> In a way, the problem of liberalizing the Communist system in Poland constitutes a vicious circle; no really essential and lasting changes in Poland's domestic structure are possible as long as the country remains within the Soviet orbit; on the other hand any attempt to leave the orbit would be suicide, as proved in the case of Hungary. This is understood by Gomulka, who after his Sturm and Drang period of the autumn of 1956 has returned to the role of a hardboiled, astute politician, an old Communist but also a patriot supremely aware of the stakes in the game.

The Yugoslav Way

Ernst Halperin:
The Triumphant Heretic,
Wm. Heinemann Ltd., London, 1958.

Fred Warner Neal:
Titoism in Action,
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1958.

Branko Lazitch:
Tito et la Révolution Yougoslave, 1937-1956
(Tito and the Yugoslav Revolution),
Fasquelle, Paris, 1957.

The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958: A Documentary Record,
Ed. by Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury,
East Europe Institute,
Prospect Books, New York, 1959.

Yugoslavia's Way: The Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists,
Trans. by Stoyan Pribichevich,
All Nations Press, New York, 1958.

Reviewed by D. D. Kostich

FOR THE FIRST thirty years after the Bolshevik Revolution, the development of communism was conditioned by Russia's own history. The emergence of Titoism a decade ago, first as a successful rebellion against Soviet authority and then as a doctrine and system of government, broke that tradition, and for the first time the evolution of communism was effectively divorced from exclusive Moscow control.

Five recent books dissect the genesis and application of the Yugoslav doctrine. Together they offer a valuable contribution to the understanding of Titoist theory and practice. Two of the volumes are compilations of documents which speak for themselves. The remaining three books are the works of authors of vastly different backgrounds—an American political scientist, a Yugoslav émigré serving on the faculty of the College of Europe, and a discerning Swiss writer intimately acquainted with Eastern Europe.

THE YUGOSLAV COMMUNIST PARTY'S history between the two world wars, as told by Mr. Lazitch, provides some clues about the psychological climate in which the present Yugoslav leaders were formed. The party had but a few years of legal existence between 1919 and 1945. In 1922 it had about 60,000 members and obtained about one-eighth of the votes cast in the parliamentary elections. Outlawed and torn asunder by

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factional struggles reflecting those in the USSR, party membership decreased to 3,000 in 1929 and 200 in 1932, not counting those in prison or exile. Many of the party leaders who found asylum in the Soviet Union died in the Great Purge of the 1930's. University students and professional revolutionaries composed the Yugoslav party ranks; there were only a few workers among them, and yet fewer peasants. The party survived the years of peace against heavy odds. In 1941, after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav Communists started organizing an underground army. The original Partisan force of some 1200 Yugoslav veterans of the Spanish civil war rapidly expanded into a full-fledged army which for four years successfully fought a war of liberation against the German occupation forces as well as a revolutionary war against the Yugoslav anti-Communist resistance. By 1945 the Partisans defeated the German armies and won the revolution. Of this double effort of the Yugoslav Communists Mr. Lazitch paints a canvas rich in outlines and color.

Friction between the Yugoslav party and the Kremlin developed as early as 1942. The Soviet Communist leaders demanded at that time that the Partisans shelve their revolutionary work until a later phase of the war, but the Yugoslav Communists, who attached primary importance to the civil war, resisted Moscow's pressure. Mr. Lazitch documents this early conflict with the texts of wartime radiograms exchanged between the Soviets and the Partisan headquarters and published by the Yugoslavs after 1948. These exchanges not only illustrate the Yugoslav Communists' attachment to doctrinal goals when confronted with Soviet political expediency, but also go far to explain Tito's cautiousness toward Stalin after the war. Eventually this attitude stiffened into outright resistance to Stalin's drive for absolute control of the Yugoslav party; the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform and the final schism in world communism were the logical sequels.

IN HIS *Titoism in Action*, Professor Neal presents a comprehensive analysis of the present Yugoslav system. He tells the remarkable story of how a Communist party, in a reversal of the orthodox totalitarian pattern, proceeded through experiment toward a reformulation of its political doctrine. The book deals thoroughly with the search, by trial and error, and the gradual evolution of a system based on administrative decentralization, yet politically wedded to the Leninist precept of "democratic centralism." It describes a system developing under the aegis of a party which, although weaned from the Kremlin, is still constrained by the doctrinaire petrifications of its Soviet heritage. As the author makes clear, the Yugoslav regime stands for reform, but only within the confines of a narrowly modified doctrine—a doctrine which renders it highly distrustful of its subjects.

In its effort to reform the state apparatus, Yugoslavia's ruling party—the Yugoslav Communist League—has effected a significant measure of decentralization in industry by creating workers' councils invested with a certain amount of management authority; by increasing the administrative authority of the agencies of municipal self-government; and finally by substituting persuasion for compulsion in its drive for a collectivized agriculture. Ideologically, the party has reaffirmed its adherence to the ultimate goal of the "withering away of the state," to be achieved through gradual economic and administrative decentralization of the country.

HOW REAL IS THE decentralization achieved thus far in Yugoslavia? Professor Neal's analysis does not provide a categorical answer. While a significant measure of decentralization has been attained, the scope of local autonomy remains severely limited—more so, in fact, than is warranted by the letter of Yugoslav law. The constraints are imposed first and foremost by the Communist League, a highly centralized organization with strict discipline and well-defined channels of command. Through the medium of auxiliary organizations, such as the nationwide labor union federation and the Socialist Alliance of Working People (a political "supra-party" mass organization), the League's control organs penetrate deep into the formally decentralized state and assure compliance with party directives. It is Professor Neal's opinion that the Yugoslav system of indirect controls works better than Soviet centralism; but whether this approach will lead toward true decentralization and the eventual withering away of the state remains an open question.

Above all else it is probably the pragmatic approach to both tactics and strategy that distinguishes Yugoslav communism from its more ideologically oriented Soviet "mentor." In this respect, as Mr. Neal points out, the Yugoslav way amounts to an abandonment of Leninism as a cohesive body of theoretical and operational principles. He cites in this connection the example of the Yugoslav attempt to adjust theory to agricultural policy. Until they abandoned their collectivization effort the Yugoslavs accepted Lenin's theory that socialism in the village was a prerequisite for socialism in the country, and that a socialist agriculture could be achieved only through the introduction of class warfare in the countryside. Having accepted this premise, the Yugoslavs had launched after the war—just as the Russians had done some twenty years earlier—a determined collectivization

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drive which reached a high point about two years after the break with the Cominform. When the Yugoslav party decided to give up forced collectivization, it did not hesitate to reverse explicitly Lenin's dictum: rather than socialism in the village being necessary to achieve socialism in the country as a whole, the official theory now holds that socialism is to be introduced gradually in all sectors of society, and that with the growth of socialist economy the outlook of the people—including the peasants—will be accordingly transformed.

Mr. Neal concludes that the most significant features of Yugoslav communism are the insistence on separate ways to socialism based on national conditions and the return to the idea of the withering away of the state, implemented by administrative decentralization and worker control of industry. In these aspects the new Yugoslav doctrine constitutes, in effect, a devastating Marxist criticism of Soviet theory and practice.

THE MILESTONES of the great schism in the Communist world are surveyed step by step in a carefully edited anthology of Soviet and Yugoslav documents entitled *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958.* The editors, Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, linked the selected excerpts with clear narrative passages which do much to illuminate the complex story of Soviet-Yugoslav relations during the last decade. There is also an important introduction by Professor Hans Kohn, the eminent scholar of East European nationalism, which sets the Soviet-Yugoslav controversy into proper perspective.

As Professor Kohn points out, the question of Yugoslav national independence versus Soviet hegemony remained paramount in the relations of the two countries throughout the whole period. At first the Yugoslavs' answers to the Cominform's—*i.e.* Stalin's—accusations showed astonishment at the questioning of their doctrinal purity, and as the controversy developed, the Yugoslavs appeared willing to yield in everything except in their insistence on the modicum of independence necessary to maintain Tito in power. When this request was ignored by the Kremlin, the thought that the USSR might be motivated by considerations other than those of ideological purity took hold in Belgrade. The Soviet part of the correspondence shows some remarkable manipulation of fact and logic, and more and more, as the reader progresses, the dank air of the cellars of Moscow's Lubianka prison seems to winnow the doctrinal pretense from the clumsy and heavy Stalinist lines.

The next important milestone in Soviet-Yugoslav relations was the beginning of the thaw following Stalin's death. After 1953, however, the Kremlin no longer faced in Yugoslavia merely a modified image of the Soviet system, but a Communist state with a system of its own, and a workable one at that. The Khrushchev-inspired reconciliation of 1955 was thus couched more in terms of co-existence between two compatible systems rather than in terms of an ideological "reunion". Yugoslavia made it clear that it was not returning to the Soviet Bloc. The nature of the agreement, unheard-of in Soviet history, contributed to the confusion which for a time characterized the Kremlin's policy *vis-à-vis* the satellites, and which was thus indirectly responsible for the Polish and Hungarian uprisings of October 1956.

While, in 1955, the Soviets acknowledged the Yugoslav position as valid, they again rejected and proscribed it as revisionist some two years later. Clearly, the acceptance as well as the rejection were determined by international and possibly other contingencies, but not by doctrinal considerations. What is it then that made political co-existence between the two Communist regimes so short-lived?

Professor Kohn's answer is unequivocal and is amply supported by the evidence presented in the volume under discussion. He identifies the conflict between Great Russian and Yugoslav nationalism as the direct cause of the incompatibility. The foundation of Soviet-Yugoslav co-existence was first severely damaged by the Polish and Hungarian upheavals of 1956, and completely destroyed a year later when the Yugoslavs refused to sign the "Peace Manifesto" issued in Moscow by 64 Communist parties on the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The manifesto would have committed the Yugoslav Communists to ". . . subordination of the interests of the proletarian struggle in one country to the interests of the struggle on a worldwide scale . . . [of] the invincible camp of Socialist states headed by the Soviet Union." They refused this commitment in 1957 just as they had resisted Stalin's cruder threats in 1948. Co-existence, collaboration, and even interdependence are the Yugoslav terms for relations with the Soviet Union, but not submission and obeisance.

THE VOLUME *Yugoslavia's Way,* an English translation of the Yugoslav Communist League's political credo formulated in April 1958, by the League's Seventh Congress in Ljubljana, makes the Yugoslav party's position very clear: "There is only one socialism, but the roads leading to it vary. . . ." The program further asserted that the threat to socialism is internal rather than external and identified the bureaucracy of state capitalism as the principal source of danger. Mos-

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cow's rejoinder, incorporated nine months later in the resolution of the Soviet Communist Party's 21st Congress, rang with equal clarity: "The views and policies of the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist League strike at the achievements of the peoples revolution and socialism in Yugoslavia."

Soviet-Yugoslav relations have thus come full circle since 1955, and once again in the Soviet bloc the Yugoslav party bears the stigma of heresy. The truth of the matter, of course, is that the Yugoslavs tried to avoid this development. Having been warned in advance of the Soviet reaction to their draft program, they introduced on the eve of the Seventh Congress last-minute modifications which they hoped would pacify the Soviet bloc. But in Moscow's view the changes did not go far enough—and slight they were indeed, as a comparison of the final text in *Yugoslavia's Way* with the comprehensive excerpts of the draft in *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958* will reveal.

As an ideological document, the Yugoslav program represents both an advance and a new point of departure for the Communists. It no longer paints the simple picture of humanity divided between the immutable forces of capitalism and the progressive forces of proletarian revolution. In spite of the persistence of some of the old encrusted Communist myths, the document demonstrates that the Yugoslav Communists are finally beginning to face the world of political reality.

IN HIS EXCELLENT book, *The Triumphant Heretic,* Ernst Halperin offers a perceptive and penetrating analysis of Titoism as a Communist political phenomenon, as a factor in Soviet bloc politics, and as a system of government. It is in the nature of the Yugoslav Revolution that Halperin finds the source of the Moscow-Belgrade conflict. Since Yugoslavia's Communists acquired power by the strength of their own arms, rather than receiving it from the Red Army, they created a revolutionary center of their own, which by its very existence denied the Soviet premise that all revolutionary power issues from the Kremlin. Conflict between Moscow and Yugoslavia then became only a matter of time, and the specific issues arose as soon as Stalin realized that Tito's independence would bolster resistance to Soviet hegemony over the satellites.

In this connection Halperin reviews the relatively obscure issue of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation which was the immediate cause of the 1948 break between Moscow and Belgrade. Stalin viewed this union as an end in itself, designed to consolidate Soviet power in the Balkans. On the other hand, Tito and

KROKODIL ON TITO: 1959



The Collapsible Seat

Upper left: " 'The leaders of the Yugoslav League of Communists are very offended when we tell them that they are sitting on two chairs. They assure us that they are sitting on their own Yugoslav chair. But why is this chair supported by the American monopolies!'—From the speech of N. S. Khrushchev at the 21st Party Congress." ("Yugoslav" holds papers labeled "revisionism.")

—From Krokodil (Moscow), May 10, 1959

Bulgaria's Dimitrov regarded it as only the nucleus of a larger federation which would eventually extend from the Aegean to the Baltic, and from the Adriatic to the Black Sea; it would consist of member states roughly equal in size and power and ready to cooperate on the basis of equality. Had the Kremlin's objective been a Communist rather than a Soviet-dominated world, such a federation could only have been welcome in Moscow; but as matters stood, Stalin considered the Yugoslav conception a major threat to the USSR and decided to smother the plan by liquidating Tito and all that his regime represented.

Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform was the result, and in its wake followed Stalin's bloody purges in the satellites. Determined to destroy all true or fancied opposition to Soviet control in Eastern Europe, the Kremlin despot sent scorces of leading East European Communists to the gallows and into prison. His victims were mostly Communists, many of them Jews, who had spent the war years in the underground or in the West. Halperin is at his best as he unfolds the background of these persecutions and traces their inspiration to the rampant chauvinism and racism of Stalin's last years. This was the morbid climax of a decadent dictatorship which, in its drive for self-aggrandizement, had given up all pretense of Marxist internationalism.

In the meantime Tito had set out to reform his own regime. His efforts were motivated by the three factors on which his survival depended: the unqualified support

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of his party, Western aid, and popular approval of his resistance to the Soviet Union. The last two factors in turn required reforms diametrically opposed to the interests of Yugoslavia's totalitarian and privileged party. Tito undertook the gamble and, at the Sixth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist League in the fall of 1952, he presented a program which virtually proclaimed the dismantling of the totalitarian party. The new Yugoslav state was to be an agglomeration of self-governing communes with a self-managing industry controlled by workers' councils and functioning within a market economy. The program represented a stage in the transition from complete totalitarianism to an authoritarian form of government endowed with elements of democracy.

But with Stalin's death, Halperin continues, died the need for the evolution of democratic forms of government in Yugoslavia, and Tito's impulse to preserve totalitarianism prevailed. Of the top Yugoslav leaders only Milovan Djilas remained sufficiently uncorrupted by power to reject the expediency of totalitarian rule for the real values contained in the Titoist postulates of decentralization and the withering away of both state capitalism *and* the party. At the party trial of Djilas in January 1954, Stalinist totalitarianism re-emerged from its shallow and temporary Yugoslav grave.

Tito's reversal prepared the ground for the Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation of 1955. Titoism equipped with a totalitarian party was an organizational structure acceptable to Khrushchev as a solution to the immediate post-Stalin problems in the Soviet bloc, and the Soviet leader was ready to come to terms with Tito at the expense of the political élite in the satellites. The conflict which then ensued between the totalitarians and the reformers in Eastern Europe is superbly described by Halperin. The struggle and the suppression of the risings of 1956 disclosed the true reality of totalitarianism. And with the failure of Khrushchev's experiment came also the end of Soviet tolerance for Titoism.

Nevertheless, the ideas of revolution in the Communist world have not been buried. Their influence, although now limited, threatens the Soviet monolith and the whole structure of the Soviet empire. But what are these ideas? Do they flow from Titoism? To quote Halperin:

> **Tito conducted his fight against Stalin as a contest between totalitarian parties. He is a politician of genius, a master-manager of the totalitarian party machinery, but he is all this at a stage of history when the people are making ready to smash totalitarian parties. Tito has defeated Stalin. But the real victor in the fight between Titoism and Stalinism, the man whom events have proved right, is Milovan Djilas, behind who stands no party machine, no police, no army, and who is still sitting, deserted and proscribed, in a Yugoslav prison cell.**

Revolutions in Latin America

Robert J. Alexander:
The Bolivian National Revolution,
Rutgers University Press,
New Brunswick, N. J., 1958.

Ronald M. Schneider:
Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954,
F. A. Praeger, New York, N. Y., 1959.

Reviewed by Victor Alba

IN THE LAST DECADE, only two countries in Latin America — Bolivia and Guatemala — have experienced national movements for social-political transformation which could lay claim, in Latin American eyes, to be classed as "revolutions." This alone is enough to underline the special interest and importance of the studies reviewed here, whose appearance within a brief interval of each other affords the opportunity for an illuminating comparison of the radically different directions taken by the two revolutions.

The qualification, "in Latin American eyes," is important since it must be borne in mind that the term

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"revolution" signifies something quite different in Latin America from its common meaning north of the Rio Grande. For North Americans, the term denotes any movement that establishes (or attempts to establish) itself in political power by undemocratic methods, regardless of its ideological character, or even of whether or not it aims at anything more than the mere substitution of a new political regime. In the Latin American conception, on the other hand, a movement is genuinely revolutionary only when it not merely carries through a simple transfer of political power—either through democratic processes or by a popular uprising (but never through a purely military *coup d'état*)—but also embarks upon a program for solving national problems and *transforming the existing social order.* (Thus, for example, the changes in Argentina in 1955 did not constitute a real revolution in the Latin American sense; as for the current upheaval in Cuba, it is still too early to make final judgment.)

BESIDES this semantic difference, one must beware of the tendency to mistake, as "socialistic," transformations which in the Latin American context do not at all have such a character. In fact, in the majority of Latin American countries, a movement would qualify as revolutionary if its goal—as was the actual case in both Bolivia and Guatemala—was to effect a transition from the semi-feudal social order of the past to an essentially *capitalist* system, even though the latter might not conform to the classic definition or to the present-day forms of capitalism as they exist in the United States and Western Europe.

But while the Bolivian and Guatemalan revolutions thus started out, in both instances, as genuine national and popular movements aiming at the institution of far-reaching political and social changes, their actual courses of development were vastly different. Only the Bolivian movement successfully maintained its original revolutionary and national character, whereas in Guatemala the revolution aborted when the national movement fell under Communist influence and was diverted from its revolutionary goals to the service of Moscow's international political objectives. The studies by Mr. Alexander and Mr. Schneider are particularly valuable in that, examined together, they shed light upon the causes which underlay the opposite outcomes of the two revolutions. Aside from this, both books individually deserve to be rated among the relatively few objective, complete, and documented studies thus far published in English, or in any other language, on these highly important Latin American developments.

To understand why the Bolivian and the Guatemalan experiences turned out so differently, one must view them in the special milieu in which revolutionary movements in Latin America have usually arisen. Most frequently we find them springing up under dictatorships, existing outside the law, and subjected to varying degrees of political persecution. Under the dictator's harsh rule, a generation grows up which is discontent with its surroundings and eager to change them, but because of the suppression of democratic political activity, it is deprived of the opportunity to investigate and study national problems, and to prepare itself ideologically and politically for assuming governmental responsibility. Where the dictatorship is both severely repressive and long-lasting, as it was in Guatemala up to 1944, the young generation's lack of political education and experience is especially pronounced. Where, on the other hand, the dictatorship alternates with occasional brief interludes of at least formal democracy, as happened in Bolivia, there is a greater chance for the development of a revolutionary movement with a firm ideological orientation and some measure of preparedness for the exercise of democratic political leadership.

Then, sooner or later, the dictatorship topples—often as part of a general democratic tide sweeping over the continent. (There have been alternating waves of democratic and dictatorial ascendancy in Latin America: *e.g.,* the democratic wave of 1944-45, the resurgence of dictatorship in 1948-49, and the new democratic tide of 1957-59.) The young revolutionary generation that spearheaded the struggle against the dictatorship now finds itself suddenly grasping the reins of power and faced by the necessity of formulating a program of action and instituting concrete measures of reform. In such circumstances, the extent to which the revolutionary movement has been able to build a firm ideological base and to develop its political capabilities becomes vitally important. A movement like the Guatemalan, animated by general principles and broad aspirations, but lacking in ideological maturity and practical political experience, is both ill-prepared to meet the test of actual leadership and more vulnerable to alien ideological influences.

THIS VULNERABILITY of the revolutionary movements assumed critical importance with the marked upsurge of Communist influence in Latin America starting in 1944-45. To a large extent the Communists were not affected by the handicaps afflicting the democratic revolutionary groups. For one thing, they had managed to carry on their doctrinal training through the period of dictatorial repression, either by means of underground activity or, more often, by going into temporary exile abroad. They were able, moreover, to offer ready-made,

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"complete" solutions of national problems since it was enough for them to look to the Soviet Union and, later, to Communist China for a model to go by. They were armed not only with a comprehensive ideological doctrine, organizational discipline, and a fanatical spirit of self-sacrifice, but also with money and with experience in labor union organization, in political maneuvering, in propaganda, and above all in the flexible application of "front" tactics designed to facilitate Communist infiltration of the improvised democratic parties and thereby gain control of the revolutionary governments. But while the Communists pretended to adhere to the same principles and aims as the democratic groups, their objective actually had nothing to do with satisfying national needs. On the contrary, in the last fifteen years, the Communist objective in Latin America has been solely to create conditions enabling the party to foment distrust of the United States and its allies and thus serve the interests of the Soviet bloc.

The Communists applied these tactics wherever the emergence of a democratic revolutionary regime provided them with the opportunity. In Guatemala, they achieved their most striking success, with fatal consequences for the whole revolution, while in Bolivia they were notably unsuccessful. The Alexander and Schneider studies thus serve as individual case studies of the effectiveness of the Communist tactics when applied in the different situations typified by Bolivia and Guatemala: on the one hand, where the Communists face a strongly-organized revolutionary movement with a relatively solid doctrinal foundation; and, on the other, where they encounter ideological immaturity, improvised organizations, and general political inexperience.

ALTHOUGH BOLIVIA had experienced intermittent periods of pseudo-democratic government during the years following the 1943 overthrow of the Peñaranda dictatorship, the real Bolivian revolution began only in 1952 with the establishment of a new regime representing the *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* (National Revolutionary Movement), or MNR. Mr. Alexander terms this revolution, on the basis of what it has accomplished to date, "the most profound movement of social change in America since the beginning of the Mexican Revolution in 1910." Its objectives, he states, have been essentially the same as those of the Mexican Revolution, and like the latter its keystone has been agrarian reform. A further common characteristic, the author notes, is that both revolutions "asserted the national character of their respective countries," that "neither has been led by people owing their allegiance to any foreign government or to any foreign ideology."

Mr. Alexander attributes the relatively peaceful execution of the Bolivian revolution to the fact that the MNR, which directed it, was a well-organized, disciplined movement with clearly-defined objectives. Ideologically the author identifies this movement with the fairly widespread revolutionary-nationalist trend of thought in Latin America which may be referred to as "Aprista" (derived from the name of the movement which originated it, the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana,* or APRA, organized in Peru in 1924). Besides the MNR, the author places in this category the *Acción Democrática* (Democratic Action) party in Venezuela, the *Partido de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Party) in Costa Rica, the *Partido Popular Democrático* (Popular Democratic Party) in Puerto Rico, and of course the *Partido Aprista* (Aprista Party) in Peru.

In Mr. Alexander's view, these parties represent "the major American alternative to communism"—a judgment strongly supported by the fact that not merely in Bolivia, but wherever such movements are strong, communism has scored no significant success. As the author shows, Communist influence in Bolivia has continuously declined ever since the MNR assumed power. Even before that, in fact, the party's recognition of the MNR as the most serious obstacle to its political ambitions was evidenced by the fact that the Communist-dominated *Partido de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (Revolutionary Leftist Party), or PIR, consistently supported the regimes in power against the MNR up until the latter's victory in the 1951 elections. Thereafter the PIR, from which the left-wing elements had broken away to form an official Communist Party, temporarily altered its hostile attitude toward the MNR in the hope of infiltrating it, but when these efforts failed it again joined forces with the Communists in opposition to the MNR government. The Communist tactics of opposition have sometimes been carried to revealing extremes. For example, when the government's proposed agrarian reform bill was being discussed in the legislature, the Communists presented their own bill, which later was discovered, according to Alexander, to be a translation of the Chinese Communist agrarian law of 1950!

IF THE CASE OF Bolivia demonstrates that the presence of a ruling revolutionary party founded upon a clear, firmly-rooted ideology constitutes an effective barrier to Communist infiltration, that of Guatemala provides equally convincing proof that ideological instability in the revolutionary movements invites such infiltration. Schneider's study of the Guatemalan Communist drive to power does not specifically inquire into this aspect of the question, but it nevertheless furnishes abundant data

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which, when put together and analyzed, lead to the conclusion that the Communist success in infiltrating and gaining control of the Arbenz government (1951-54) would not have been possible if a long period of continuous dictatorship (terminated in 1944 by the overthrow of the Ubico regime) had not left the younger generation in Guatemala without political education and prevented the formation of a national revolutionary movement with clearly-defined objectives and capable, like the MNR in Bolivia, of applying the revolutionary experience of other Latin American countries, particularly Mexico. Precisely because the Guatemalan revolutionary parties lacked a definite ideological orientation and a prepared program based upon it, it was possible for the Communists to make themselves politically indispensable: they helped in working out "solutions," put forward a seemingly innocuous program, provided slogans, and suggested tactical methods—all of which the inexperienced Guatemalan revolutionary parties were incapable of improvising on their own as readily as they had fashioned a new government to replace the defunct dictatorship.

SCHNEIDER recognizes this in more than one passage in his book. Thus, for example, he notes (p. 14) that "the lack of an organized opposition during the Ubico regime meant that there was no alternative government ready to step in after his fall." Again, he writes still more explicitly (p. 49):

No native revolutionary movement or ideological force capable of rivaling communism developed, nor was there any effective opposition [to the Arbenz regime] from an advanced left-wing party. To a considerable extent the Communists were able to play upon the political ignorance, inexperience and preoccupation of the other revolutionary parties.

The absence of a broad political movement facilitated Communist activity in Guatemala in another way not evident in Bolivia. In Guatemala, the mass of the population never really participated in political action, whereas in Bolivia—a country with a cultural and economic level even lower than that of Guatemala—the MNR drew the masses into active participation in politics. This mass political participation acted as a deterrent to militarist action inimical to the revolutionary government. In Guatemala, on the contrary, the opposite conditions aided Communist efforts to make the army a tool of the party's interests.

In the end, however, it was the army's turnabout and the indifference of the masses that doomed the Communist attempt to transform Guatemala into a Latin American "people's democracy." Thus, as Schneider remarks, the same conditions that facilitated the Communists' rise to power—the absence of mass participation in political life—"contributed to their ineffectiveness in the final crisis." The author warns, however, that communism in Guatemala is still viable. The party (Guatemalan Labor Party) remains active both in exile and secretly in the interior of the country, where it has been strengthening its cadres, building up a team of local leaders, and making fresh preparations and plans incorporating the lessons taught by its experience during the Arbenz regime.

IN SUM, a comparative reading of the two studies under review scarcely lends support to the often-heard thesis that the chief ally of communism is poverty. On the contrary, the Alexander and Schneider studies of the Bolivian and Guatemalan revolutions strongly suggest that, at least in Latin America, a factor of more decisive importance is whether or not there exists, in any given country, a revolutionary movement based upon a firm, clearly-defined ideology that is both national and international at the same time. In the development of such movements, therefore, lies perhaps the surest deterrent to the spread of communism in Latin America.

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Was Collectivization Inevitable?

Some comments on E. H. Carr's A History of Soviet Russia; Vol. V, Socialism in One Country *(Macmillan, London and New York, 1958). Reprinted from* Soviet Studies *(University of Glasgow), April 1959; permission to republish must be obtained from Basil Black, 49 Broad St., Oxford, England.*

THIS IS NOT REALLY a review of Mr. Carr's latest stimulating and scholarly volume, which has rightly won high praise. The object of this note is to set down some questions raised by one of the subjects which he analyzes, approaching it from a somewhat different angle. This subject is the peasant problem of the 1920's, which plays a key role in the history of the period and to which Mr. Carr rightly devotes much detailed attention. The questions I propose to ask are the following: what choices were in fact open to the Communist leadership in dealing with the peasant problem; given their desire to industrialize and to maintain the Soviet regime in being, could they have acted differently; what other possible solutions to these problems exist in analogous circumstances?

Some scholars would hold that such questions are meaningless. They would say that what was, was, and that it is of no interest to imagine what would have happened if various persons had acted differently, or if circumstances were other than they in fact were. On this view, all that historians can do is to seek to understand and explain the various forces which led to the events which actually occurred. Such arguments have undoubtedly a degree of validity. For example, it is not much use imagining what would have happened if Mensheviks had been Kadets,[1] or if the Bolsheviks had not been Bolsheviks. But it is possible to press such a logic too far. There are instances in which people, while not ceasing to be themselves, could have made different choices. For example, in writing the military history of the British army in 1918, our description of the events of that year must surely be influenced by the fact that Haig could have placed his reserves nearer the Fifth Army sector and chose not to. By contrast, no one in his senses would attribute the retreat of 1914 to the qualities of the then British Commander-in-Chief, who was evidently swept away by forces which he could not possibly control. Our judgment and presentation of historical evidence must be colored by a consciousness of what could or could not have been done.

But there is another more practical reason for closer enquiry into the possibilities of the agrarian situation of the 1920's. It is repeatedly asserted by Soviet publicists that the path actually taken in Russia—mass collectivization involving a high degree of coercion[2]—is a law of society, which none can escape. Thus we may be sure that the Poles and Hungarians are reminded at regular intervals of their essentially unorthodox and provisional solution of the peasant question. At the same time, underdeveloped countries are told that if they wish for rapid economic development, they must study carefully the way forward taken by the Russians. They too lack sources of spontaneous capital accumulation and are saddled with a vast number of small peasants. Therefore the whole question has a present-day political importance and is not merely of historical interest. Mr. Carr has done us a great service by his lucid description of the complex debates on the peasant problem which raged in Russia in the 1920's. But one feels in his book a tendency to suggest that the solution adopted (if not the precise extent of the violence used) was predestined. Perhaps it was, but it is still worth carefully enquiring into possible alternative roads.

THE REVOLUTION had led to a redivision of land, eliminating not only the big estates but many of the large peasant farms geared to commercial production for the market. Under the New Economic Policy, the peasants had rights over the land and over the disposal of their product, which meant that the size of the off-farm surplus depended in the last resort on what the peasants did. The land redivision in itself tended to reduce marketings. The lack of attractive and cheap manufacturers, consequent upon the backward state of industry and the impossibility of large scale imports, made it still more difficult to tempt the peasants to sell. Inflation, real or anticipated, discouraged saving and encouraged hoarding. These circumstances would have caused serious frictions even if the government confined its industrial activities merely to the restoration of prewar capacity. It was obviously going to be very difficult to obtain an adequate margin to finance even a modest industrialization drive. These were the es-

[1] Members of the liberal Constitutional Democratic Party—*Ed.*

[2] Of course, the Russian publicists deny the coercion, but it is inevitably involved in that kind of collectivization.

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sential physical and institutional elements in the situation. To them will have to be added in due course the ideological and political aspects. Of course these played a vital role in the process of decision-making, but it is useful for purposes of analytical clarity to be conscious of the fact that they have a separate existence. For example, if the facts suggest that there was another solution, but that it was rejected primarily on ideological-political grounds, it can and should be known to those who have the same problems to solve but do not share the political or ideological standpoint of the Soviet regime.

Let us first consider the problem of the off-farm surplus in relation to the average size of farm. In the middle 1920's the average peasant family holding was on the order of five hectares of sown area. Before asserting that holdings of this size are inherently incapable of feeding a large urban population, it is desirable to look at Japan. Japanese peasants have two hectares or less per family, there are very few large farms, yet remarkable successes have been achieved in increasing both aggregate output and off-farm surpluses. It is certainly true that there is a large difference between Japanese and Russian soil, climate and eating habits. Yet at least some of this difference is discounted if one takes five hectares in Russia to be equal to two hectares in Japan.

THE JAPANESE solution seems of great interest and is surprisingly little known. Had it any relevance to the Soviet situation? Could the Russians have advanced along that path in the 1920's? The obstacles to such an advance were many and varied. Firstly, the Japanese peasant had gradually acquired a tradition of highly intensive cash crop production; the Russian peasant thought largely in terms of subsistence farming. Secondly, Japanese industry provided the peasants with a large volume of cheap consumer goods; Russian industry in the 1920's could not hope to do this, although of course the Bukharin solution would have involved emphasis on investment in light industry and therefore did go in this direction.[3] Thirdly, Japan is a relatively small country with well-developed communications; Russia was and is a vast country in which most peasants are remote from markets. Fourthly, the possibilities of intensification, and especially the availability of natural and artificial fertilizers, were vastly different. Finally, land redistribution, which was completed after Japan's defeat in World War II, took place long after the completion of "primitive accumulation." In an earlier stage, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Japanese peasants were harshly exploited as part of the financing of industrialization. Therefore, in the social and economic setting of Soviet Russia in the 1920's, it was very unlikely that an egalitarian distribution of the land between peasant farmers could provide an adequate surplus. Change would doubtless have occurred in the long run, but it was probably unreasonable to expect anyone to wait so long. But a greater awareness, and closer study, of Japanese experience is clearly desirable, and the above remarks do not even scratch the surface of the problem.

IF AN egalitarian distribution could not do the job, it did not follow that it was necessary to collectivize. We ought not to neglect what might be called, for short the *kulak* solution. Far from being imaginary or impossible, this was in fact the elemental tendency which was showing itself within Russian agriculture in the 1920's, and which so frightened and dismayed the Communist leadership. Mr. Carr adduces ample evidence to show that both the leaders and the peasants were conscious that it was illogical to insist on opposing the creation of large commercial farms if the prime object was to increase marketings. Was this way forward rejected solely on the grounds of politics and ideology?

What would have happened if the *kulaks* had been allowed to grow? They would have extended their land holdings, bought such machinery and fertilizer as could be made available, and as a result production for the market would have increased (provided, of course, that there was no effort made to fix selling prices below those considered fair by the producers). This process would have continued the task, earlier tackled by Stolypin, of breaking up the village *obshchina*.[4] The number of landless laborers would have increased, and a growing number of poor villagers would flock to the towns to seek employment. Thus a development along this path would have simultaneously increased the off-farm surplus and ensured a flow of labor for an expanding industry. To expand industry it was necessary to accumulate capital. The *kulaks* were unlikely to finance industrialization voluntarily, and would hardly have bought state bonds even at a very high interest rate. However, the state had possible means of getting revenue out of money taxation, and the state monopoly of foreign trade could provide another

[3]N. Bukharin, the leading economic theoretician of the party in the middle 1920's (later purged by Stalin), advocated the continuation of the New Economic Policy as conceived by Lenin. To unfreeze the idle industrial capacity in the cities and to counteract the supply strikes in the village he advocated replacement of wholesale requisitioning of foodstuffs in the countryside by a limited "tax in kind"; opening of the channels of trade through which the non-taxable part of peasant surplus could be profitably sold; denationalization and encouragement of small-scale industry to supply the peasants; and marketing and peasant cooperation in agriculture to enlarge peasant demand for industrial goods.—Ed.

[4]Peter Arkadievich Stolypin (1862-1911), Russian Prime Minister between 1906 and 1911, was the author of the agrarian reform which entitled every member of the peasant land commune (*obshchina*) to receive full title to his share of the communally owned plowland. This legislation, which went far in destroying the Russian system of communal land ownership, was designed to combat socialism in the countryside by creating a class of prosperous peasant proprietors.—Ed.

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valuable source of revenue. The spasmodic efforts which were in fact made on these lines were associated (except for a very short period) with measures to limit *kulak* enterprise, and so these possibilities were never properly tested. It is true that peasants who own the instrument of production and the produce of the land are hard to coerce, and therefore a policy based on coercion (*i.e.*, in the last resort on police rather than fiscal measures) required collectivization. However, if there was a desire to avoid a head-on clash with the peasants, a pro-*kulak* policy was more logical and more promising than a reliance on the poor and middle peasant.

It is quite impossible within the compass of this little note to examine in detail the possible consequences of such a policy. The object of these remarks is to raise questions rather than answer them, and in this instance the argument is that we should not assume that the solution was utterly impracticable. Bukharin evidently believed that this was a possible way forward. In one sense he was more logical than the opposition; he faced boldly the ideologically uncomfortable fact that this meant accepting and even encouraging the *kulaks*, at least up to a point. He also realized that this involved a slow pace of industrialization. It is less clear how he proposed to reconcile his policy with the retention of power by the Communist Party, in a situation in which the *kulaks* would increasingly dominate village life.

The difference between Bukharin's views and those of the opposition have at various times been eloquently emphasized both by Bukharin and the opposition. Yet, when the smoke generated by the polemics is blown away, it is arguable that they had a great deal in common. Indeed, they seem to have resembled each other much more than either resembled the compulsory-collectivization policy launched by Stalin after 1928. Preobrazhenski's argument about industrialization and "primitive socialist accumulation," which had to be largely at the peasants' expense, was theoretically unanswerable, and Bukharin's opposition to it was, on a purely intellectual plane, not altogether honest.[5] Preobrazhenski understandably accused Bukharin of having "sacrificed theoretical integrity to the tasks of current polemics."[6] Bukharin appears to have been influenced by a desire, probably quite justifiable politically, to attack any theory which might justify measures that could destroy the precarious balance between workers and peasants, and so endanger political stability. In actual practice, it is hard to see how Bukharin could possibly have avoided pursuing a policy involving accumulation at the peasants' expense. Perhaps he was more consistent than the opposition, in this respect at least, since he realized that the *kulaks* were needed for this very purpose, as it was easier to tax them than the poorer peasants. Preobrazhenski, by contrast, was associated politically with those who were strongly anti-*kulak*.

STALIN'S actual policy after 1928 could be presented as a rather drastic form of "primitive socialist accumulation," as if he had taken over the opposition's policy after its political defeat. Stalin then appears as expressing the dictates of "necessity." It does seem desirable to question the validity of this approach. Stalin's policy, especially its pace and violence, was quite foreign to Bukharin, but was also totally different to that advocated earlier by Preobrazhenski. It is true that, following Lenin, they all saw virtues in the expansion of rural cooperation, but there is no suggestion of collectivization by compulsion. Preobrazhenski advocated a price and tax policy which would facilitate an increase in the rate of accumulation, but he repeatedly asserted that the burden on the peasants should increase by no less than the increase in their incomes. Nothing in his book or articles would support the view that he intended to base himself on administrative coercion, and therefore, writing in 1926, he assumed that it was "self-evident that for Russia the entire process would be long, incredibly slow." He by no means excluded foreign aid, preferring long term credits rather than concessions, although of course he was aware of the difficulties in going far along this road.[7] Is it not arguable that the measures taken by Stalin were different in kind?

It seems very doubtful, therefore, if Stalin's policy of 1928 bore more than a superficial resemblance to that advocated earlier by the opposition. The question remains whether Preobrazhenski's ideas were practicable without Stalinist coercion. The possibility of squeezing an individual peasantry should not be underrated. It has been done elsewhere. Japan's primary accumulation was based on extremely heavy burdens on the peasants, bud did not involve their expropriation. Soviet experience is inconclusive. Obviously, the efforts made under war communism to seize produce without payment proved nothing. Nor can one make far-reaching deductions from the

[5] N. Preobrazhenski was the leading economist of the Left wing of the party which bitterly opposed Bukharin's compromise with the individualist peasantry and advocated relatively rapid progress toward modernization of the Soviet economy, in spite of the high social cost involved. Preobrazhenski proposed a system of compulsory saving—or "primitive socialist accumulation," as he termed it—which was to be effected by state monopoly of foreign trade and price manipulation in the domestic market; the first instrument was to secure a high priority for capital goods in Russian imports, and the second, by keeping the prices of industrial products relatively high and the prices of foodstuffs relatively low, was expected to contain the pressure of the consumers' demand.—Ed.

[6] *Novaia ekonomika*, p. 211. Mr. Carr (p. 209) speaks of Bukharin "refuting" Preobrazhenski. Presumably he does not mean refuting by logical argument.

[7] Whether foreign loans were a possible solution is another open question. There was an understandable reluctance on the part of foreign countries to lend to a Bolshevik government, but the question remains worth asking, since there are many underdeveloped countries today without such government and with a need for capital. There is unfortunately not the space to pursue further this complex and interesting problem.

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peasants' refusal to supply grain at unfavorable prices in 1925 and again in 1927-28. These instances merely serve to demonstrate that peasants will seek to avoid selling at an artificially low price.

Mr. Carr, in describing the events of 1925, says that the peasants were successfully "holding the cities to ransom" (p. 193), but surely this is an unreasonable formulation. If individual producers exist, then the laws of the market operate. Arbitrary interference with these laws leads to consequences which should be familiar and which are common to the experience of many countries. Preobrazhenski's policy was consistent with the use of the market mechanism to squeeze the peasants. Under the circumstances the most effective way to ensure a peasant contribution to the accumulation fund would be through taxes (either direct or on goods used by the peasants), rather than futile attempts to decree artificially low prices for farm products. No serious effort was made along these lines.

Stalin's decisions in 1928-29 appear to represent a qualitatively new and original policy, associated with a tempo of industrialization which was not regarded as possible by the opposition in earlier years. The genesis of these decisions should receive a most careful analysis, but it would be dangerous to assume that the policy was a response to necessity, or that the "necessity" analyzed by Preobrazhenski necessarily led to the policy which Stalin adopted. At this point apologists for Stalin often invoke the threat of foreign invasion. They sometimes overlook the fact that the decisions were taken five years before Hitler came to power in Germany. Of course, Bolshevik economic policy was influenced by their desire to make themselves secure militarily in a hostile capitalist environment, but consciousness of this problem was common to all the leaders, including those who favored a very much less drastic approach to the peasant problem.

These random notes are not, of course, a thorough examination of any of the problems raised. Question marks are implied throughout even where they do not explicitly appear. However, for what they are worth, these are some of the thoughts which came into the mind of one reader of Mr. Carr's latest volume.

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EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to send communications dealing with matters discussed in *Problems of Communism.* Letters should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism,* U.S. Information Agency, 1729 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington 25, D. C.

LENIN AND GERMANY—FURTHER REMARKS

In reply to Mr. Carsten's rejoinder to my letter (*Problems of Communism,* No. 3, Vol VIII), I prepared an answer of 1,800 words. This letter was returned to me with the request to cut it to 600 words. This limitation precludes effective documentation. Hence, I wish to record that Mr. Carsten did not see fit to defend his comparison of Alan Moorehead with the forgers of the Protocals of the Elder Men of Zion, or to apologize for his slander. Mr. Carsten's assertion that Possony is "trying to show that Lenin was a German agent," is untrue.

Lenin was hard up for money between September and the middle of October 1914, moderately hard up between January and August 1915, in some trouble during early December 1915, and in great financial misery between September 1916 and late January 1917. The Bolshevik organization in Stockholm had difficulties from the fall of 1914 to early 1915, fared better during spring and summer, then broke down completely, resumed operations on a large scale during October 1915 and all but went out of business in summer 1916.

The money which Lenin received in the fall of 1914 was not from the German government, nor was the money he received in the summer or early fall of 1915 of German government origin, but German government influences were behind both payments. The German government funneled money into Lenin's organization during October and November 1915, after a short delay resumed payments in December, and continued to pay till the end of June 1916. These ups and downs are clearly reflected in Lenin's letters. These "contributions" were made available through Alexander Keskuela and not, as Mr. Carsten assumes erroneously, through Parvus-Helphand.

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As we learn from a German document, Keskuela, in exchange, transmitted to the Germans "the contents of the situation reports sent to Lenin by Lenin's confidential agents in Russia." Between June 1916 and Lenin's dispatch from Switzerland to Russia (April 1917) the German government made no payments to Lenin. Lenin's financial distress, reflected in Krupskaya's book, was very great between September 1916 and late January 1917, when he received private money from Russia. I leave it to Mr. Carsten to interpret the telling correlation of these dates for himself.

Mr. Carsten reproduces the seven points of Lenin's "peace offer" of September 1915 and asserts that Lenin's conditions were "in flagrant opposition to the policy of the Kaiser's government." He based this evaluation on point 5, which promised a Russian offer of peace "without any consideration for France, but on condition that Germany renounce all annexations and war reparations." Unfortunately, Mr. Carsten did not bother to indicate that his quote was incomplete. Between point 5 and point 6, as a commentary to the "no annexation" clause, the German Minister inserted: "On point 5, Keskuela has observed that this condition does not exclude the possibility of separating those national states from Russia which would serve as buffer states." The establishment of national states" along the western frontiers of the Tsarist empire was, under the name of *Randstaatenpolitik*, the foremost eastern war aim of imperial Germany. Thus, according to Keskuela whose reliability I was able to check in several instances, Lenin assented to the dismemberment of the Russian empire. By implication—"without any consideration for France"—Lenin also agreed to Germany's retention of Alsace-Lorraine. Moreover, he promised to renounce Russian claims to the Straits which also were among Germany's war aims. Lastly, he promised to march into India, that is, to wage war against Britain which at that time was an ally of Russia and was at war with Germany. I can't conceive of many Russian policies which in 1915 would have fitted Germany's foreign policy better. After receipt of Lenin's program, the Wilhelmstrasse budgeted financial support to Lenin and his organization. Obviously, it would have acted differently if it had consulted with Mr. Carsten.

Stefan T. Possony
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Mr. Carsten replies: In spite of the wording of Professor Possony's letter there seems to be agreement between him and me that Lenin was *not* a German agent, and this was the question which I put in my original article. As to his charge that I "did not see fit to defend my comparison of Alan Moorehead with the forgers of the Protocols of the Elder Men of Zion," there was no need to defend it because I never made this comparison. What I wrote was: "we are not too far removed from the *views* of the Wise Men of Zion." I did not accuse Mr. Moorehead of forgery, but asserted that his interpretation of the events leading to the October revolution came close to the historical interpretation underlying the "Protocols": "The October revolution, seen in this way, was a conspiracy instigated by the Kaiser's government, . . . and the leading actors became little chessmen moved about at the master's command." Professor Possony seems to have misunderstood the meaning of my words.

Professor Possony and I further agree that the Bolsheviks received German money and that they were not the only Russian revolutionaries who did so. Naturally, these "contributions" were paid through various agents, whether Parvus or Keskuela, and naturally it is extremely difficult to trace them and the use to which they were put. Professor Possony also claims that "Lenin made available intelligence information and put the Germans on to sabotage experts." To my question what the evidence for this claim was, the reply is a quotation from Mr. Zeman's documents saying that Keskuela "transmitted to us the contents of the situation reports sent to Lenin by Lenin's confidential agents in Russia." But there is a vast difference between the claim and the quotation adduced in proof of it. Clearly, these were reports about the situation in Russia which Lenin received from members of his party: but did they contain "intelligence information," and did he "put the Germans on to sabotage experts"?

With regard to the other document I quoted from Mr. Zeman, Professor Possony maintains that I "did not bother to indicate that the quote was incomplete." But this is not the case because the note of the German Minister to the effect that "Keskuela has observed that this condition does not exclude the possibility of separating those national states from Russia which would serve as buffer states," was an insertion and *did not belong to Lenin's list of conditions.* According to Professor Possony this meant that "Lenin assented to the dismemberment of the Russian empire." But the same applies to his program on national self-determination published many years before: if the Poles, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, *etc.* used their right of self-determination and opted for secession from Russia this meant the dismemberment of the empire. This policy certainly coincided with that of Germany. But Lenin also stipulated "that Germany renounce all annexations and war reparations" and this did *not* coincide with Germany policy. I therefore disagree with Professor Possony that "this program was tailored to suit German desires": anyone who read Lenin's writings would have found the same views expressed there. If Lenin was in receipt of German money—and that seems fairly certain—he seems throughout to have retained his political independence and not to have carried out any German instructions: this was the point which I tried to establish in reviewing Mr. Moorehead's book, and Professor Possony does not seem to deny it.

(This correspondence is now closed—Ed.)

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